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CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS: WHEN 
WORLDS COLLIDE 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON* 
When Ponzi schemes collapse and enter into bankruptcy liquidation, 
bankruptcy trustees assume that conveyances made by the debtor for no 
consideration are fraudulent conveyances.  This Article argues that they are 
not.  Virtually all the assets held by a Ponzi scheme are held in constructive 
trust for the victims of the fraud.  If victims of the fraud can trace the proceeds 
of their investments into property transferred to a third party, the third party 
holds the asset transferred in trust for the relevant victim.  When a bankruptcy 
trustee characterizes the asset as a fraudulently conveyed asset, the trustee 
expropriates the asset from the victim on behalf of the unsecured creditors of 
the Ponzi scheme.  There are only two justifications for this expropriation.  
First, tracing is impossible or too costly.  This claim reduces to the theory that 
a thief should not restore the loot to the victim when it is costly to do so.  Second, 
when the third party points out that the victims (not the bankruptcy trustee) own 
the cause of action for restoration of the loot, the third party is making an 
impermissible ius tertii defense.  Being estopped from this defense, the third 
party must surrender the transferred asset to the bankruptcy trustee.  This 
essentially completes the expropriation of victim property for the benefit of the 
unsecured creditors, who are scarcely entitled to enjoy this stolen property. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Ponzi schemes, an evil mastermind controls constructive trust property 
that belongs to the victims of fraud.  The Supreme Court has implied (and the 
Sixth Circuit has directly ruled) that bankruptcy trustees have no standing to 
collect trust property on behalf of the victims (who properly are not even 
creditors).  Yet bankruptcy courts assume that transfers by the mastermind to 
third parties are fraudulent transfers, in which case bankruptcy trustees do have 
standing.  But they are not fraudulent transfers.  This Article describes why not 
and discusses whether a bankruptcy trustee nevertheless can enjoy standing to 
supervise the liquidation of a Ponzi scheme. 
Fraudsters often end up in jail, and their larceny-riven estates in bankruptcy.  
Very frequently, just before either event, the fraudster usually tries to unload 
the loot—by giving it away to accomplices or by paying creditors, who may or 
may not know they are getting stolen money. 
Are these fraudulent transfers?  I insist they are not.  In a fraudulent transfer, 
a debtor (D) owns the legal and equitable title to some property, real or personal.  
D then conveys the property to some third party (X).  If, at the time, D is 
insolvent and if X has given no value in return, X has a voidable title to the thing 
transferred.  The creditors of D (or D’s bankruptcy trustee) are invited to place 
a judicial lien on X’s thing.  If X has given value in return, the creditors of D 
might still claim that X has received a fraudulent transfer.  If D, by the transfer, 
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intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, then X has but a voidable 
title to the thing transferred—though X is accorded a good faith transferee 
defense where X has given value in return.1 
If, however, X is receiving a property looted from some victim (V), X is not 
receiving D’s property.  X is receiving V’s property.  D’s creditors have no 
cause of action against X. Rather, V does.  And yet, to an extensive degree, 
litigants, courts, and law reviews simply assume that fraudulent transfer law 
has jurisdiction over the case.2 
This Article explores cases in which D unloads pirated booty before 
descending into the black pit of bankruptcy.  In such cases, we may assume that 
we are dealing with a constructive trust.  Prior to the transfer, D had legal title 
to a thing, say a gold brick, and V had equitable title.  When X can prove this, 
X has not received a fraudulent transfer, and the creditors of D have no access 
to X’s legal or equitable title in the brick.  On the other hand, if X is denied the 
right to prove this, X will be stuck with the conclusion that X has received D’s 
property, not V’s property.  Under that assumption, X has received a fraudulent 
transfer, and the creditors have access to X’s gold brick and V has lost her 
equitable title to the brick.  In such a case, the creditors complete the pillaging 
of V that D was unable to complete. 
So far, V is a property owner with a right to possess the gold brick. 
Confusing matters is the fact that (at V’s option) V has a claim against D 
sounding in tortious conversion of V’s property.3  It is usually thought 
(erroneously) that V is thus one of D’s creditors and must share X’s gold brick 
with the other creditors of D.  This is a loss for V.  If V has a constructive trust 
claim, V could have X’s gold brick entirely to herself.  As a creditor with a 
conversion claim, V must share.  Yet V is no creditor where V does not exercise 
this option to seek a money judgment for conversion. 
Constructive trusts and fraudulent transfers occupy entirely different 
worlds.  Courts need to discover which of these worlds they occupy.  The 
dilemma becomes acute in the case of Ponzi schemes.  In such cases, nearly 
everyone is V.  D has an equitable interest in no (or comparatively little) 
property but legal title to the whole.  If X has received a distribution from a 
 
1. David Gray Carlson, Mere Conduit, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 475, 483–85 (2019) [hereinafter 
Carlson, Conduit]. 
2. See Andrew Kull, Common-Law Restitution and the Madoff Liquidation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 939, 
944 (2012) [hereinafter Kull, Madoff] (“Trustees and courts settled on ‘fraudulent transfer’ as the least-
bad fit . . . .”). 
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 222A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Conversion is an 
intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right 
of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the 
chattel.”). 
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Ponzi artist and if X is permitted to point out that X received V’s property (not 
D’s property), then D’s creditors (and their representative, the bankruptcy 
trustee) have no fraudulent transfer theory against X.  X walks away scot-free 
from bankruptcy litigation.  X is still liable to V for converting V’s property.  
But V may not be sufficiently organized to pursue X.  In that case, X (D’s bad 
faith coconspirator) enjoys the avails of D’s fraudulent scheme.  Neither V nor 
C get anything.  X walks away with the gold brick. 
Cannot the bankruptcy trustee declare herself to be a representative of V, 
empowering the trustee to recover for the benefit of V from X?  The Supreme 
Court and the Sixth Circuit have implied that the answer is no.4  Therefore, if 
bankruptcy courts are to keep jurisdiction over Ponzi liquidations, some 
account must be given as to how X has received a fraudulent transfer when D 
was never the equitable owner of the property conveyed. 
Two doctrines come to the rescue of bankruptcy trustees seeking to recover 
Ponzi distributions.  First, if V cannot trace the property V conveyed to D into 
the hands of X, V’s constructive trust theory fails.  Then we must admit that D 
did have equitable title to the property conveyed to X.  Failure of tracing 
suggests D has successfully stolen V’s equitable interest by commingling it with 
D’s other things.  In that case, (if X is not a good faith transferee for value) D’s 
bankruptcy trustee has a fraudulent conveyance theory against X.  But there is 
something ethically wrong with the easy claim by D’s bankruptcy trustee that 
tracing is impossible, in this age where computers can generate “waterfall” 
analyses in seconds.5  When a trustee pleads that tracing is impossible or too 
costly, the trustee asks the court to complete the theft from V that D only 
commenced.  The direct beneficiaries of tracing inconvenience are the clients 
of the bankruptcy trustee—the unsecured creditors of D. 
Alternatively, suppose tracing is conceptually possible.  Then perhaps the 
trustee can invoke the ancient doctrine of ius tertii—the idea that estops X from 
claiming that a third party not before the court has better title to the thing 
transferred than do the creditors of D.  If ius tertii silences X, then the trustee 
can proceed as if D had both legal and equitable title to the thing transferred. 
But if we apply the ius tertii rule in this way, the bankruptcy, in effect, 
completes the theft from V that D failed to consummate.6  The claim of ius tertii 
has a dicey ethical component to it, which this Article shall explore.  Ius tertii 
 
4. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 417 (1972); Stevenson 
v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838, 855–56 (6th Cir. 2002). 
5. See In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 219–22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
6. Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 265, 276 (1998) [hereinafter Kull, Bankruptcy] (explaining that the refusal to recognize 
constructive trusts “makes bankruptcy an instrument of confiscation”). 
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is also obviously in tension with the principle that the trustee has no standing 
to assert the equitable property interests of third party property owners in 
litigation against X. 
Before we can proceed, we need a very precise definition of constructive 
trust and how the concept of constructive trust relates to the rawer, cruder 
notion of stolen or embezzled funds.  Part I provides this definitional work. 
Courts suspect (wrongly) that constructive trust law violates the federal 
bankruptcy policy of equality between creditors.  Accordingly, the law of 
constructive trust in bankruptcy turns out to be problematic.  In three federal 
circuits, there are danger signs that the state law of constructive trust will be 
preempted by contrary bankruptcy notions of creditor equality.  If constructive 
trusts violate federal bankruptcy policy, then the worlds of constructive trust 
and fraudulent transfer do not collide for the simple reason that there is only 
one world—the world of fraudulent transfer.  Therefore, this Article surveys 
the authority for the proposition that constructive trusts are not permitted in 
bankruptcy cases. 
A short Part II defines precisely what a fraudulent transfer is, with an eye 
toward distinguishing a fraudulent transfer from D’s conveyance of 
constructive trust property.  The distinction will be: Does D own the equitable 
interest in the transferred thing?  If so, we are in the world of fraudulent transfer.  
Does V own the equitable interest in the thing transferred?  If so, we inhabit the 
world of constructive trust. 
Part III attends the boisterous ruin when the world of fraudulent transfer 
collides with the world of constructive trust.  In a great many cases, especially 
Ponzi cases, the bankruptcy trustee pleads fraudulent transfer when in fact D 
never owned equitable title to the property conveyed to X.  Courts are often 
flummoxed when worlds collide.  In the end, the trustee’s fraudulent transfer 
theory depends on the dubious ethics of denying V access to tracing fictions or 
silencing X on ius tertii grounds.  In both cases, the trustee is shown to be a 
more effective thief than D ever was. 
II. WHAT IS A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST? 
Andrew Kull, reporter for the elegant Restatement (Third) of Restitution & 
Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE)7, laments the sad state of restitutionary 
knowledge in the modern age: 
Issues of restitution thus pervade the commercial law without 
being the focus of any imaginable law practice.  Most law 
schools gave up teaching restitution a generation ago, and 
 
7. See Andrew Kull, Three Restatements of Restitution, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 867, 867 
(2011). 
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many judges and practitioners are not familiar with its general 
principles.  Lack of familiarity with the restitutionary elements 
of the background rules results in a predictable distortion of 
commercial law.8 
In light of this sad estimate, I begin with a thorough review of the 
constructive trust as a concept, and how it fares in the bankruptcy courts.  It has 
been twenty years since such a review was conducted, and much water has 
flowed under the bridge of sighs since then, especially in the Sixth Circuit, 
which twenty-five years ago purported to abolish constructive trusts in 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Once this review is completed, a comparison may be 
made between constructive trust and fraudulent transfer theory. 
A. Delivery of Title is Required 
A constructive trust arises from unjust enrichment as a result of a transfer 
from V to F (for “fraudster”), where there is something wrong with the capacity 
of the transferor V.  For example, the transferor is an infant or is mentally 
incompetent.9  Or, most familiarly, the transferor was induced by fraud to part 
with title.10  The defects attendant to the transfer imply that F has enjoyed unjust 
enrichment.11 
It is paramount that, for a constructive trust to arise, a property owner must 
perform the incidents of transfer to a transferee.  In a constructive trust, one 
 
8. Kull, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 267.  Elsewhere, Professor Kull blames the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure: 
The reformers cannot have foreseen . . . the gradual process by which the 
elimination of a separate equity jurisdiction would lead first to the disappearance 
of equity from the law school curriculum, then to an ebb tide in professional 
awareness, as lawyers who had never learned these rules gradually took over from 
those who had. 
Kull, Madoff, supra note 2, at 966; see also Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 
1191, 1195 (1995) [hereinafter Kull, Rationalizing] (“To put it bluntly, American lawyers today 
(judges and law professors included) do not know what restitution is.  The subject is no longer taught 
in law schools . . . .”). 
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 cmt. a, b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011).  “Persons of abnormal status in our law were, originally, lunatics, infants and married 
women.”  1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 103b (rev. ed. 
1940). 
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 13. 
11. Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts In Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 297, 299 
[hereinafter Sherwin, Constructive Trusts] (“Unjust enrichment is a broad concept: it refers to any case 
in which the defendant received a benefit that, for reason of fairness, he should not retain.”). 
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expects to find that V has surrendered title12 to property to F.  Thus, the R3RUE 
states: 
If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to 
identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in 
violation of the claimant’s rights, the defendant may be 
declared a constructive trustee, for the benefit of the claimant, 
of the property in question and its traceable product.13 
In a real estate case, a transfer of title would require the signing and delivery 
of a deed.  In the case of tangible personal property, delivery of the thing is the 
usual formality.14 
In spite of the defect in transferor consent,15 the transferee still gets title.  
That title has transferred is just another way of saying that V has delivered a 
deed in favor of the transferee F, or that delivery of personal property has been 
accomplished with the idea, however flawed, that the transferee F is to have 
title. 
To give a counter-example, a bailor may permit the bailee to have 
possession of a thing, but the bailee has no title.  We would therefore never say 
 
12. Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., v. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc., 961 F.2d 341, 352 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“Under New York law, a party claiming entitlement to a constructive trust must ordinarily 
establish four elements: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise, express or implied; 
(3) a transfer made in reliance on that promise; and (4) unjust enrichment.”).  It is V that must surrender 
title.  In the classic case of Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality Holstein Leasing), F owned an airplane 
as to which a lender (SP) had an unperfected security interest.  752 F.2d 1009, 1010 (5th Cir. 1985).  
The security interest was unperfected because of a fraudulently filed release of a perfected security 
interest.  Id. at 1011.  F gave the plane to D Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary, and D Corp. filed for 
bankruptcy.  Id.  SP claimed that, since F was dishonest, F (who was not bankrupt) retained equitable 
title; D Corp. should be compelled (SP claimed) to give the plane back to F, where SP might enforce 
its security interest, free of D Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee.  Id. at 1011–12.  The constructive trust was 
properly rejected.  Id. at 1015.  SP was a transferee of a security interest on F’s legal and equitable 
title; SP was no transferor to D Corp.  Id. 
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1) (emphasis 
added).  Some authorities hold that “although, under applicable state law, a debtor may not be able to 
obtain title to property which it obtains by fraud, a debtor may nonetheless have an interest in that 
property sufficient under the language of § 548.”  Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of 
Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 162 (1998) (citing Jobin v. Lalan (In 
re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 160 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993), aff’d, 167 B.R. 219 (D. Colo. 
1994).  In fact, legal title follows the deed.   Thus, in a constructive trust, F has a voidable title to the 
res of the trust.  Whether this suffices as sufficient under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a) will be considered 
in due course. 
14. Robert Stevens, When and Why Does Unjustified Enrichment Justify the Recognition of 
Proprietary Rights?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 919, 926 (2012). 
15. See Daniel Friedmann, Does the Dead Contract Rule Restitution From Its Grave?, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 811, 811 (2012) (“defect in the will”). 
 
CARLSON_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:45 PM 
372 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:365 
that the bailee holds the thing in constructive trust.  The bailor never, even 
defectively, intended to convey title.16 
In a constructive trust, the title that F has is voidable.17  That means that the 
transferor V may rescind the deed and compel the transferee to re-convey title.18  
Or, alternatively, if the transferee F is not of a mood to obey court orders, V 
may have a court declare that the transferor is the owner of title.19 
Alternatively, V may recover a money judgment for conversion.20  But by 
taking that route, V debases herself and becomes a mere general creditor of F.  
If V opts for conversion, V affirms that F is the title owner of the item stolen 
and that F must pay the price.  Thus, conversion depends upon V’s admission 
that V has no property interest in the disputed chattel.21  Conversion puts an end 
to constructive trust theory. 
B. Voidable, Not Void 
A constructive trust arises from a transfer under conditions of unjust 
enrichment.  But V is not required to rescind.22  Title is voidable, not void.  For 
example, suppose an infant conveys Blackacre to D, and D pays for title.  The 
guardian in charge of the infant’s estate may conclude that the infant shrewdly 
obtained a good price and that rescission is not prudent.23  In contrast to the 
guardian (who chooses not to rescind), D (the transferee) has no right to 
rescind.24  D had capacity to receive title even though the infant lacked capacity 
to give it (in anything but a voidable way).  Title then stays with D (so long as 
 
16. Stevens, supra note 14, at 926.  If bailment is coupled with authority to sell, and if the sale 
occurs, it has been said that the seller holds the proceeds in constructive trust.  See In re Mississippi 
Valley Livestock, 745 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 2014).  This is more appropriately called a resulting 
trust, as “constructive trust” connotes wrongdoing.  On resulting trusts, see infra text accompanying 
note100. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 22–25. 
18. Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918–1919 Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 421 
(1918) (“As the chancellor acted in personam, one of the most effective remedial expedients at his 
command was to treat a defendant as if he were a trustee and put pressure upon his person to compel 
him to act accordingly.”). 
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 70(a) provides for this, in the case of federal litigation. 
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 60(3) (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
21. Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 182 N.E. 235, 236 (1932); Cooper v. Shepherd (1846) 136 Eng. Rep. 107, 
109; 3 C.B. 265, 269. 
22. United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010, 1020 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that constructive trusts 
are “imposed, at the election of an aggrieved party”). 
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 cmt. e; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 cmt. d. 
 
CARLSON_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:45 PM 
2019] CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 373 
the guardian chooses not to rescind).  The relation between the guardian and D 
is an asymmetric one. 
That the transfer is merely voidable, not void, has its effect when a third 
party X wants to claim that X has not received a fraudulent conveyance from D 
because D had only legal title and because V is the equitable owner of the 
conveyed property.25  Voidability (as opposed to voidness) gives rise to the ius 
tertii principle that usually will be decisive in Ponzi scheme cases. 
C. Stolen Property Compared 
A different situation exists with regard to stolen property.  A thief is said to 
have “no title” to the property stolen.  Suppose the thief sells to a good faith 
purchaser, B.  Since the thief has no title to give, B obtains no title.26  On the 
other hand, suppose B pays cash to the thief.  Through the magic of ratification, 
V has the option to change the thief into a faithful agent.27  As faithful agent in 
possession of V’s funds, the erstwhile thief buys a thing on behalf of V.28  The 
thief then takes possession of the purchased thing in constructive trust for V.  
This is how proceeds theory works.  Via ratification, the thief’s wrongful act 
becomes a rightful act.  Ratification (not theft) is the moment when legal and 
equitable title split themselves in twain.29  Thus, stolen goods are not held in 
constructive trust, but the consequences of the theft (at the option of the victim) 
might become trust property. 
 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 396–421. 
26. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
27. Ratification, so far as I know, is my own contribution to the law of restitution.  In an 
otherwise astute article, Professor James Steven Rogers writes of Scalawag, who steals a car from Fred.  
Scalawag then swaps the car for a tractor. 
The tractor never belonged to Fred, so Fred has no special rights to the tractor as 
a matter of simple property law.  Under the law of restitution, however, Fred can 
obtain a declaration that Scalawag holds the tractor in constructive trust for 
Fred . . . .  The Restatement states this principle without qualification: “A 
claimant entitled to restitution from property may obtain restitution from any 
traceable product of that property, without regard to subsequent changes of form.”  
Although this may seem like a simple proposition, it is, in fact, virtually 
impossible to come up with a coherent explanation for the result that Fred gets 
the tractor. 
James Steven Rogers, Indeterminacy and the Law of Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1377, 1399 
(2011) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58(1)).  In fact, 
ratification does the trick.  The theft was actually (after the fact) made into a consensual transfer to a 
trustee who faithfully swapped the car for the tractor. 
28. Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. George I. Fox, Inc., 156 N.E. 670, 671 (N.Y. 1927). 
29. Am. Sugar-Ref. Co. v. Fancher, 40 N.E. 206, 207–08 (N.Y. 1895). 
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D. Constructive Trusts Pre-exist Their Judicial Declaration 
Courts repeat the adage that constructive trust is just a remedy.  Such a 
claim is misleading.30  It yields the misimpression that, until a constructive trust 
is declared, it does not exist.  Such an assumption guarantees that, in most cases, 
constructive trusts are void in bankruptcy. 
As Professor Stevens has put it: 
Unfortunately, describing the constructive trust as remedial 
can also lead to confusion.  It can make it appear that there is 
no trust at all before the court order and that the judge is 
creating property rights out of thin air where none existed 
before.  Where the defendant is in bankruptcy proceedings, for 
example, allowing the judge to create rights that will afford the 
plaintiff priority when the plaintiff had no such entitlement 
beforehand is profoundly wrong. . . .  Claims for remedial 
constructive trusts in this sense profoundly offend bankruptcy 
policy and are rightfully struck down both in England and the 
United States. . . .  [H]owever, the Restatement (Third) does 
not employ “remedy” in this strong sense.  The rights to 
rescind . . . do not offend bankruptcy policy because they are 
not remedial in this strong sense.  They simply reflect the rights 
that existed before the court order.  It is the law that creates the 
trust, not any choice of the judge.31 
In fact, a constructive trust has two elements to it.  As the R3RUE 
emphasizes, one element is implication of a remedy.32  A constructive trust is 
not itself, strictly speaking, a remedy.33  The constructive trust invokes remedies 
supplied from other sources.34  In real estate cases, the remedy is ejectment or 
declaratory relief or perhaps an injunction to deliver legal title to V.  In the case 
of personal property, the remedy is replevin. 
 
30. Kull, Rationalizing, supra note 8, at 1222–23. 
31. Stevens, supra note 14, at 934–35 (footnotes omitted).  
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b. 
33. But see XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1449 (6th Cir. 
1994) (“A constructive trust is a legal fiction, a common-law remedy in equity that may only exist by 
the grace of judicial action.”). 
34. Kull, Rationalizing, supra note 8, at 1194 (“The restoration remedies (replevin, ejectment, 
and so forth) operate without regard to the defendant’s enrichment.”). 
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The second element is pre-existing reality.35  Constructive trust reports a 
pre-existing state of affairs.36  The pre-existing state of affairs goes by the name 
of unjust enrichment.  The remedy follows from the state of the world where 
the transferor V is already entitled to repossess from F.  This is an example 
(pervasive in law) of the future anterior tense37—the property will have 
belonged to V, once the court is induced to ponder the matter. 
Ignoring this second aspect gives rise to the accusation that a constructive 
trust does not exist until a court declares it so.  On this view, V has no interest 
in Blackacre upon executing the deed, but she has a right to rescind.  If the court 
acts to vindicate this right, she is (for the first time) the equitable owner of 
Blackacre and becomes the legal owner when the transferee, under constraint 
of specific performance, actually executes the deed back. 
But this is a false view.  To illustrate why, let us consider the ancient case 
of Taylor v. Plumer,38 where V entrusted funds to F.  F embezzled the funds 
and bought some stock certificates and gold.  V’s agent violently grabbed the 
stock and gold just before F was about to flee the country.  F was later forced 
into bankruptcy.  The bankruptcy “assignees” sued V in trover (i.e. the tort of 
conversion).  V prevailed.  Therefore, V’s equitable interest in the stock and 
coins must have pre-existed a judicial declaration of the constructive trust.39 
This result had nothing to do with F’s bankruptcy proceeding.  Suppose F 
was not bankrupt and brought a trover action against V.  F must show a right to 
possess that is good against V.  But this is precisely what F cannot show.  F had 
a duty to tender possession of the stock and coins to V.40  No court would order 
 
35. City Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Gen. Coffee Corp. (In re Gen. Coffee Corp.), 828 F.2d 699, 702 
(11th Cir. 1987) (“[A] constructive trust arises when the facts giving rise to the fraud occur.”). 
36. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts, supra note 11, at 312 (“In the [First] Restatement’s view, the 
plaintiff is the equitable owner of the property from the time of the unjust enrichment.  Therefore, when 
the court grants a constructive trust decree, it is merely enforcing a preexisting property right, rather 
than establishing priority between the claimant and other creditors.”). 
37. David Gray Carlson, The Traumatic Dimension in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2287, 2287 
(2003). 
38. (1815) 105 Eng. Rep. 721; 3 M & S 562. 
39. In the film noir PITFALL (Regal Films 1948), Byron Barr embezzles funds from his employer 
and buys gifts for his fiancée Lizabeth Scott.  He is arrested and imprisoned.  Dick Powell, in a great 
looking fedora, pays off an insurance bond and (being subrogated to the employer’s rights against Barr) 
simply takes Scott’s gifts.  No court had declared that Scott held the gifts in constructive trust.  Thus, 
Hollywood believes a constructive trust justifies self-help. 
40. Suttles v. Vogel, 533 N.E.2d 901, 904 (Ill. 1988) (“The sole duty of the constructive trustee 
is to transfer title and possession of the wrongfully acquired property to the beneficiary.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) 
(“The obligation of a constructive trustee is to surrender the constructive trust property to the claimant, 
on such conditions as the court may direct.”). 
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V to pay F where V’s right of possession is better than that of F.  Ergo, V’s right 
of possession precedes any declaration of a constructive trust.  A constructive 
trust implies V’s right to self-help, just as any presently possessory property 
right does.  Title, under the circumstances, is just an airy abstraction (which 
nevertheless signifies a power to give perfect title to a bona fide purchaser for 
value).41  The right of possession is with V. 
Here is a further test to prove that V has property in the absence of a court 
declaration.  Suppose V conveys Blackacre to F in a rescindable conveyance.  
F conveys to B, a bad faith purchaser, for value.  B inherits F’s duty to convey 
the land back to V.42  This proves V had the equitable interest in Blackacre as 
soon as V conveyed title to F.  If, at the time of the F-B transaction, F had no 
interest in Blackacre because no court has yet imposed the constructive trust, 
then B buys both legal and equitable title from F, and B has no duty to convey 
to V.  But clearly B does have that duty, because B has only obtained what F 
had—a legal title held for the benefit of V.43 
The idea that B inherits the duty to convey title back to V proves that a 
constructive trust pre-exists its declaration.  No other concept but V’s pre-
existing equitable ownership explains why B has a duty to convey to V when V 
was induced to convey to F. 
It is sometimes said that “constructive trust” is a label, not an argument.44  
If such statements are simply reminders that unjust enrichment is the source of 
constructive trust—that a constructive trust is not self-grounding—I have no 
objection.  But if such statements signify that constructive trusts do not precede 
their judicial declaration, I deny that constructive trust is just a label.  Unjust 
enrichment has, under well-recognized conditions, property consequences that 
arise as soon as the unjust enrichment arises.  The fact that, après la lettre, a 
court recognizes property consequences makes constructive trusts no different 
from any other property concept. 
 
41. On the other hand, if F files for bankruptcy, the automatic stay from F’s bankruptcy petition 
would prevent V from exercising self-help.  Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Sigma Serv. Corp., 712 F.2d 962, 
967–68 (5th Cir. 1983); see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
42. This has been called the “transitive feature” of restitution. Kull, Madoff, supra note 2, at 946.  
43. Professor Robert Stevens views the matter differently.  V does not have an equitable interest 
in Blackacre.  V has an interest in F’s interest in Blackacre, which, in F, is a unified interest.  Stevens, 
supra note 14, at 923.  This view is based upon V’s incapacity to exclude trespassers, id. at 922, a 
proposition which I doubt. 
44. Emily Sherwin, Why In re Omegas Group Was Right: An Essay on the Legal Status of 
Equitable Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (2012) [hereinafter Sherwin, Omegas] (“If, as the 
Restatement (Third) assumes, a constructive trust is a vehicle for prevention of unjust enrichment, 
equitable title should be a conclusion rather than a premise of the decision to impose a trust.”). 
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Does fee simple absolute pre-exist the judicial declaration of it in 
subsequent litigation?  I doubt it.  An owner (O) may be confident that she owns 
Blackacre in fee simple absolute, but this is always contestable, and a court may 
decide that O is not the owner after all.  If I am right, then constructive trust 
precedes a court’s declaration in precisely the same way that legal title to land 
pre-exists a judicial declaration of it.  Nothing in law is final until the Supreme 
Court says it is, and even then, some subsequent Supreme Court may say 
otherwise.  Restitutionary claims are therefore not different from any legal 
claim to property.  Either both or neither pre-exist judicial recognition. 
E. Bona Fide Purchasers 
Beneficial interests in constructive trusts share most features with other 
equitable interests.  In general, when legal and equitable title are cleft in twain, 
so that F has legal title and V has equitable title, F has a power (in the 
Hohfeldian sense)45 over V’s equitable property interest.  By that I mean F has 
the ability to transform the legal “present,” in which V has a right of possession.   
D has power to make a bona fide purchaser for value the “present” rightful 
possessor.  “In effect, the constructive trust claim is cut off because the bona 
fide purchaser has not been unjustly enriched.”46 
Significantly, unsecured creditors of F can obtain judicial liens on F’s legal 
title, but these lien creditors are not purchasers.47  “Purchase” implies that F 
(the holder of legal title) has made a voluntary conveyance.48  A creditor obtains 
a property interest in the debtor’s property as a (remote) consequence of 
obtaining a money judgment.49  But creation of a judicial lien, though a 
 
45. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24 (1913). 
46. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts, supra note 11, at 306 n.41. 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 60(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
48. 11 U.S.C. § 101(43) (2012) (“The term ‘purchaser’ means transferee of a voluntary 
transfer . . . .”); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 290(2) (Consol. 2019) (“The term ‘purchaser’ includes every 
person to whom any estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable consideration, and 
every assignee of a mortgage, lease or other conditional estate.); U.C.C. § 1-201(29) (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (“‘Purchase’ means taking by sale . . . or any other voluntary transaction 
creating an interest in property.”). 
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 60(1) cmt. b (“As a 
formal matter, the judicial lien creditor is not a purchaser because the judicial lien is the result of an 
involuntary transaction.”). 
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transfer,50 is not a purchase.  Judicial liens arise by operation of law, over the 
opposition of D.  Typically, D does not voluntarily convey a judicial lien.51 
F. Creditor or Property Owner? 
Suppose D defrauds V out of title to a gold brick.  If no constructive trust is 
ever declared, the creditors of D are the winners.  The increased size of D’s 
estate means that D’s unsecured creditors are more likely to collect.  But if V 
makes a claim to the gold brick, the creditors are back where they started before 
D defrauded V. 
Two contradictory normative instincts inhabit the field.  First, there is the 
notion that F’s creditors should not benefit from F’s thefts.52  Second, there is 
the notion that V is a creditor like any other.53  Why should this creditor (V) be 
preferred over the other creditors, who may well be victims of F’s other tortious 
acts?54 
But is it even true that V is a “creditor”?  Properly the answer is no,55 if a 
deep inquiry is made into what a creditor is.  On this score, we must consult the 
common law notion and also the definition that the Bankruptcy Code directly 
supplies.56 
 
50. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(A) (defining “transfer” to include “the creation of a lien”). 
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 60(1) cmt. b.  Cognovit 
judgments are perhaps an exception. 
52. Austin W. Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money, 27 
HARV. L. REV. 125, 128 (1913) (“The creditors of the wrongdoer . . . should not stand in a better 
position than their debtor; they should not be allowed to profit by his wrongful act.”).  According to 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. d: 
Even if A’s suit for restitution is formally asserted against B as defendant, A’s 
implicit claim—to justify in equitable terms the remedy of constructive trust—is 
that B’s unsecured creditor C will be unjustly enriched, at A’s expense, if B’s 
debt to C is satisfied from assets that B obtained from A by fraud.  The intuitive 
objection is that a debtor should not be allowed to rob Peter to pay Paul. 
53. Scott, supra note 52, at 128.  
54. Anthony Duggan, Proprietary Remedies in Insolvency: A Comparison of the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment with English and Commonwealth Law, 68 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1229, 1237 (2011). 
55. Accord Lionel Smith, Equity is Not a Single Thing, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE LAW OF EQUITY (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet, & Henry E. Smith eds., forthcoming 2020) 
[hereinafter Smith, Equity], https://ssrn.com/abstract=3376874 [https://perma.cc/8HLF-CXAL]; 
LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 307 (1997) [hereinafter SMITH, Tracing]. 
56. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2012). 
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According to the common law notion, a creditor is a person who, when 
tendered legal currency, is obliged to take it in satisfaction of an underlying 
obligation.57 
A creditor can also be defined as a person who is entitled to get a money 
judgment against the debtor.  This is sometimes referred to as having “recourse” 
against the debtor personally.58 
A creditor can also simultaneously be a property owner, as where a creditor 
has a security interest in some or all of a debtor’s property.59 
A secured creditor can be of a nonrecourse variety.  Outside of bankruptcy, 
nonrecourse creditors are not considered creditors for the purpose of state 
fraudulent transfer law.60  The Bankruptcy Code, however, has a rather different 
definition of “creditor.”  Under § 101(10), “creditor” means an “entity that has 
a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief 
concerning the debtor.”  “Claim” is defined in § 101(5) to include the: 
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if 
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not 
such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
secured, or unsecured.61 
As a rule of construction, § 102(2) adds, “‘claim against the debtor’ 
includes claim against property of the debtor.” 
In Johnson v. Home State Bank,62 D granted a lender (SP) a mortgage on 
his farm.  D filed for bankruptcy in chapter 7 where D received a discharge of 
all in personam liability to SP.  SP was therefore a nonrecourse creditor.  After 
the chapter 7 case ended, SP recommenced foreclosure proceedings.  D 
responded with a chapter 13 case.  D filed a plan in which SP would be paid 
over the life of the plan, with a big balloon payment at the end.  SP argued that 
SP was not a creditor, and its nonrecourse mortgage was not a “claim.”  The 
Supreme Court ruled that nonrecourse mortgages are indeed claims 
under § 101(5)(A): 
[W]e have no trouble concluding that a mortgage interest that 
 
57. Smith, Equity, supra note 55, at 13–14. 
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A). 
59. See infra text accompanying notes 65–66. 
60. Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 973 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1992). 
61. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). 
62. 501 U.S. 78, 80–82 (1991). 
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survives the discharge of a debtor’s personal liability is a 
“claim” within the terms of § 101(5).  Even after the debtor’s 
personal obligations have been extinguished, the mortgage 
holder still retains a “right to payment” in the form of its right 
to the proceeds from the sale of the debtor’s property.  
Alternatively, the creditor’s surviving right to foreclose on the 
mortgage can be viewed as a “right to an equitable remedy” for 
the debtor’s default on the underlying obligation.  Either way, 
there can be no doubt that the surviving mortgage interest 
corresponds to an “enforceable obligation” of the debtor.63 
Thus, nonrecourse secured creditors are “creditors” in bankruptcy, even 
though they can claim only designated collateral and cannot otherwise share in 
the bankruptcy estate.64 
As property owners, secured creditors are entitled to their collateral under 
Bankruptcy Code § 725.65  But, as is well known, a bankruptcy trustee may use, 
sell, or lease a secured creditor’s collateral if the trustee proffers adequate 
protection of the collateral’s value.66  Key to this vision is the fact that the 
collateral is property of the bankruptcy estate.  For instance, suppose D grants 
a valid perfected security interest in a truck and then files for bankruptcy.  The 
entire truck rides into the bankruptcy estate under § 541(a)(1).  The trustee may 
use, sell, or lease the truck consistent with the terms of § 363. 
A constructive trust is different from a secured claim.  V’s right is to get the 
property back.  D has no right of redemption, as is true of secured creditors.67  
Nor is V’s equitable interest “property of the estate.”  The encumbered truck, in 
its entirety, is property of the estate, and for that reason it could be used, sold, 
or leased by the bankruptcy trustee.  An equitable interest in any sort of trust 
property never enters the bankruptcy estate.68  According to § 541(a)(1), only 
D’s legal title enters the estate.  V’s equitable title is outside the estate.  Granted, 
the automatic stay that is engendered by a bankruptcy petition prevents V from 
retaking D’s legal title,69 but the trustee’s ability to use, sell, or lease is entirely 
 
63. Id. at 84. 
64. In chapter 11 cases, nonrecourse secured creditors are given recourse.  
11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A). 
65. 11 U.S.C. § 725. 
66. Id. § 363(e). 
67. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1341 (Consol. 2019); U.C.C. § 9-623 (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
68. There is an alarming exception for cash.  See infra text accompanying 135–138. 
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  Even stolen things in D’s possession are protected by the automatic 
stay.  48th St. Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Grp., Inc. (In re 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc.), 835 F.2d 427, 
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different from the case of the truck.  In the case of D’s voidable title, the trustee 
can only use, sell, or lease the legal title, which is useless, worthless, and not 
worth renting.  The equity is outside the bankruptcy estate. 
A point that challenges that above conclusion is the existence of the tort of 
conversion.  Does not V have an in personam cause of action when D possesses 
constructive trust property?70  This is clearly an option for V, when D has 
substantially interfered with V’s right of possession.  But D cannot “buy” the 
stolen property by tendering the value of the property stolen.  That is, D cannot 
redeem stolen property.  The absence of an equity of redemption proves that V 
is not a creditor. 
In support of this concept is a fundamental truth of conversion.  The tort is 
a forced sale: if V obtains a tort judgment, V affirms D has both legal and 
equitable title.  V thus ceases to be a property owner when the conversion theory 
is pressed to its conclusion.  So long as V retains a property right against the 
stolen item, V is not a creditor.  Properly, V is a property owner with the power 
to “put” the trust property to D in exchange for an obligatory price.  Until the 
put option is exercised, V is no creditor. 
One may say that the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “creditor” and 
“claim” that it serves two purposes.  First, if V is a creditor, then V is entitled to 
a share of the bankruptcy estate.71  But V does not seek a share of D’s property.  
V seeks to repossess the whole of V’s own property.  Second, if V is a creditor 
then D is potentially eligible to have the claim discharged.72  This would never 
be relevant to V’s property right.  Discharge concerns in personam liability.  
Discharge cannot sanctify the theft of V’s property that D’s wrongful 
prepetition activity only commenced. 
Accordingly, V is no creditor, and the constructive trust is not the preference 
of one “creditor” over the others.73 
 
430 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Indeed, a mere possessory interest in real property, without any accompanying 
legal interest, is sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay.”). 
70. See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The limited partners were tort 
creditors of the corporations from which they had been inveigled into buying limited-partner 
interests . . . .”); Steven Walt & Emily L. Sherwin, Contribution Arguments in Commercial Law, 42 
EMORY L.J. 897, 905 (1993) (assuming cestuis que trust are creditors). 
71. Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re Ground Round, Inc.), 482 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
72. Id. 
73 Douglas J. Whaley, The Dangerous Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 82 TEX. L. REV. 73, 112 
(2003) (V not a creditor for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 544(b)(1)). 
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G. Other Equitable Interests Compared 
Is a constructive trust a trust?74  The word “constructive” confesses doubt.  
“Constructive” is an adjective that means, in legal contexts, “it’s a lie, but let’s 
pretend it is true.”75  Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the 
term: 
A trust . . . when not qualified by the word “charitable,” 
“resulting” or “constructive,” is a fiduciary relationship with 
respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to 
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property 
for the benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a 
manifestation of an intention to create it.76 
The emphasis of the above definition dabbles in ontogeny.  A proper trust 
is intentionally created.  A constructive trust arises by operation of law.  But 
origins be hanged!  The salient fact is that both versions of the trust split legal 
from equitable title.  Each implies fiduciary duties on the person who holds 
legal title.  Thus, some courts are willing to say constructive trusts are trusts.77  
Indeed they are, if we disinterest ourselves in origin and focus on one aspect of 
the substance—the fact that legal and equitable title are split between two 
persons.78 
An express trust and a constructive trust are not the only ways that the law 
splits legal and equitable title.  In the bankruptcy cases we shall soon visit, 
constructive trusts are suspect.  Other splits between legal and equitable title 
are not suspect.  So when courts make category errors, taking some other kind 
of equitable title to be a constructive trust interest, the equitable title of V is at 
risk.  Here are a series of ideas that split legal and equitable title and yet, are 
not constructive trusts. 
 
74. XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1449 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“A constructive trust is not really a trust.”). 
75. Stevens, supra note 14, at 936 (“‘[C]onstructive’ may be thought to mean ‘constructed’ (i.e. 
made up) . . . .”). 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (emphasis added). 
77. City Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Gen. Coffee Corp. (In re Gen. Coffee Corp.), 828 F.2d 699, 706 
(11th Cir. 1987) (“A constructive trust . . . is a trust relationship . . . .”).  Cf. Strom v. Goldman, Sachs 
& Co., 202 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[C]onstructive ‘trusts’ . . . ’are not really trusts . . . .’”). 
78. Stevens, supra note 14, at 937 (“We need a label to describe those trusts that arise other than 
by virtue of having been intentionally created, and ‘constructive trusts’ is as good a label to capture 
this idea as any.”).  One must account for this difference.  In an express trust, the trustee does not 
necessarily have the duty to convey legal title directly to the beneficiary.  In a constructive trust, this 
duty is immediate and omnipresent.  Sherwin, Constructive Trusts, supra note 11, at 301 (“A 
constructive trust is merely a means by which the court can say that the defendant must relinquish to 
the plaintiff property that represents an unjust enrichment.”). 
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1. Equitable Lien 
Closely related to the constructive trust is the equitable lien.79  The equitable 
lien splits legal and equitable title as well—with this difference.  A constructive 
trust implies V is entitled to possession.  An equitable lien does not imply a 
right of possession.  Rather, the lien constitutes a power to sell F’s right of 
possession in order to pay a debt to V.80  When we have an equitable lien before 
us, we must admit that V is a secured creditor. 
V is usually invited to choose an equitable lien over a constructive trust.  
This might occur where the value embezzled exceeds the total value of the 
identifiable property, in which case V might prefer to have an unsecured claim 
for the deficit.81 
An equitable lien might displace a constructive trust82 (to the consternation 
of V) if the recovery of a monetary amount (as opposed to a possessory right) 
protects an innocent recipient.83  The classic case is when F spends trust money 
improving X’s land, where X is not a purchaser for value of the trust money.  In 
such a case, a court might deny to V a possessory right and may limit V to a lien 
on the improved real estate to recover the amount of the trust money.   
“Equitable lien” may also displace a constructive trust if a constructive trust 
awards profits to the plaintiff—e.g., when F embezzles a dollar and buys a 
winning lottery ticket.  In such a case, an equitable lien (for a dollar) is 
appropriate if F is insolvent and has creditors.84 
2. Equitable Conversion 
A contract for the sale of real property splits legal and equitable title to the 
affected property.85 
When B and S enter into a contract for the sale of goods, B typically has no 
right to specific performance of the contract.  But when B and S enter into a 
contract for the sale of real property, B always has the right of specific 
 
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011).  Equitable liens have been described as “a special and limited form of a constructive 
trust.”  In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d 651, 658 (Colo. 1986). 
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56(3). 
81. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts, supra note 11, at 302. 
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 50(4). 
83. Id. § 50(3) (“The liability in restitution of an innocent recipient of unrequested benefits may 
not leave the recipient worse off (apart from the cost of litigation) than if the transaction giving rise to 
the liability had not occurred.”). 
84. Id. § 61(a). 
85. See Robert L. Flores, A Comparison of the Rules and Rationales for Allocating Risks Arising 
in Realty Sales Using Executory Contracts and Escrows, 59 MO. L. REV. 307, 319, 345–55 (1994). 
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performance, because real property is considered unique and money damages 
are considered inadequate.  Inadequacy of the legal remedy provokes the equity 
courts to provide an injunctive remedy.  Of course, as a condition to getting the 
injunction, B must perform B’s side of the contract by tendering the purchase 
price to whomsoever has legal title only.  This is called the doctrine of equitable 
conversion—a rather confusing and inadequate name.  The name relates to the 
fact that the real estate contract “converts” S’s legal title into B’s purchase 
price.86  The consequence is a trust relationship, wherein B is the beneficiary.87 
The right to an injunction with regard to property always implies a split 
between legal and equitable title.88  Courts dislike F’s conveying to a male fide 
purchaser (M), thereby defeating the equitable remedy.  Therefore, it is said that 
the eventual right to an injunction implies that B is already the equitable owner 
of the real property.  This explains why B can obtain an injunction against M. 
B, however, must tender to M the purchase price (promised to S) in order to 
obtain the injunction. 
The doctrine of equitable conversion splits legal and equitable title but it is 
not a constructive trust.  In equitable conversion, B has not conveyed legal title 
to S. S had legal title prior to the equitable conversion.  Equitable conversion 
implies that the equitable title is conveyed to B, whereas in a constructive trust, 
V retains the equitable interest and conveys the legal title.  Nor, in the case of 
equitable conversion, does B’s equitable title depend on S’s wrongdoing.  B is 
the equitable owner in cases where S is the punctilio of honor itself. 
Courts err in confusing equitable conversion and constructive trust.  When 
they do so, equitable title is at risk because, to some courts, constructive trusts 
are suspect. 
Equitable conversion arises when the issue is risk of loss.  Suppose there is 
a temporal gap between the real estate sales contract and the delivery of the 
deed by S.  Delivery of the deed would make B both the legal and equitable 
owner, but we presume this has not yet happened.  Suppose some evil is visited 
upon the premises, such as a damaging fire.  Courts have derived a dizzying 
 
86. STEPHEN MARTIN LEAKE, AN ELEMENTARY DIGEST OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND 
306 (1874) (“A contract of sale of which a court of equity would decree specific performance further 
operates in equity as a conversion, according to the terms of the contract, of the land into money on 
the part of the vendor, and of the amount of purchase money into the land on the part of the 
purchaser . . . .”). 
87. Flores, supra note 85, at 319. 
88. Paine v. Meller (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 1088, 1089; 6 Ves. Jun. 350, 352–53 (“[I]f the party by 
the contract has become in equity the owner of the premises, they are his to all intents and purposes.  
They are vendible as his, chargeable as his, capable of being incumbered as his; they may be devised 
as his; they may be assets; and they would descend to his heir”). 
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array of solutions as to who bears the risk of loss and who has the right to 
receive fire insurance proceeds.89  In this discussion, the doctrine of equitable 
conversion often gets bandied about. 
Personal property scholars will recall a similar scandal involving the sale 
of goods in the 1930’s.  Courts assigned the risk of loss depending who had 
title.  Karl Llewellyn thoroughly flogged the courts of his time for circular 
reasoning.90  He thought location of title merely announced the result.  As an 
argument, the question was begged.91  This very controversy played a huge role 
in the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code, and has led to the rookie 
assumption that Article 2 of the U.C.C. abolished title.92  It does no such thing.  
It is true that the Article 2 sections dealing with risk of loss don’t use the word 
“title”—though plenty of other provisions do.93 
Similarly, in real estate sales, courts used “equitable conversion” to locate 
the risk of loss, with similar dissatisfaction.94  As a result, legislative 
intervention—such as the Uniform Risk of Loss Act—removes the concept 
from the allocation of the loss.95 
This legislative intervention has led to the serious misconception that the 
doctrine of equitable conversion has been abolished and that the formation of a 
real estate sales contract no longer splits legal and equitable title.96  This is a 
false view.  To my knowledge, every jurisdiction in the United States 
recognizes a split in title as soon as the real estate sales contract is formed.  The 
concept is, however, not always relevant in adjudicating risk of loss. 
3. Estoppel By Deed 
Another occasion for splitting legal and equitable title is estoppel by deed.   
In such a case, F does not own Blackacre.  Nevertheless, F writes out an 
apparent deed granting V an interest in Blackacre.  Later, F acquires Blackacre.  
Equity presumes that F, smitten with conscience (that blushing shame-faced 
spirit that mutinies in man’s bosom), acquires Blackacre for the benefit of V.   
 
89. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 11.30–.31 (A. Casner ed., 1952) [hereinafter ALP]. 
90. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed 
“Property,” 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1295 (1996). 
91. Id. at 1282. 
92. Id. at 1294. 
93. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-401 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).  
94. Milton M. Hermann, The Doctrine of Equitable Conversion: I, Conversion by Contract, 12 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1962). 
95. ALP, supra note 89, § 11.30. 
96. CRS Steam, Inc. v. Eng’g Res., Inc. (In re CRS Steam, Inc.), 225 B.R. 833, 843 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1998) (declaring equitable conversion to be a relic of the past). 
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Thus, legal and equitable title are split.  V has the right to an injunction 
compelling F to convey legal title to V.97 
Estoppel by deed is sometimes taken to be the origin of the after-acquired 
property security interest authorized by Article 9 of the U.C.C.98  As such, it 
has become so familiar that it is not always recognized.  Prior to Article 9, we 
observe chattel mortgage courts proclaiming that the secured lender had an 
“equitable lien” on after-acquired collateral obtained by the borrower.99 
Estoppel by deed is not a constructive trust.  In an estoppel case, V does not 
convey legal title to F.  Rather, F obtains legal and equitable title from some 
stranger.  Equitable title is deemed obtained for the benefit of V.  In addition, 
the doctrine does not depend on wrongdoing by F.  It is an ordinary after-
acquired property concept. 
4. Resulting Trust 
Another idea floating about the law is resulting trust.  Suppose all we know 
is that O has delivered cash to a transferee (T) and T has bought something.  It 
is possible O intended a gift of the cash, in which case T owns the purchased 
thing outright.  But it is also possible O did not intend a gift, and there is no 
evidence T defrauded O.  Then we say that a trust results just because a gift was 
not intended.  T owns the thing in resulting trust for the benefit of O.100 
A resulting trust does not depend on T’s wrongdoing.  Rather, it is an 
interpretation of what O fully intended.  In contrast, in a constructive trust, O’s 
intent to convey legal title is present, but that intent is defective. 
5. In Custodia Legis 
Yet another idea is occasionally confounded with constructive trust, and it 
is one that does not entail a split between legal and equitable title.  It is the 
 
97. Mickles v. Townsend, 18 N.Y. 575, 582–83 (1859); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 154–55 (3d ed. 1944); Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life 
History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 425, 450–51 (2007). 
98. Galveston R.R. v. Cowdrey, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 459, 481 (1871); see David Cohen & Albert 
B. Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 642–43 (1939) (criticizing this 
genealogy). 
99. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.4 (1965); Russell A. 
Hakes, According Purchase Money Status Proper Priority, 72 OR. L. REV. 323, 331 (1993). 
100. Jamie Glister, Lifetime Wealth Transfers and the Equitable Presumptions of Resulting Trust 
and Gift, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1971, 1974–75 (2018); see Fleet Nat’l. Bank v. Valente (In re Valente) 
360 F.3d 256, 263–66 (1st Cir. 2004) (because a conveyance resulted in a trust, the transaction was not 
a fraudulent transfer); Doster v. Manistee Nat’l. Bank, 55 S.W. 137, 141 (Ark. 1900) (“[F]or where a 
conveyance is made to defraud creditors a resulting trust never arises in favor of the fraudulent 
debtor.”). 
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notion of in custodia legis, which states that, once a court has jurisdiction over 
property, the court may dispose of it in the litigation before it, in spite of 
subsequent litigation in a different, perhaps higher, court.101  A small claims 
court could dispose of property that was in custodia legis, even though a federal 
court case has subsequently commenced where title to the property was at stake.  
Federal bankruptcy legislation has changed that tradition.  Bankruptcy itself is 
said to be founded on the principle of in custodia legis,102 but it is prepared to 
dishonor custody already established by other courts—including federal 
diversity or federal question courts.  Thus, the automatic stay prevents other 
courts from disposing of property in custodia legis.103  “Custodians” 
(conditionally) must account to the bankruptcy courts for property under their 
custody, no matter if authorized by a nonbankruptcy court of proper 
jurisdiction. 
Opinions differ as to when property is in custodia legis.  Classically, 
commencement of litigation104 put the disputed property in the jurisdiction of 
the court.  Often the moment of custody is deferred to the time a court issues a 
remedial order.105 
The in custodia legis principle is not a constructive trust.  First, it is not 
necessarily the case that legal and equitable title are split.  It is typically said 
that in custodia legis gives rise to a lien on the property before the court, on 
behalf of the creditor who claims it.  Nor is fraudulent acquisition necessarily 




101. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) (“Where the action is in rem the effect 
is to draw to the federal court the possession or control, actual or potential, of the res, and the exercise 
by the state court of jurisdiction over the same res necessarily impairs, and may defeat, the jurisdiction 
of the federal court already attached.  The converse of the rule is equally true, that where the jurisdiction 
of the state court has first attached, the federal court is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over 
the same res to defeat or impair the state court’s jurisdiction.”); Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165, 175 
(1902) (“The state courts had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and possession of the 
property.  And it is well settled that where property is in the actual possession of the court, this draws 
to it the right to decide upon conflicting claims to its ultimate possession and control.”); Peck v. 
Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624 (1849). 
102. Acme Harvester v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 306–07 (1911); Robert W. Miller, 
Everything Old is New Again: Why the In Rem Summary Jurisdiction of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act Still 
Limits the Constitutional Authority of Bankruptcy Judges, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2015). 
103. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (3) (2012). 
104. Metcalf Bros., 187 U.S. at 173–75; see David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment 
(Part Two: Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 43, 177–78 (2009). 
105. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5202(b) (Consol. 2019). 
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III. ARE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS VALID IN BANKRUPTCY? 
The whole point of constructive trusts is to keep unsecured creditors of F 
from profiting off F’s crime.106  Where F has no creditors, the remedy of money 
judgment quite suffices to assure that at least V gets monetary compensation.  
Where V elects to treat the wrong as a conversion, V gets, not just V’s former 
property, but any other property of F that cannot be traced to the V-F 
conveyance. 
Therefore, constructive trust doctrine denies that the victim is an unsecured 
creditor equal to the fraudster’s other unsecured creditors.  In fact, constructive 
trust doctrine denies that the victim is a “creditor” who must accept legal tender 
in satisfaction of an unsecured claim.  Rather, V is a property owner, and F is 
in wrongful possession of V’s property. 
A. Legal v. Equitable Title and the Bankruptcy Estate 
Constructive trust requires that F’s legal title be administered for the benefit 
of the victim.  As such, a constructive trust is no different from a trust expressly 
created by a grantor in an estate planning environment. 
Assume, in the prepetition period, bankrupt D was a trustee and V was the 
beneficiary of a trust.  D could be a fraudster and the trustee of the constructive 
variety, but our analysis does not turn on this.  What we say applies whenever 
legal and equitable title are split. 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, all of D’s prepetition property enters the 
bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(1).  According to 
§ 541(a)(1), the bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case . . . .”  So far, the 
bankruptcy estate of a constructive trust inherits D’s legal title to the trust 
property. 
According to § 541(d): 
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement 
of the case, only legal title and not an equitable interest, such 
as a mortgage secured by real property, or an interest in such a 
mortgage, sold by the debtor, but as to which the debtor retains 
legal title to service or supervise the servicing of such 
 
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“Priority in this three-way context may be explained without reference to formal notions 
of title.  Even if A’s suit for restitution is formally asserted against B as defendant, A’s implicit 
claim . . . is that B’s unsecured creditor C will be unjustly enriched, at A’s expense, if B’s debt to C is 
satisfied from assets that B obtained from A by fraud.  The intuitive objection is that a debtor should 
not be allowed to rob Peter to pay Paul.”). 
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mortgage or interest, becomes property of the estate under 
subsection (a)(1) or (2) of this section only to the extent of the 
debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any 
equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not 
hold.107 
This section seems to have been added at the behest of participants of the 
secondary mortgage market.  The section says remarkably little.108  When 
property enters the estate by means of §541(a)(1),109 only D’s legal title comes 
in. B’s beneficial interest in the trust does not.110  We don’t need § 541(d) to 
justify this conclusion.  The matter can be reasoned from § 541(a)(1) alone. 
B. Real Estate Held in Trust 
One of the doctrinal embarrassments in the Bankruptcy Code is that, 
logically, beneficial interests in real estate are wiped out if the trustee files for 
bankruptcy. 
According to § 544(a)(3): 
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, 
and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any 
creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of 
property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor 
that is voidable by— 
. . . . 
 
107. 11 U.S.C § 541(d). 
108. Kull, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 266 (stating that § 541(d) has “essentially nothing to say 
about the problem” of constructive trusts in bankruptcy); see also id. at 269 n.11 (“In truth, it is difficult 
to see any idea behind § 541(d) other than legislative solicitude for the secondary mortgage market”); 
id. at 291 (“pure tautology”). 
109. Prior to 1984, beneficial interests in trusts were expelled from the estate if brought into the 
estate “under subsection (a)” of § 541.  Some courts therefore held that the strong-arm power was never 
adequate to avoid the beneficial interests of even constructive trusts.  Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re 
Quality Holstein Leasing), 752 F.2d 1009, 1013–14 (5th Cir. 1985).  Under this theory, the strong-arm 
power cannot destroy constructive trusts in real estate.  Accord McTevia v. Adamo (In re Atlantic 
Mortg. Corp.), 69 B.R. 321, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).  In 1984, Congress increased the analytical 
barriers for disposing of the strong-arm power by substituting “under subsection (a)(1) or (2)” for 
“under subsection (a).”  Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 456, 98 Stat. 363, 376 (1984).  It is therefore a fair reading of the 1984 amendments that 
Congress intended to subject the secondary mortgage market to the strong-arm power.  See Nat’l Bank 
of Alaska v. Erickson (In re Seaway Express Corp.), 912 F.2d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 1990); Belisle v. 
Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1989).  For a case holding that the strong-arm power overrides a 
constructive trust even before the 1984 amendments to § 541(d), see Elin v. Busche (In re Elin), 20 
B.R. 1012, 1017 (D.N.J. 1982), aff’d, 707 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1983). 
110. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990) (“Because the debtor does not own an equitable 
interest in property he holds in trust for another, that interest is not ‘property of the estate.’”). 
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(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, 
from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such 
transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide 
purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the 
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser 
exists.111 
A bona fide purchaser takes free of equitable title in real estate generally.112  
Let’s take this point seriously.  Suppose an executor in a will is appointed to 
administer Blackacre for the minor heirs.  The executor files for bankruptcy.  
The unsecured creditors take Blackacre away from the orphan heirs.  The 
orphans have next to nothing (unless someone had the wit to file, on behalf of 
our orphans, a lis pendens against the soon-to be-bankrupt trustee). 
To make matters worse, a bankruptcy trustee under § 544(a)(3) is not 
deemed to be a bona fide purchaser of fixtures.  So our minor heirs retain the 
pipes and windows—arguably all of the building.  The bankruptcy trustee takes 
only the land underneath. 
This is absurd and unthinkable.  Accordingly, there are no reported cases in 
which orphans have funded bankruptcy dividends for the unsecured creditors 
of their fiduciary.113  Section 544(a)(3) is simply shunned under these 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, the absurdity of disinheriting orphans of their real 
estate is the “plain meaning” of the Bankruptcy Code.114 
Section 544(a)(3) has been applied to constructive real estate trusts.  In 
Belisle v. Plunkett,115 a real estate developer took money from investors and 
bought a leasehold interest in the Virgin Islands.116  Instead of putting title in 
the limited partnership, as he should have, he took title in his own name.  Soon 
he was bankrupt.  The bankruptcy trustee took title to the leasehold free and 
 
111. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). 
112. United States v. Clark, 200 U.S. 601, 607–08 (1906). 
113. Such a challenge arose in Mills v. Brown (In re Brown), 182 B.R. 778, 783 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1995).  The court upheld the equitable interest against the strong-arm power on the authority of 
In re Mill Concepts Corp., 123 B.R. 938 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991), discussed infra in the text 
accompanying notes 119–20.  182 B.R. at 782. 
114. If the heirs get the fixtures, do unrecorded mortgagees also get fixtures?  Probably not.  The 
bankruptcy trustee is a hypothetical judicial lien creditor against fixtures.  11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1).  
Unless the unrecorded mortgagee has filed a financing statement pursuant to Article 9 of the U.C.C., 
the trustee takes the fixtures free and clear of this part of the mortgages. 
115. 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989). 
116. Id. at 513.  Under ancient common law, leases (“chattels real”) were thought to be personal 
property.  Placer Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Walsh (In re Marino), 813 F.2d 1562, 1566 (9th Cir. 1987).  
But the Virgin Islands aided the cause of fraud by deeming leases to be real property.  V.I. CODE ANN. 
tit. 27, § 421 (2019). 
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clear of the equitable title claimed by the limited partnership that should have 
had title. 
A different result adheres, however, when the cestui que trust is in 
possession of the real property.  In that case inquiry notice applies.  The doctrine 
of inquiry notice states that a purchaser is deemed to visit the property being 
purchased and to observe that someone is in possession.  This possession gives 
rise to a duty to ask the possessor, “What are your rights?”  If the question is 
not asked, the purchaser is charged with all the knowledge that a successful 
inquiry would produce.  The bankruptcy trustee, as purchaser, is deemed not to 
have asked the possessor about her rights.117  Accordingly, constructive trusts 
on real estate survive when the beneficial owner is actually in possession.118 
In In re Mill Concepts Corp., Judge James F. Queenan tried to end the 
absurdity of these results with an extremely close reading of § 544(a), which 
turned on the words “such transfer” in subparagraph (a)(3).119  
Mill Concepts Corp. actually involved a fraudulent transfer.  A had 
conveyed real property to B.120  If A’s conveyance was a fraudulent transfer, B 
was the trustee of the real property for the benefit of A’s creditors.121  B then 
filed for bankruptcy.  A did not.122  C, A’s creditor claimed A’s conveyance was 
fraudulent.  B’s bankruptcy trustee claimed to be a bona fide purchaser of B’s 
property and therefore had a defense against C’s fraudulent transfer cause of 
action.  Judge Queenan denied that B’s bankruptcy trustee could use § 544(a)(3) 
as a defense to C’s fraudulent transfer theory. 
Here is how the arguments works.  Recall that the preamble of § 544(a) 
promises the trustee the “rights and powers” of a hypothetical type, and that the 
trustee “may avoid any transfer of property” made by the debtor that a 
 
117. McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 16–17 (3d Cir. 1982).  For a case assuming that inquiry 
notice saves a constructive trust from the trustee’s strong-arm power, see Helbling v. Thomas (In re 
Thomas), No. 12-14916, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5644 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2013).  Inquiry notice 
would have saved the plaintiffs in Carrick v. Hagan (In re Carrick Trucking, Inc.), No. 15-cv-13115, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53980, at *7–8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2016), but the court held, as a matter of 
Michigan law, that constructive trusts never relate back to the time of the wrong—a doctrinal error. 
118. See David Gray Carlson, The Trustee’s Strong Arm Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 
S.C. L. REV. 841, 896–911 (1992). 
119. 123 B.R. 938, 940–42 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (Queenan, J.). 
120. Id. at 939. 
121. Carlson, Conduit, supra note 1, at 485. 
122. That A was not bankrupt was important.  If A had been bankrupt, A’s bankruptcy trustee 
would have expropriated C’s cause of action against B’s bankruptcy trustee.  11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) 
(2012); Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Large Private Beneficial Owners (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent 
Conveyance Litig.), 818 F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2016).  In such a case we would observe a suit by A’s 
bankruptcy trustee against B’s bankruptcy trustee. 
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hypothetical entity could avoid.  A stripped-down version of the statute, 
illustrating Judge Queenan’s grammatical point, states: 
(a) The trustee shall have . . . the rights and powers of, or may 
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor . . . that is voidable 
by 
. . . . 
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, 
from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such 
transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide 
purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the 
commencement of the case, whether or not such purchaser 
exists.123 
According to Judge Queenan: 
The words “such transfer” necessarily have reference to the 
transfer previously described in the body [i.e. preamble] 
of § 544(a) in the phrase “may avoid any transfer of property 
of the debtor . . . .”  Nowhere in subparagraph (3) is there any 
indication of a grant of power beyond the ability to avoid 
transfers of property made by the debtor.124 
The idea of this interpretation is that “such transfer” knocks out “rights and 
powers.”125 
Although this reading would save the constructive trust in real property, it 
is not sound grammar.  “Such transfer” would appear to refer to the hypothetical 
transfer that the debtor makes to the bankruptcy trustee.  Thus, the trustee is a 
 
123. In re Mill Concepts, 123 B.R. at 940 (emphasis added) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988)). 
124. Id. at 941.  For a rehearsal of Judge Queenan’s theory, see Kull, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, 
at 296–97.  Professor Kull would later write this interpretation of § 544(a)(3) into the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM. LAW INST. 2011) itself.  Professor Kull does 
thicken the soup by noting that “such transfer” appears twice in § 544(a)(3).  Kull, Bankruptcy, supra 
note 6, at 298.  The first time “such transfer” supposedly refers to a transfer the debtor actually made 
before bankruptcy.  Id.  The second “such transfer” refers to the hypothetical transfer from the debtor 
to the bankruptcy trustee.  Id.  He writes: “If we attempt (with the court in Belisle v. Plunkett) to read 
both references to “such transfer” as referring to the debtor’s hypothetical transfer to the trustee as 
hypothetical bona fide purchaser, the perfectibility qualification to the trustee’s status is rendered 
nonsensical.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989).  Professor 
Kull further complains that the disfavored reasoning “would require either: (i) that the hypothetical 
transfer be perfectible against the debtor as transferor; or (ii) that the hypothetical transfer be perfectible 
by the bona fide purchaser against himself.”  Id. at 298 n.76.  In my view, this argument from nonsense 
does not function.  The trustee can be a transferee against whom an earlier transfer might be perfected 
and a purchaser who has perfected.  There’s nothing nonsensical about that! 
125. For a similar interpretation by Judge Queenan to save the doctrine of equitable conversion 
from bankruptcy avoidance, see Rodolakis v. Pedone (In re Belba), 226 B.R. 738, 743 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1998) (Queenan, J.). 
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purchaser of property in a hypothetical transfer from the debtor, where “such 
transfer” is of the sort that can be perfected.126   
In effect, bankruptcy is a transfer, and § 544(a) describes what kind of 
transfer.  The transfer of personal property from the debtor to the bankruptcy 
trustee is a nonvoluntary creation of a lien.  The transfer of real property is by 
purchase.  Judge Queenan’s interpretation denies that § 544(a)(3) characterizes 
the nature of the transfer of which bankruptcy consists. 
Although Judge Queenan’s reading saves the constructive trust in real 
property (as well as express trusts),127 it does presuppose that Congress intended 
to reserve “rights and powers” for personal property cases only.  Yet both 
“rights and powers” and “avoid any transfer” seem generally applicable to real 
and personal property cases alike. 
A later Massachusetts bankruptcy court refused to follow this 
interpretation.  In In re Pina, Judge Joan Feeney used § 544(a)(3) to knock out 
an equitable interest arising from the doctrine of equitable conversion.128  Under 
such a doctrine, when the holder of legal title to real property enters into a real 
property sales contract, the buyer is considered to be the equity owner and is 
entitled to an injunction requiring a deed to pass legal title, contingent on 
tendering the agreed price.129   
 
126. Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The statute mentions ‘transfer’ only 
in the sense of the hypothetical transfer that measures the trustee’s rights . . . .”). 
127. This position is memorialized in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 60 cmt. f, illus. 17, but without the grammatical analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). 
128. 363 B.R. 314, 316 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (Feeney, J.). 
129. Actually, Judge Feeney denied that Massachusetts even has a doctrine of equitable 
conversion, citing some “risk of loss” cases.  Id. at 327–28.  In these cases, courts allocate the loss of 
misfortunes that occur between the contract and closing.  Massachusetts is more pro-seller than many 
states, but it does not go so far as to deny equitable title if the buyer arises at the time the contract is 
executed.  Dooley v. Merrill, 104 N.E. 345, 345 (Mass. 1914) (“It is well settled that when by the terms 
of a binding contract a conveyance of land ought to be made, equity will regard that done which ought 
to be done, and, if the holder of the legal title refuses to make conveyance, will treat him as trustee for 
the purchaser ready and able to perform his part of the contract.”) 
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Thus, under In re Pina, constructive trusts in real estate do not survive,130 
unless a lis pendens has been filed.131 
C. Personal Property Held in Trust 
The rules are quite different when a constructive trustee has title to personal 
property and then files for bankruptcy.  In such a case, the bankruptcy trustee 
has no strong-arm theory against the owners of equitable title.  The trustee is 
no bona fide purchaser of personal property—only of real property that is not 
fixtures.  Judicial lien creditors are not considered purchasers,132 and so the 
trustee inherits D’s duty to deliver possession to V.133  This duty is imposed 
by § 725, which provides: 
After the commencement of a case under this chapter, but 
before final distribution of property of the estate under section 
726 of this title, the trustee, after notice and a hearing, shall 
dispose of any property in which an entity other than the estate 
has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not been disposed 
of under another section of this title.134 
 
130. A noble try by Professor Kull goes as follows: The equitable interest in constructive trust 
property does not enter the bankruptcy estate through the front door of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (“all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).  Kull, Bankruptcy, 
supra note 6, at 269 n.11.  It enters through the postern gate of § 541(a)(3) (“‘property that the trustee 
recovers’ under . . . § 550 . . .”).  Id. at 300. 
[T]he power to appropriate for the estate the equitable interest represented by a 
claim of constructive trust cannot be described either as the recovery of property 
or as the avoidance of a transfer.  The claimant’s equitable interest cannot, 
therefore, come into the bankruptcy estate by the literal terms of §§ 550(a) and 
541(a)(3).  Nor is there any other statutory route by which such property becomes 
part of the bankruptcy estate. 
Id.  This argument assumes that § 550(a) organizes all avoidance actions, including the use of the 
strong-arm power.  But in fact, strong-arm cases involve an automatic feature.  To illustrate, suppose 
D grants an unperfected security interest to SP and SP declines to perfect.  D then files for bankruptcy.  
On the day of bankruptcy, the trustee has a lien that is already senior to the unperfected security interest, 
without any reference to § 550(a).  See David Gray Carlson, The Res Judicata Worth of Illegal 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 351, 381–87 (2009).  True, § 550(a) implies that 
the debtor has conveyed a thing to a third party that the trustee must retrieve or “recover.”  But the 
strong-arm power has a life above and beyond § 550(a). 
131. Hurst Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Lane (In re Lane), 980 F.2d 601, 602–03 (9th Cir. 1992). 
132. See C. Scott Pryor, Third Time’s the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 843, 862 (2013). 
133. See City Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Gen. Coffee Corp. (In re Gen. Coffee Corp.), 828 F.2d 
699, 704 (11th Cir. 1987). 
134. 11 U.S.C. § 725. 
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One serious impediment to V, however, is the definition of “cash 
collateral.”  Cash collateral is defined in § 363(a) as: 
[C]ash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, 
deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired 
in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an 
interest and includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, 
or profits of property and the fees, charges, accounts or other 
payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public 
facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties subject 
to a security interest as provided in section 552(b) of this title, 
whether existing before or after the commencement of a case 
under this title.135 
This definition encompasses funds held in trust—or in constructive trust.  
D’s legal title is inherited by the bankruptcy estate and “the estate and an entity 
other than the estate have an interest” in the funds.  That is, the estate has the 
legal title and V has the equitable title. 
What this means is that the trustee can “use, sell, or lease” V’s cash, if a 
bankruptcy court so approves.  The trustee, however, will have to provide 
“adequate protection” to V.  “Adequate protection,” in this context, probably 
means substitute collateral.136  That is to say, the bankruptcy trustee can compel 
V to “lend” the funds back to the bankruptcy estate.  There is some reason to 
believe, however, that this expropriation of cash collateral (in exchange for 
other collateral) can only happen in a reorganization case, where D is 
conducting a business.137 
As with the invalidity of express trusts on real property, courts have failed 
to confront the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.  A conspiracy of silence 
has so far managed to suppress the use of § 363(a) to bring cash held in trust 
under the sway of the bankruptcy trustee’s power to use, sell, or lease cash 
collateral.138 
D. The Sixth Circuit 
In the Sixth Circuit, constructive trusts have been found inconsistent with 
the bankruptcy policy of unsecured creditor equality.  According to Judge 
 
135. Id. § 363(a). 
136. Id. § 363(c), (e). 
137. This is apparent from the structure of 11 U.S.C. § 363(c).  Subsection (1) permits a trustee 
to execute transactions if in the ordinary course of business.  Subsection (2) prohibits use of cash 
collateral in this context unless the secured creditor or the bankruptcy court consents. 
138. I rudely spell out the implications in David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of 
Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (1998). 
 
CARLSON_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:45 PM 
396 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:365 
Batchelder in XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Group, Inc.):139 
“Constructive trusts are anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since they take 
from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors, not from the 
offending debtor.”140  “The ermine robe of unjust enrichment is hardly a fitting 
adornment for creditors who are typically paid a pittance on their claims,”141 as 
Judge Queenan would later put it.  Of course, these holdings assume that 
beneficiaries of constructive trusts are creditors, which I have disputed. 
Omegas involved a claim to constructive trust which has been criticized as 
poor in quality, because the claimant had “unclean hands” or because it is not 
clear V was actually defrauded by D.142  In Omegas, V wished to pull a fast one 
on IBM.  V had signed a disadvantageous redistribution contract with “Big 
Blue.”  In desperate financial shape, D approached V and proposed 
skullduggery.  D had a better deal with IBM.  D proposed that D would order 
computers for V without IBM’s knowledge, V would advance the purchase 
price, and D, as V’s agent, would buy IBM computers.  V would pay D a 
commission on each computer. 
V advanced $1.1 million to buy IBM computers.  Instead of buying the 
computers, D held the money and proposed that V lend D that sum.  V refused.  
D filed for bankruptcy instead.  The cash advanced was identifiable in the 
bankruptcy estate of D.  V claimed this cash from D’s bankruptcy trustee. 
The bankruptcy court imposed a constructive trust on part of the funds.  
Both sides appealed. 
Speaking for a plurality of the Sixth Circuit, Judge Batchelder ruled that a 
constructive trust is nothing until, prior to bankruptcy, a court proclaims it to 
exist.  The bankruptcy court itself is forbidden to recognize the constructive 
trust. 
We think that § 541(d) simply does not permit a claimant in 
the position of [V] to persuade the bankruptcy court to impose 
the remedy of constructive trust for alleged fraud committed 
against it by the debtor in the course of their business dealings, 
and thus to take ahead of all creditors, and indeed, ahead of the 
trustee.  Because a constructive trust, unlike an express trust, 
is a remedy, it does not exist until a plaintiff obtains a judicial 
decision finding him to be entitled to a judgment “impressing” 
 
139. 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994). 
140. Id. at 1452. 
141. CRS Steam, Inc. v. Eng’g Res. Inc. (In re CRS Steam, Inc.), 225 B.R. 833, 842 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1998). 
142. In re Omegas Grp., Inc., 16 F.3d 1443, 1445–46; Kull, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 271–
75; Pryor, supra note 132, at 856–57; Sherwin, Omegas, supra note 44, at 888. 
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defendant’s property or assets with a constructive trust.  
Therefore, a creditor’s claim of entitlement to a constructive 
trust is not an “equitable interest” in the debtor’s estate existing 
prepetition, excluded from the estate under § 541(d).143 
Trusts created by state statute were distinguished.144  But constructive trusts 
imposed by common law were not permitted.  The principal reason: 
constructive trusts do not pre-exist their judicial declaration—a doctrinal 
error.145 
The Sixth Circuit was influenced by the “well known”146 law review article 
by Professor Emily Sherwin early in her career.  Professor Sherwin also insisted 
that constructive trusts do not pre-exist their declaration,147 but, rather 
inconsistently,148 she supported the imposition of constructive trusts by 
bankruptcy courts, under a standard that does not match the typical state-law 
notion that equitable title under constructive trusts are good against judicial lien 
creditors.149  Judge Batchelder seems to have ignored the nuanced part of the 
 
143. In re Omegas Grp., Inc., 16 F.3d at 1451. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1449 (“Unless a court has already impressed a constructive trust upon certain assets 
or a legislature has created a specific statutory right to have particular kinds of funds held as if in trust, 
the claimant cannot properly represent to the bankruptcy court that he was, at the time of the 
commencement of the case, a beneficiary of a constructive trust held by the debtor.”). 
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 reporter’s note d. 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
147. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts, supra note 11, at 326. 
148. If undeclared constructive trusts imply no property in V, then the trustee’s strong-arm power 
means that the bankruptcy trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien encumbers both legal and equitable title, 
and a constructive trust is quite useless to V.  Davis v. Cox (In re Cox), 274 B.R. 13, 29–30 (Bankr. D. 
Me. 2002) (trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien primed ex-wife’s claim to marital asset), rev’d, 356 F.3d 
76 (1st Cir. 2004). 
149. The thrust of Professor Sherwin’s view is in the following passage: 
This article rejects the Restatement’s position on creditors’ rights.  According to 
the analysis proposed here, priority over general creditors should not follow 
automatically from the plaintiff’s right to a constructive trust against the 
defendant’s property.  Instead, the priority of a restitution claimant in 
bankruptcy . . . should be based on the strength of her claim in relation to the 
claims of competing parties who will bear the burden of the remedy.  Put another 
way, the right to a constructive trust in bankruptcy should depend on whether 
creditors would be unjustly enriched by sharing in the property the plaintiff 
claims. 
Sherwin, Constructive Trusts, supra note 11, at 306.  Professor Sherwin assumes state law is 
completely insensitive to the effect of insolvency on constructive trusts.  See id. at 317.  But this does 
not follow.  Insolvency exists under state law and should be construed as part of constructive trust 
doctrine. 
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article and instead followed the logic according to which constructive trusts 
never pre-exist their declaration.150 
Omegas is not in the spirit of Butner v. United States.151  Butner holds: 
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is 
no reason why such interests [i.e. property interests created 
under state law] should be analyzed differently simply because 
an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.152 
Of course, Judge Batchelder has identified equality of unsecured creditors 
as the federal interest requiring that the state law concept of constructive trust 
be overridden.153  But this presupposes that beneficiaries of constructive trusts 
are indeed creditors, which I have disputed.  Even so, Supreme Court dicta prior 
to the Bankruptcy Code support the concept of constructive trust.154  It was 
certainly the case that equality of creditors was also a policy of the 1898 Act.  
It never occurred to the Supreme Court that equality of creditors mandates the 
abolition of constructive trust doctrine in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Since Omegas, the Sixth Circuit has backpedaled.155  In McCafferty v. 
McCafferty (In re McCafferty), D and W divorced.156  In the divorce decree, W 
received a property settlement according to which W was granted a 50% interest 
in D’s pension (not yet collectible).  In effect, D was to buy back the pension 
by making installment payments to W.  W had an equitable lien on D’s pension 
 
150. See Kull, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 289 n.61.  Judge Ralph Guy concurred, but on the 
ground that Kentucky state law denies that constructive trusts pre-exist their judicial declaration.  In re 
Omegas Grp., Inc., 16 F.3d at 1445.  For this he relies on Commonwealth Cabinet for Human Res. v. 
Sec. of Am. Life Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 176, 180–81 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).  The point was an alternative 
holding.  The cestui que trust also could not trace the purloined funds into res in question. 
151. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
152. Id. at 55. 
153. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994) (citations omitted) (“[W]here the 
‘meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s text is itself clear,’ . . . its operation is unimpeded by contrary state 
law or prior practice.”). 
154. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135–36 (1962) (“Property interests in a fund 
not owned by a bankrupt at the time of adjudication, whether complete or partial, legal or equitable, 
mortgages, liens, or simple priority of rights, are of course not a part of the bankrupt’s property and do 
not vest in the trustee.  The Bankruptcy Act simply does not authorize a trustee to distribute other 
people’s property among a bankrupt’s creditors.  So here if the surety at the time of adjudication 
was . . . either the outright legal or equitable owner of this fund, or had an equitable lien or prior right 
to it, this property interest of the surety never became a part of the bankruptcy estate to 
be . . . distributed to general creditors of the bankrupt.”); Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 11 (1924) 
(implying that Ponzi victims could claim a constructive trust if they could identify assets through 
tracing). 
155. For a faithful application of Omegas to bar a constructive trust in a mistaken payment case, 
see In re Dow Corning Corp., 192 B.R. 428, 440–41 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996). 
156. 96 F.3d 192, 193 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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(not yet payable by the pension plan).157  We may note that no constructive trust 
was really before the court.  W did not convey anything to D subject to a right 
of rescission, as constructive trust doctrine requires.158 
D then filed for bankruptcy and commenced an adversary proceeding 
seeking a declaration that W’s secured claim against D was dischargeable.  In 
short, the case is really about bankruptcy discharges, not equitable liens. 
A few notes about discharge are appropriate.  Under Bankruptcy 
Code § 523(a)(5), alimony payments are not dischargeable, but debts arising 
from a property settlement are.159  From this principle, we can deduce the 
answer to the adversary proceeding: D was entitled to a discharge of the debt.  
But discharge never affects the security interest in collateral that may happen 
to exist with regard to the discharged debt.160  At the end of the day, when the 
bankruptcy was over and the automatic stay was laid to rest,161 W was entitled 
to enforce the equitable lien against the pension.  To be sure, the pension plan 
could not be made to pay out before D’s retirement, but perhaps a court of 
equity could order the sale of a half-pension to some buyer willing to wait and 
gamble actuarially on the ultimate payout. 
In McCafferty, the bankruptcy court agreed with all this.  W, however, 
appealed.  She did not actually disagree that debts connected with property 
settlements were dischargeable.  Rather, W “reasserted her argument that by 
virtue of the divorce decree, her share of the pension benefits was her sole and 
separate property held in constructive trust by [D] and could not be considered 
property of [D’s] bankruptcy estate.”162 
Properly, this question should not have been before the court of appeals.  
The status of the equitable lien (not a constructive trust) should have been 
decided after bankruptcy by a state court.  In such a state court proceeding 
Omegas would presumably have no bite.  A state court could freely recognize 
the equitable lien. 
 
157. Equitable liens have been described as “a special and limited form of a constructive trust.”  
In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d 651, 658 (Colo. 1986). 
158. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250–51 (2000) 
(quoting Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889) (“Whenever the legal title to property is 
obtained through means or under circumstances ‘which render it unconscientious for the holder of legal 
title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the property 
thus acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same . . .’”). 
159. Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583, 585–86 (1st Cir. 1986). 
160. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (2012). 
161. Id. § 362(c). 
162. McCafferty v. McCafferty (In re McCafferty), 96 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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Nevertheless, D sought a declaration from the court of appeals that W’s 
“constructive trust” was automatically void by the mere fact of D’s bankruptcy 
petition.  If W was a dischargeable unsecured creditor, D’s discharge would 
have the effect of burying all hope in W for a recovery. 
The proper answer was for the court to affirm the bankruptcy court and to 
say nothing about constructive trusts or equitable liens.  The court of appeals, 
however, ruled that a court in the divorce proceeding had already established 
W’s equitable interest in the pension.163  Therefore, Omegas did not apply.164  
And even if this were not true, Omegas was about vindicating the policy of 
ratable distribution between creditors.  Since D’s pension was exempt property, 
recognition by the bankruptcy court of a constructive trust on the pension did 
not affect D’s creditors, and so Omegas was no impediment to recognition of a 
constructive trust.165 
A divorce court, evidently, may split legal and equitable title between 
husband and wife, but that does not mean it is imposing a constructive trust.  A 
constructive trust suggests a right of rescission to prevent unjust enrichment.   
The court, however, announced that “[s]ince it would result in an unjust 
enrichment for [D] to receive the entire value of the retirement benefits, a 
constructive trust arose.”166  This rather perverts the “constructive trust” notion.   
A constructive trust arises to prevent unjust enrichment.  Here, the unjust 
enrichment is the hypothetical violation of a pre-existing fiduciary duty.  In 
short, a court-created trust existed, but there is no compelling reason to call it a 
constructive trust.167 
Omegas was more directly compromised in Kitchen v. Boyd (In re 
Newpower).168  The case involved the Vs’ motion to lift the automatic stay to 
continue state court actions in which the V sought a declaration of the 
constructive trust.  It is rather hard to discern the final result from this difficult 
opinion, but it appears that the bankruptcy court permitted actions against third 
party transferees from D, but declined to lift the stay with regard to constructive 
trust property still possessed by D at the time of the bankruptcy.  This is a result 
that coheres with Omegas.  The district court reversed in part, holding that the 
 
163. “The domestic relations court clearly did not use the magic words ‘constructive trust’ in its 
divorce order.”  Id. at 197.  The court of appeals nevertheless ruled that such was the state court’s 
intent.  Id. at 198. 
164. Id. at 197. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 199. 
167. See FDIC v. AmFin Fin. Corp., 757 F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that Omegas 
does not apply to a resulting trust). 
168. 233 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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automatic stay should be obliterated entirely.  This would allow the V in state 
court to dispossess the bankruptcy trustee of all constructive trust property.  The 
court of appeals apparently affirmed the district court, in spite of a contrary 
statement in the “majority” opinion.169 
In Newpower, D defrauded V into investing in a corporation (NPI).  Part of 
the investment was a loan to NPI made before NPI was incorporated.  For this 
part of the investment, V wrote D a personal check, on the assumption that D 
was agent for the soon-to-be-born corporation.170  D, however, deposited the 
check in his personal account.  As to this aborted loan, the court thought that D 
never had title to the funds before the embezzlement and no title after.171  Still, 
as will be emphasized below,172 V or NPI prevails only if constructive trusts are 
valid in bankruptcy.  So this part of the opinion overrules Omegas in the case 
of constructive trusts arising from stolen funds. 
A different part of the investment was in the form of a loan directly to NPI 
(now incorporated).  As agent of NPI with the power to write checks, D 
embezzled the money from NPI accounts.  D spent some of it on things, 
including a power boat.173  Part of the money was still identifiable in D’s 
bankruptcy estate. 
V commenced suits against third parties who had received proceeds of these 
funds.  D filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter, which triggered the 
 
169. Judge Kennedy, ostensibly for the majority ruled, 
In sum, we AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that none of the money 
misappropriated by debtor was property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate 
although some of the proceeds are.  We REVERSE the district court to the extent 
it concluded that debtor’s bankruptcy estate did not have legal title to the 
property that debtor bought with such funds, and that he still possessed at the 
time he filed his bankruptcy petition. 
Id. at 934 (Kennedy, J.).  But two of the three-member paneled “concurred” that the district court 
should be affirmed entirely.  Id. 
170. The check was payable to D but the “memo portion of the check stated that the check was 
for NPI . . . ”  Id. at 926. 
171. The court viewed D as agent to V, so that title to the funds never left V.  Id. at 933–34. 
172. See infra text accompanying note 193.  The point will be that stolen funds always implicate 
constructive trusts, unless the stolen currency is located as such in D’s possession at the time of D’s 
bankruptcy petition. 
173. Newpower, 233 F.3d at 927 (“Among other things, [D]: bought a Corvette, a four-wheel 
drive pickup truck, and a power boat; built a new house for his girlfriend; loaned $60,000 to a former 
fiance; invested $50,000 in the production of a music CD for another girlfriend; spent tens of thousands 
of dollars in ‘loan repayments’ to customer trust accounts for [D’s] real estate business; and made 
thousands of dollars of cash distributions to himself for ‘walking around money.’”). 
 
CARLSON_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:45 PM 
402 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:365 
Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay against general state law collection 
actions.174 
A procedural note is in order.  We are not told very much about the state 
court actions against third parties, but one of them seemed to be based on D’s 
building “a new house for his girlfriend,”175 whom we shall call G.  We shall 
use this presumed action against G’s land as a paradigm action against the other 
third parties. 
As we are not told whether G was actually sued, or what form the suit took, 
let us assume that D wrote checks to a construction company that built a house 
on land G already owned.  In exchange for D’s check, the construction company 
built a house.  If without knowledge of the source of the funds, the construction 
company had a bona fide purchaser defense against a conversion cause of 
action.176  The construction company, however, bestowed labor and materials 
on D, which D then directed toward G.  The claim was that the benefits of the 
construction contract (materials and labor) could be traced into G’s real 
property.  Ergo this real property (to the extent of value added) was held in trust 
by G for the benefit of the V.  Undoubtedly, it is best to think of this claim as 
an equitable lien.177  In other words, V and NPI would have the right to a 
 
174. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
175. Newpower, 233 F.3d at 927. 
176. Recognizing that bank deposits fall between the cracks of negotiable instrument law, with 
its concept of holding in due course, many states have enacted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act (U.F.A.).  
The U.F.A. repeals inquiry notice for third parties who take bank checks drawn on stolen funds.  UNIF. 
FIDUCIARIES ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (“If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by a 
fiduciary . . . and is thereafter transferred by the fiduciary . . . in payment of a personal debt of the 
fiduciary . . . the transferee is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his 
obligation unless he takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of 
such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith”).  Thus, the third party is 
privileged to assume that, when D, a fiduciary for V, writes a check on D’s deposit account containing 
V’s traceable funds, D is acting consistently with fiduciary duty.  If, however, the third party knew or 
should have known of the misconduct, then the third party has converted V’s funds.  DeLaRosa v. 
Farmers State Bank, 474 S.W.3d 240, 244–46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).  For nonstatutory cases, see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 108(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“In dealing with a trustee, a third 
party need not: (a) inquire into the extent of the trustee’s powers or the propriety of their exercise.”). 
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“Equitable lien is the typical response when improvements to realty have been made with 
misappropriated funds . . . .”).  According to Professor Rendleman: 
A judge will impose an equitable lien when a constructive trust would 
“overkill.”  For example, if the defendant embezzles $250,000 and buys a house 
for that amount, the judge will impose a constructive trust . . . .  On the other 
hand, if the defendant embezzles $25,000 and spends it to remodel the kitchen 
in his $250,000 house, the judge will impose an equitable lien for $25,000, a 
security interest the plaintiff can foreclose. 
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foreclosure against a whole or part of the property to raise cash in order to 
reimburse V or NPI for the theft of funds. 
If this is correct, we observe that D indirectly transferred materials and labor 
to G.  Having conveyed away legal title to this value, D, at the time of the 
bankruptcy, could claim no property interest in G’s real property.  Therefore, 
the automatic stay did not apply to prevent this lawsuit.  This was basically the 
position of the bankruptcy court. 
But suppose constructive trusts are void—that is, they do not pre-exist their 
declaration.  Then D had both legal and equitable title to the funds.  If so, D 
made a fraudulent transfer to G.  The proceeds of the fraudulent transfer are 
property of the estate and the automatic stay ought not to be lifted.178  Thus, in 
anticipation of the main theme of this Article, either we have a constructive 
trust, in which case D has transferred legal title to G and the automatic stay does 
not apply because D has no property interest. Or there is no constructive trust, 
and D has conveyed D’s own property in violation of fraudulent transfer law. 
In that case, the automatic stay does apply. 
Moving to lift the stay with regard to third party actions already commenced 
makes some sense.  But as to the things D possessed at the time of the 
bankruptcy petition (such as the power boat bought with stolen funds), moving 
to lift the automatic stay was a curious way to pursue the boat.  Presumably, the 
way to obtain the power boat from D’s bankruptcy trustee was to seek a court 
order directing the trustee to make a § 725 distribution of the boat to V.179  This 
entails a judicial recognition that the trustee had mere legal title and that V had 
equitable title under a constructive trust.  As it is, limitation of the case to lifting 
the automatic stay suggests that V would have to join D’s bankruptcy trustee to 
a state court action, and it is the state court that would order the trustee to do 
his duty under § 725. 
Newpower is an odd opinion in that, with little warning, what appears to be 
Judge Cecilia Kennedy’s majority opinion morphs into the dissenting opinion.  
The real majority opinion can be found in the concurring opinion of Judge Alice 
Batchelder, the erstwhile enemy of the constructive trust in Omegas. 
 
Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory Damages 
and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 991 (2011). 
178. Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 
F.2d 1266, 1277 (5th Cir. 1983). 
179. This could be done under FED. R. CIV. P. 70(a) (“If a judgment requires a party 
to . . . perform any . . . specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court 
may order the act to be done . . . by another person appointed by the court.”).  See Mid-Atl. Supply, 
Inc. of Va. v. Three Rivers Aluminum Co., 790 F.2d 1121,1122 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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According to Judge Batchelder, the automatic stay should be lifted entirely 
with respect to V.  Thus, V was invited to get a judicial declaration from a state 
court that third parties are constructive trustees for V.  Judge Batchelder offered 
four different propositions as to why Omegas did not apply to the facts in 
Newpower: 
1. Because V owned the equity and D did not, § 362(d)(2) 
entitles V to relief from the stay.180  By contrast, in Omegas 
it was not clear D owned the equity.  Obviously, a 
bankruptcy court can know V owns the equity only if it is 
permitted to recognize the state law doctrine of 
constructive trust (even before a state court has imposed 
the trust).  On this view, Omegas never applies when the 
constructive trust status of property is clear.181 
2. Omegas did not involve an attempt by V to lift the 
automatic stay.  Therefore, Omegas never applies in 
automatic stay litigation.182  As to whether the ultimate 
declaration of the constructive trust by a state court should 
bind a bankruptcy court, no opinion is expressed.183  But 
Omegas does not bar that conclusion either.184 
3. Omegas applies to transfers of title in the ordinary course 
 
180. Judge Batchelder implied that there was a constructive trust, even though no state court had 
so declared: 
The automatic stay imposed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition shall be lifted 
upon motion by a party in interest in cases . . . (2) where the debtor does not have 
an equity interest in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective 
reorganization.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  [V qualifies] under the second condition 
set forth in § 362(d).  As we have already held, the debtor did not obtain equitable 
title to these proceeds, and this case does not involve a reorganization . . . .  
Newpower, 233 F.3d at 935 (Batchelder, J.). 
181. In Newpower, D obtained legal title to the proceeds of stolen money, but “he clearly did not 
obtain equitable title in the goods.”  Id. at 936. 
182. Id. at 935, 937. 
183. “We express no opinion on whether, in the event [V was] successful in obtaining such a 
[state court] judgment [of constructive trust], it would have an effective date prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition—a matter that is governed by state law.”  Id. at 937. 
184. Id. at 937.  There is a hint that if a state court were to impose a constructive trust, it would 
be honored by a bankruptcy court: “In our view, the state court where [V] initiated [his] action before 
the bankruptcy petition was filed is best suited to determine who holds the equitable interest in the 
property at issue under Michigan law.”  Id. at 936 n.2.  In a subsequent opinion, Poss v. Morris (In re 
Morris), 260 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2001), Judge Batchelder, in recalling Newpower, leaves out the part 
wherein Newpower gives no opinion on whether a postpetition declaration of constructive trust (where 
the stay has been lifted) is binding on a bankruptcy court.  See In re Morris, 260 F.3d at 667.  Instead, 
Newpower is said to stand for the bindingness of state law.  Id. 
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of business, not to thefts.185  If this were not so, thieves 
could launder stolen funds by buying things that would be 
free of a constructive trust claim.186 
4. Omegas does not apply because V commenced a state court 
action (even though an imposition of the constructive trust 
had not yet occurred).187  Commencement implies that the 
automatic stay itself is the only reason a declaration of a 
constructive trust had not occurred.188  Of course, a 
bankruptcy court cannot know this unless it peeks beneath 
the blanket of dark to discern that the constructive trust is 
actually there. 
These disparate thoughts do not exactly cohere.  It is tempting to conclude 
that, in the Sixth Circuit, constructive trusts are valid in bankruptcy in case of 
theft (and perhaps only when the victim has already commenced an attempt to 
foment a state-court declaration).  Also, a constructive trust can be recognized 
as a reason to lift the automatic stay.  Otherwise, constructive trusts are invalid 
in Sixth Circuit bankruptcies.  
Meanwhile, Judge Cecilia Kennedy thought that stolen funds were not part 
of the bankruptcy estate.189  She would have applied Omegas in any case 
involving proceeds of stolen money, where a bona fide purchaser of the stolen 
money conveyed some valuable thing to D.  In such cases, D had title to the 
thing.  The only way to recognize V as the holder of equitable title is to 
 
185. Newpower, 233 F.3d at 936. 
186. Id. at 936. 
187. According to Judge Batchelder, Omegas did not apply here because C “initiated a state 
court action to recover the stolen property before the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, and the sole 
reason that the state court has not yet issued a decision is the stay imposed by the bankruptcy court.”  
Id. at 935.  In Omegas, “we were not faced with the question of either obtaining or enforcing a state 
court judgment.”  Id. at 936. 
188. “[A]nd the sole reason that the state court has not yet issued a decision is the stay imposed 
by the bankruptcy court.”  Id. at 935.  Actually, the Bankruptcy Code, not the bankruptcy court, 
imposes the stay automatically.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
189. Newpower, 233 F.3d at 931 (“Thus, we hold that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding 
that money which debtor embezzled from NPI was part of debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  Consequently, 
we also hold that the debtor’s bankruptcy estate has no property interest in such embezzled funds which 
are now in the hands of third parties.”). 
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recognize a constructive trust that splits legal and equitable title.190  But this is 
precisely what is not permitted under Omegas.191 
A serious flaw in Judge Kennedy’s view is that, when funds are stolen, 
everything is proceeds, unless the funds are paper currency and the currency 
can still be located in D’s possession.  For example, in Newpower, D stole funds 
from NPI by writing a check to himself on NPI’s account and depositing the 
NPI check in D’s deposit account.  Under these circumstances, D’s bank (D 
Bank) is a good faith purchaser of the funds from NPI.192  As such, D Bank has 
a bona fide purchaser defense against NPI.  Meanwhile, D Bank gave D “title” 
to that part of D’s deposit account that is attributable to the stolen funds.  NPI’s 
only remedy is to ratify D’s act and make D a constructive trustee for D’s 
deposit account.  This proves that, when deposit accounts are involved, it is 
constructive trust theory all the way down.193  It is not clear that Omegas 
survives Newpower at all when stolen funds are involved. 
In Poss v. Morris (In re Morris), Judge Batchelder enforced what the 
beneficial owner called constructive trust.194  This holding arose in a mass of 
tedious procedural knots that profits no one to untangle.195  Suffice it to say that, 
 
190. “The general rule ‘that a constructive trust will arise when stolen or embezzled funds are 
used to purchase other property . . . often is qualified by the provision that the owner may follow and 
recover the property or its proceeds as long as it has not been transferred to a bona fide purchaser.’”  
SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 04 Civ. 2322, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35342 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 
2008) (citing J.A. Bryant, Annotation, Imposition of a Constructive Trust in Property Bought with 
Stolen or Embezzled Funds, 38 A.L.R.3d 1354 § 3 (1971)). 
191. Per Judge Kennedy’s opinion: 
Thus, the $382,463 that [D] embezzled directly from NPI was never property of 
[D’s] estate . . . .  However, the same cannot be said of property that [D] 
purchased for himself with the stolen money.  The good faith seller from which 
the thief purchases property intends to pass both title and possession of the 
property sold to the thief, and obtains good title to the money the thief 
provides. . . .  Accordingly, the thief obtains legal title to the goods purchased, 
which thereby become part of his estate . . . . 
The original owner would normally not be without remedy in such a 
situation, as a constructive trust may be imposed on the proceeds held by the thief 
or embezzler . . .  However, under In re Omegas, a constructive trust is an 
equitable interest that exempts property from the bankrupt’s estate 
under § 541(d), only if the trust is declared by a court in a separate prepetition 
proceeding or a state statute provides that the property is to be held in trust for a 
particular purpose. 
Newpower, 233 F.3d at 930–31. 
192. Carlson, Conduit, supra note 1, at 485–91. 
193. SMITH, Tracing, supra note 55, at 7–8. 
194. 260 F.3d 654, 668 (6th Cir. 2001). 
195. I share one sentence from In re Morris to scare off readers from this unrewarding Gordian 
knot: “The structure of this second transaction resulted in an anomalous situation in which Poss owned 
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in response to a state money judgment lawsuit, D promised V that D would 
convey real estate to V.  The settlement was solemnized as a judgment of the 
state court.  D defaulted and filed for bankruptcy.  The stay was lifted at V’s 
behest, and a state court affirmed that V had equitable title to the real property. 
What we have here is, basically, a real estate sales contract—a case of 
equitable conversion.196  There is no need to call this a “constructive trust.”  
“Constructive trust” implies that legal title in the constructive trustee can be 
rescinded.  But equitable conversion does not turn on the right of rescission.  It 
exists independently of any such right. 
Nevertheless, V labeled the right as one of constructive trust, and Judge 
Batchelder, accepting this questionable taxonomy,197 upheld V and 
distinguished Omegas. 
Omegas, Judge Batchelder reminisced, merely counsels the parsimonious 
use of constructive trust doctrine to override “the bankruptcy policy of ratable 
distribution among creditors” which “conflicts with the constructive trust 
remedy . . . ”198  Also, since V had obtained a lift of the automatic stay and since 
a state court announced V had equitable title, the “constructive trust” (that is, 
equitable title arising under the doctrine of equitable conversion) declared by a 
state court was binding in bankruptcy.199 
 
the building housing Morris’s business, Morris owned the land on which the building was situated, and 
each leased his or her respective interest to the other.”  Id. at 658.  Needless to say, neither Poss nor 
Morris had benefit of counsel before cooking up this legal back-of-a-napkin relationship. 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 86–96. 
197. In her opinion, Judge Batchelder writes: 
Ohio follows the traditional rule of the common law that regards contracts for the 
conveyance of real property as falling within the jurisdiction of courts of equity 
because of the inherent inadequacy of any legal remedy . . . .  Although the 
availability of an equitable remedy . . . depends upon on the inadequacy of a 
remedy at law, “where land is the subject matter of the agreement, the jurisdiction 
of equity to grant specific performance does not depend upon the existence of 
special facts showing the inadequacy of a legal remedy in the particular 
case.” . . . .  In other words, under Ohio law a contract for the conveyance of real 
property falls squarely within the equitable jurisdiction to fashion an appropriate 
remedy. 
In re Morris, 260 F.3d at 667–68 (citations omitted).  There follows a non sequitur: “Essentially, Ohio 
courts will use the remedy of constructive trust ‘where there is some ground . . . upon which equity 
will grant relief.’”  Id. (citing Henkle v. Henkle, 600 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)).  The 
ellipses substitute for “such as fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake.”  Henkle, 600 N.E.2d at 796.  
In short, a real estate contract is equated with fraud, distress, etc., by Judge Batchelder. 
198. Morris, 260 F.3d at 666. 
199. Id. at 667 (“Of course, whether a judgment obtained by a creditor in a state court proceeding 
initiated prepetition . . . following the lifting of the automatic stay has an effective date prior to the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition is a matter left to state law.”). 
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Finally, Judge Batchelder admitted that Omegas had already been overruled 
in one crucial respect: 
Although in Omegas Group we said that a constructive trust 
“does not exist until a plaintiff obtains a judicial decision 
finding him to be entitled to a judgment ‘impressing’ 
defendant’s property or assets with a constructive 
trust,” . . . we recognized in McCafferty that a constructive 
trust can arise without a formal judicial decision under Ohio 
law.  This case addresses one of the questions Newpower noted 
remained open following Omegas Group, namely whether the 
bankruptcy court may give effect to a state court judgment 
obtained postpetition in an action initiated prepetition.  We 
answer that question affirmatively, reaffirming that state law 
governs the effective date of such a judgment.200 
To underscore this holding, the Morris court also overruled the bankruptcy 
court’s holding that the constructive trust was a voidable preference.  A 
voidable preference it was, if constructive trusts do not pre-exist their 
declaration.201  But since a constructive trust does pre-exist its declaration if 
state law says it does, the voidable preference holding became untenable and 
had to be reversed.202 
In the name of completeness, reference should be made to a case appearing 
early in the above-described sequence of Sixth Circuit opinions.  In Blachy v. 
Butcher, the court of appeals ruled, as a matter of Michigan state law, that a 
constructive trust on real property never pre-exists its judicial declaration.203  
 
200. Id. at 669. 
201. Mason v. Clark (In re Book), No. 11-62686, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3303 at *13 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio Aug. 1, 2013). 
202. In re Morris, 260 F.3d at 669–70.  How was a postpetition declaration of the trust a 
prepetition transfer to V (in the opinion of the bankruptcy court)?  Prior to bankruptcy, V had sued on 
breach of the settlement agreement and had obtained on an ex parte basis an order directing the registrar 
of deeds to record V as the owner of the disputed real property.  Id. at 659.  After bankruptcy, the state 
appellate court ruled that the ex parte order was procedurally inappropriate.  Id. at 660.  On postpetition 
remand, the trial court ruled that, although it could not order the registrar of deeds to record V as the 
owner, V was invited to seek specific performance based upon a prepetition equitable title.  Id. at 661.  
Thus, the bankruptcy court thought, the constructive trust had been declared prepetition in a nunc pro 
tunc style.  Id. at 662. 
203. 221 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2000). Judge Ronald Lee Gilman, would write: 
Even a diabolical bar examiner would be reluctant to impose this case’s 
complex mixture of subject matter jurisdiction, fraud, real estate, marital 
property, bankruptcy, tax liens, contributory negligence, equitable remedies, 
and civil procedure upon hapless law school graduates.  Because reality often 
marches in where creators of hypotheticals fear to tread, however, we are the 
“hapless” appellate court judges obliged to struggle with this twisted tale of true-
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Omegas was cited, but only to prove that constructive trusts not yet judicially 
declared are “inchoate”204 and therefore subordinate to a tax lien under federal 
tax law. 
LTDC was a land-owning partnership owned by H and W (husband and 
wife). LTDC granted to H and W a tenancy by the entirety (duly recorded) to 
17.83 acres of a residential development.  LTDC then double-conveyed 12.6 
acres of the H-W 17.83 acres to HCDC, yet another partnership owned by H 
and W.  H and W permitted LTDC and HCDC to sell to various V.  Of course, 
legal title was not theirs to sell.  H and W continued to own the 17.83 acres. 
The V would later claim that H and W held title in constructive trust because 
the V had been defrauded by the sales by LTDC and HTDC to the V. This must 
be sharply questioned. H and W were not transferees of title from the V.  This 
is what is required if H and W are to be considered constructive trustees.  In fact 
the V were not transferors.  They were transferees—or more precisely non-
transferees since their vendors had no title to sell. 
Quite unrelatedly, the V were duped by non-owners of real estate to part 
with their money.  If anything, LTDC and HTDC were constructive trustees of 
the Vs’ money.  To the extent H and W received this money as the owners of 
LTDC and HTDC, H and W were constructive trustees of money.  Their title to 
the 17.83 acres was unaffected by the actions of LTDC and HTDC. 
To add fuel to the fire, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed a tax 
against H and W, thereby giving rise to a federal tax lien.205  An issue would be 
whether or not the IRS was senior to the V with regard to the real property 
owned by H and W.  Properly, the V had no claim to the H-W lands at all. 
 
life conflict. 
Id. at 900. 
204. Id. at 906.  In the early 20th century, state law began to experiment with floating security 
interests in personal property.  Starting in 1929, however, the Supreme Court ruled, in effect, that 
inchoate liens were not really liens.  See Spokane Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 94 (1929); Frank 
R. Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal Government against 
the Inchoate Lien, 50 IOWA L. REV. 724 (1965).  Inchoate liens were uncertain as to “(1) the identity 
of the lienor, (2) the property subject to the lien, and (3) the amount payable were fixed beyond 
possibility of change or dispute.” William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities–Agenda for the 
Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 230 (1967); see United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 
(1954).  Any creditor with a prior “floating” security interest found it could not claim to have a lien at 
all, insofar as the tax lien was concerned.  See generally William H. Baker, Drye and Craft—How Two 
Wrongs Can Make a Property Right, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 745, 748–57 (2003).  Thus, at an early stage, 
federal law felt entitled to call the bluff of state law.  Just because state law called the inchoate interest 
“property” did not make it so.  Inchoate interests are not property at all, insofar as federal tax liens are 
concerned. 
205. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2012). 
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Later W (but not H) filed for bankruptcy.  After the bankruptcy, H conveyed 
his interest in the debatable lands to W, so that W’s bankruptcy trustee and W 
were cotenants to the property.206 
W’s 50% share was her postpetition property, not subject to the automatic 
stay emanating from her bankruptcy.  I shall refer to this 50% as W’s 
nonbankruptcy half.  V commenced litigation against this half, first in state 
court and then, after removal, in federal district court.  Hence, litigation 
continued in bankruptcy court for the bankruptcy half and in the federal district 
court for the nonbankruptcy half.  The district court responded by remanding 
the nonbankruptcy litigation to the bankruptcy court, which then had before it 
both halves of the cotenancy.207 
First, with regard to the bankruptcy litigation, but for the constructive trust 
claim of the V, W’s prepetition 50% share went into W’s bankruptcy estate.  The 
entireties could (if W so wished) be exempted,208 but no exemption claim could 
be valid against a joint creditor, such as the IRS.209  Since the V were all joint 
creditors,210 they (together with the IRS) guaranteed that the entireties was 
completely nonexempt in W’s bankruptcy.  W’s bankruptcy trustee, though, 
could sell the whole and retain 50% for W’s creditors within the bankruptcy.211   
The 50% surplus was postpetition property that would belong to W free and 
clear of W’s bankruptcy.212 
But now we must add the issue of constructive trust.  Properly, any 
constructive trust claim by the V lay against the money conveyed to LTDC and 
HTDC.  The H-W title to the 17.83 acres was quite free and clear of a 
constructive trust theory.  Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court ruled that V had 
the equitable interest in the 17.83 acres and that W’s bankruptcy trustee and W 
 
206. In a Michigan tenancy by the entirety, the conveyance of H to a non-spouse is a nullity.  But 
H’s conveyance to W (making W the 100% owner) will be honored.  United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 
274, 282–84 (2002) (explaining that H has power to alienate with consent of W). 
207. Blachy, 221 F.3d at 901–02. 
208. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
209. Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777 F.2d 921, 925–29 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying Virginia 
and Maryland law). 
210. The V claimed the right to compel H and W to convey to them legal title to their homes.  
Yet we have emphasized that the beneficiaries of a constructive trust are not creditors.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 52–72.  But the V would find themselves subordinate to the IRS tax lien.  Given 
no access to the constructive trust property, the V would have to locate in the concept of unjust 
enrichment an in personam right to payment if for some reason H and W could not convey legal title. 
211. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h). 
212. For details on the mysterious status of Michigan tenancy by the entirety in bankruptcy 
proceedings, see David Gray Carlson, The Federal Law of Property: The Case of Inheritance 
Disclaimers and Tenancy by the Entireties, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 60–203 (2018). 
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held their 50% shares in constructive trust for the V.  We shall treat the mistaken 
constructive trust claim as valid for the purposes of our discussion. 
Under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(3), the trustee is a bona fide purchaser for 
value of W’s share of the tenancy by the entirety.  But bankruptcy trustees are 
subject to the doctrine of inquiry notice.  According to this doctrine, the 
bankruptcy trustee is charged with knowledge of the rights of persons in 
possession of real estate.213  The V alleging constructive trust were all in 
residence, and so the constructive trust was valid in bankruptcy, in light of 
inquiry notice.  This is so, at least, outside the Sixth Circuit.214 
Omegas, however, interfered with this conclusion.  Thus, in W’s 
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court had allowed the constructive trust on W’s 
share.  The district court reversed and remanded on the ground of Omegas. 
On remand, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay so that the V and 
the IRS could pursue W’s postpetition 50% and also the bankruptcy trustee’s 
half.  After this point, the district court had sole jurisdiction over both halves.  
When the case eventually reached the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the appeal 
dealt entirely with a nonbankruptcy case.  It was not an appeal from the 
bankruptcy case. 
The district court declared a constructive trust on both halves of the 17.83 
acres.  It also found that the constructive trust related back to the time of the 
wrong.  Thus the Vs’ equitable title was free and clear of the subsequent IRS 
tax lien. 
The court of appeals reversed.  It first ruled (without citing Omegas) that 
the constructive trust did not exist—either on the bankruptcy half of the land or 
on the non-bankruptcy half: 
Under Michigan law, a “constructive trust is strictly not a trust 
at all, but merely a remedy administered in certain fraudulent 
breaches of trusts.”  Accordingly, a constructive trust does not 
arise until a judicial decision imposes such a trust under 
Michigan law.215 
For this the court cited Soo Sand & Gravel Co. v. M. Sullivan Dredging 
Co.216  In fact, Soo stands for the opposite conclusion.  In Soo, a plaintiff with 
an equitable interest in land held in constructive trust by another was allowed 
to bring a suit for trespass, even though, prior to the trespass suit, no court had 
ever declared a constructive trust.  Therefore, Soo actually affirms that 
 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 117–18. 
214. Blachy v. Butcher, 221 F 3d. 896 (6th Cir. 2000).   
215. Id. at 905 (citations omitted). 
216. 244 N.W. 138, 140 (Mich. 1932). 
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constructive trusts pre-exist their judicial declaration.217  Thus Blachy aligns 
with the Omegas holding, but it (erroneously) attributed the federal Omegas 
rule to the law of the state of Michigan. 
Alternatively, the court of appeals ruled that the constructive trust claim of 
the V was “inchoate” and therefore not valid against the IRS tax lien, as a matter 
of federal law.218  Therefore, the IRS had a senior tax lien against both shares—
the one owned by W’s bankruptcy trustee and the share owned by W personally.  
The IRS could sell the homes of the V who were living on the premises, because 
these V mistakenly believed their predecessor in interest had legal title to the 
property they bought.  Happily, they had title insurance protecting them from 
the IRS lien.219 
Where is the Sixth Circuit after these cases?  If V has commenced an action 
to impress a constructive trust, and if the automatic stay is lifted and a state 
court impresses a constructive trust, the state court declaration is binding on the 
bankruptcy court.220  The Sixth Circuit has not expressly permitted an Erie221 
guess by a bankruptcy court predicting that a state court would impose a 
constructive trust, but such a practice makes perfect sense.  If it does, Omegas 
is dead. 
One Ohio case implies Omegas is dead, and there is no need to drum up an 
exception via Newpower or Poss.  In Helbling v. Thomas (In re Thomas),222 a 
homeowner was persuaded to make a son and daughter joint tenants with him 
of his home to solve probate problems.  The scrivener botched the deed and 
made the son fee simple owner of the home.  Later, the son was bankrupt.  The 
trustee sought to sell the house for the benefit of the son’s creditors.  The court 
blocked the sale and imposed a constructive trust on the son’s interest.  Here 
there was no motion to lift the stay and no prior judicial declaration.  Omegas 
 
217. In In re Carrick Trucking, Inc., the district court distinguished the contrary Poss decision: 
Poss was under Ohio law, where constructive trusts relate back.  Carrick v. Hagan (In re Carrick 
Trucking, Inc.), No. 15-cv 13115, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53980, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 
2016).  But, according to Blachy, there is never a relation-back in Michigan.  Id. at *6.  “Appellants 
provide no authority for the claim that Michigan law does not require a court of law to impose a 
constructive trust before one is recognized.”  Id. at *7.  In fact, Soo Sand is a contrary authority.  244 
N.W. at 140. 
218. Blachy, 221 F.3d at 905–06.  For this Omega was cited, as if this bankruptcy holding 
clinched inchoateness outside of bankruptcy.  Id. at 906. 
219. Id. at 906. 
220. In re Blume, 582 B.R. 178, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2017). 
221. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).   
222. No. 12-14916, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5644 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2013). 
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was treated as a dead letter.223  In so ruling, the court ignored cases like Belisle 
v. Plunkett, which hold that a bankruptcy trustee is a hypothetical bona fide 
purchaser of real property pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(3) who takes 
free and clear of constructive trusts on real property.224  
Yet another case suggests that Omegas is basically alive and that exceptions 
must be located.  In Mason v. Clark (In re Book),225 A and D were cotenants.  A 
paid D for her 50% share but never took a deed.  Just before D’s bankruptcy D 
executed the deed.  The trustee claimed that D’s deed was a voidable 
preference.  A defended on the ground that A had an equitable interest in the 
premises before the 90-day preference period commenced.  If true, this was a 
valid defense.226  Judge Russ Kendig found that no motion to lift the stay was 
involved (per Newpower).  Nor (the court surmised) was there an enforceable 
real estate contract (as in Poss).227  Therefore A had no equitable interest before 
receiving the deed and so was guilty of voidable preference.  It may be noted 
that, even if A had an equitable interest in the real property, it was an 
 
223. Id. at *5–8.  In fact, the court went too far in blocking the sale.  It appears that the 
homeowner intended his son to get some beneficial interest in the property.  According to the court, “It 
was [the homeowner’s] understanding that the document would allow his children to become joint 
owners . . . upon his death.”  Id. at *5.  From this it appears that the son was intended to have a legal 
and equitable 50% of a vested remainder following the homeowner’s life estate.  There was no reason 
why the son’s bankruptcy trustee should not sell this interest. 
224. 877 F.2d 512, 514–15 (7th Cir. 1989). 
225. No. 11-62686, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3303 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2013) (Kendig, J.).  
226. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2012) provides that a transfer is a voidable preference if it 
[E]nables such creditor to receives more than such creditor would receive if— 
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the 
provisions of this title. 
If, however, A has the right to force transfer of legal title to A in the bankruptcy, the prepetition 
conveyance does not enable A to receive more than what A would have received in the bankruptcy. 
227. This last remark seems to contradict other parts of the In re Book opinion.  Judge Kendig 
had ruled that the prepetition deed was not a fraudulent transfer in that A paid value.  In re Book, 2013 
Bankr. LEXIS 3303, at *8–9.  If A paid value, then either the advance of $35,000 was pursuant to a 
real estate contract or the advance was a loan, and the prepetition deed was payment on antecedent 
debt.  Judge Kendig certainly implied there was a real estate contract when he wrote: “[A] paid [D] 
$35,000 for [D’s] interest in the property.”  Id. at *2.  Judge Kendig also recognized that the $35,000 
was “for” the title to D’s 50% cotenancy: “[A] paid $35,000 to [D].  At the time the property was 
transferred to [A], it was valued at $30,000.  On these figures, the benefit in the transaction tilts in [D’s] 
favor: she received more than she gave, especially if the time value of money is factored.”  Id. at *8–
9.  Certainly Judge Kendig could have found that A qualified for the Poss exception.  For present 
purposes, we note that Judge Kendig did not think Omegas was dead. 
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unperfected interest until D actually executed the deed before bankruptcy.228  
Therefore, the equitable interest was deemed to arise when it was perfected—
when D signed and delivered the deed.229  A constructive trust (more accurately, 
equitable conversion) theory would not have helped A in the slightest. 
A third case assumes that Omega lives on, but under circumstances in which 
an undersecured creditor was denied the right to an equitable interest in a 
valueless equity.  In In re Warns,230 D owned an LLC which had granted a 
mortgage and a security interest to SP, a secured creditor.  At a time when the 
loan was underwater, the LLC conveyed its interest in real and personal 
property to D.231  D then filed for bankruptcy in chapter 13.  SP moved to lift 
the automatic stay and, apparently wishing to avoid the controversy of whether 
the property was necessary to an effective reorganization,232 sought the 
declaration of a constructive trust on its valueless equity.  The court invoked 
Omega to prevent this gesture, acknowledging but holding irrelevant the 
various exceptions.  In fact, there was no constructive trust here.  SP was a 
nonrecourse mortgagee with a claim in the chapter 13 proceeding.233 
It is fair to say that, in the Sixth Circuit, constructive trust claims are 
imperiled, where they have not been declared prior to bankruptcy. 
E. The First Circuit 
Danger lurks in the First Circuit due to Judge James Queenan, an 
outstanding theorist of bankruptcy law.  Finding constructive trusts to be 
contrary to federal bankruptcy policy, Judge Queenan adds new ideas to those 
to be found in Omegas. 
In CRS Steam, Inc. v. Engineering Resources (In re CRS Steam, Inc.),234 D 
had signed an Illinois employment contract which provided that anything D 
invented belonged to E, his employer.  In addition, E was to own any new patent 
developed within 90 days after termination of employment. 
 
228. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B). 
229. Id. § 547(e)(2)(B). 
230. No. 12-16420, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2379, at *2–3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 3, 2013). 
231. Id.  The real property conveyance did not seem in any way fraudulent.  The personal 
property conveyance was accomplished after the LLC had filed dissolution papers, which gave rise to 
a duty by the LLC to use its assets for pay the creditors.  Id.  A alleged that this breach of duty justified 
declaration of a constructive trust.  Id. at *3–4. 
232. This would have been grounds to sustain continuance of the automatic stay.  
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). 
233. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83–84 (1991). 
234. 225 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998).  This case is discussed in Ashley S. Hohimer, 
Comment, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Is an Equitable Interest in Property More Than Just a 
“Claim”?, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 499, 518–27 (2003). 
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D’s employment terminated.  D invented some gizmos and also (said a jury) 
stole trade secrets.  D formed a corporation (CRS) and assigned the patent to it.  
E sued for breach of contract and expropriation of trade secrets.  A jury 
adjudged in favor of E.  D therefore was probably thus rendered insolvent.  As 
Judge Queenan describes the subsequent events: 
[E] thereafter requested injunctive relief to prevent future use 
or disclosure of its trade secrets.  It asked the court to enjoin 
the defendants from further conduct in violation of either 
[Illinois trade secrets law] or the employment agreement.  [E] 
also sought a mandatory injunction requiring them to assign to 
[E] all their right, title and interest in the patents. 
On April 29, 1997, [within 90 days of the bankruptcy 
petitions for D and CRS], the district court granted the 
requested injunctive relief, including a mandatory injunction 
ordering [D and CRS] to assign the patents.  It did so after 
concluding that the jury found [D] had misappropriated the 
designs encompassed within the patents. . . .  On May 22, 
1997, [D] executed and delivered to [E] an assignment of the 
patents . . . .235 
Apparently, the district court supplemented E’s unsecured claim for trade 
secret violations with an equitable remedy vaguely representing a proceeds 
theory: because the purloined trade secrets were the stuff of the later patent, E 
owned the patent that arose from the trade secrets.236 
Judge Queenan thought it important that this particular equitable claim (and 
perhaps all equitable claims) were bankruptcy “claims” within the meaning of 
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B).237  But it is not clear what purchase this observation has.  
What really decides the case is the assumption that a constructive trust does not 
pre-exist a judicial decree imposing it.238 
 
235. In re CRS Steam, Inc., 225 B.R. at 835–36. 
236. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508–16 (1980) (United States owned proceeds of 
a book written by a CIA agent on the basis of “trade secrets”); Flannery v. Flannery Bolt Co., 108 F.2d 
531, 532–34 (3d Cir. 1939) (embezzled funds used to fund research which resulted in a patent; patent 
held to be proceeds of a constructive trust). 
237. According to this provision, “claim” includes the “right to an equitable remedy for breach 
of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable 
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, 
or unsecured.” 
238. In re CRS Steam, Inc., 225 B.R. at 845. 
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Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Davis 
v. Cox, upheld what it called a constructive trust. 239  Superficially, this could 
be viewed as overruling CRS.  But the property interest in Davis did not meet 
our definition of a rescindable transfer of legal title to D by V.  Rather, the court 
had before it a classic case of in custodia legis. Therefore, one can view Davis 
as misusing the phrase “constructive trust,” so that CRS is not really overruled. 
In Davis, prior to his bankruptcy, D was subject to divorce proceedings 
instigated by W.  Maine law required the divorce court to issue an injunction 
against alienating marital assets out of the ordinary course.240  D violated the 
injunction by withdrawing funds from an IRA account.241  D soon filed for 
bankruptcy before distribution of marital property could be accomplished.242 
In bankruptcy, the automatic stay was lifted so that divorce proceedings 
could continue.243  D’s trustee appeared in the divorce proceeding, urging that 
the divorce court determine whether W’s rights arose only at the time of the 
divorce decree (not yet issued) or whether W’s rights in property pre-existed 
the degree. 
The divorce court did not exactly comply.244  It did award the remaining 
funds in the IRA to W as a sanction against D for violating the divorce 
injunction. 
In bankruptcy, the IRA was, under ordinary circumstances, D’s exempt 
property.  W moved to lift the stay so that the divorce judgment could be 
enforced.245  In other words, W wanted the divorce court’s injunction to have 
free reign in the hope that it would induce D to write a check to W for her share 
of the IRA. 
The bankruptcy court ruled that the bankruptcy estate took the IRA free and 
clear of any equitable interest of W and that the IRA could be exempted by D.   
In particular, Maine law gave W the right to an attachment lien on marital 
property before the divorce decree.246  The availability of the attachment 
 
239. 356 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2004); see generally Andrew Cosgrove, Note, Breaking Up Is 
Hard to Do . . . Especially When Bankruptcy Is Involved: A Look at the Unfair Results That Occur 
When Bankruptcy Intervenes in Domestic Relations Cases, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 235 (2006). 
240. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 903(1)(B)(1) (1995). 
241. Davis, 356 F.3d at 79. 
242. Id. at 79–80. 
243. Id. at 80. 
244. Id. at 81, 97. 
245. Id. at 81. 
246. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 903(5) (1995). 
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remedy implies that W had no ownership of the IRA prior to the decree in the 
absence of the attachment.247 
On appeal W maintained that Maine law provided a “non-owner spouse an 
inchoate equitable interest in all marital assets separately owned by the other 
spouse.”248  Alternatively, she claimed a constructive trust in the IRA that pre-
dated the divorce decree. 
Judge Levin Campbell punted as to the complicated first issue on the theory 
that the Maine Supreme Court, not a federal court, should determine so 
momentous a question.249  Instead, Judge Campbell proceeded “narrowly on the 
remedial theory of constructive trust.”250  Judge Campbell observed that an 
injunction had prohibited withdrawals from the IRA.  D violated that injunction.   
Therefore, W had a constructive trust (or more precisely, an equitable lien) on 
the IRA to compensate for withdrawals to the detriment of W’s share.251 
Judge Campbell reviewed Maine’s statutory scheme and concluded that 
commencement of the divorce proceeding, giving rise to a restraining 
injunction, was intended to have property consequences.  He specifically 
disagreed that the attachment remedy implies no equitable interest prior to 
attachment.  Indeed, the IRA was exempt from attachment under Maine law, 
and so that remedy could not assist W where she sought D’s exempt property.  
The legal remedy of attachment was inadequate.  Where legal remedies are 
inadequate, “they may be supplemented by appropriate equitable ones.”252  
 
247. Davis, 356 F.3d at 82 (citation omitted) (“If a divorcing spouse’s contingent rights to a 
distribution of marital property from assets held in the other’s name can be protected by attachment, it 
follows they are unprotected without it (or its functional equivalent) . . . .”). 
248. Id. at 83. 
249. Id. at 84 (“We need not decide, and indeed think it inappropriate for a federal court to decide 
without first seeking more specific guidance from Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court, whether Maine 
law, broadly applied, gives to non-owner spouses in ordinary circumstances after commencement of a 
divorce case, but before entry of judgment, an inchoate equitable interest in marital assets owned by 
the owner spouse.”). 
250. Id.  On the narrowness of its holding, the court states: 
All we need hold here is that where one spouse held title to marital property that, 
as a practical matter, was exempt from attachment, and where the specific facts 
and equities were such as have been described, the non-owner spouse may claim 
to have held an undeclared beneficial interest in the property awarded by the 
divorce court, her interest having been held for her prior to bankruptcy upon a 
constructive trust by the owner-spouse until such time as the divorce decree 
became final and the marital assets were divided. 
Id. at 91. 
251. Id. at 90 (“[T]he $65,250 award was to redress the loss to [W] caused by that misconduct” 
of withdrawing the IRA in violation of the injunction.). 
252. Id. at 89. 
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“Enactment of these particular remedies also betrayed a more general 
legislative intent, once divorce proceedings had begun, to shelter and sequester 
marital assets for the benefit of both spouses until the court could effect their 
just division.”253  The scheme “strongly suggest[s] . . . legislative approval of 
supplemental measures that a court might find reasonable and necessary to 
achieve the goal of safeguarding the marital estate until it can be properly 
divided.”254 
It should be apparent that Judge Campbell is describing the concept of in 
custodia legis, not constructive trust.  A constructive trust is a remedy in aid of 
rescission.255  Yet W never made a rescindable conveyance to D.  Nor is it clear 
that D had legal title in trust for W.  Rather, the divorce court had taken the IRA 
in custodia legis as security for H’s good behavior, pending a later equitable 
division of the property.  The issuance of the restraining injunction is the 
moment of the court’s expropriation of D’s property.  
If so, then the status of IRA exactly matches the status of certain funds that 
the prepetition divorce court ordered be held in escrow accounts of the attorneys 
for the parties.  “Those funds were not to be moved, used, or transferred absent 
a court order.”256 
As to the funds held in escrow, the bankruptcy court held that 
the state court’s pre-petition order placing the funds in escrow 
operated effectively as an attachment of those funds. . . .  As a 
result, [W]’s right to benefit from the distribution of the escrow 
funds in accordance with the divorce judgment was superior to 
the rights of the bankruptcy estate in the funds.257 
The court held that the escrow funds were in custodia legis.258  The meaning 
of this is that “the funds held in custodia legis did not pass into the bankruptcy 
estate.”259  This goes too far.  Surely D has some interest in the escrowed funds.  
The interest matches the “debtor equity” that exists after a judicial lien attaches 
to D’s property.  In any case, the point is that if the escrow funds were in 
 
253. Id. at 86. 
254. Id. at 90.  The court also found that W was the beneficiary of a resulting trust.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
255. Cosgrove, supra note 239, at 267 (“there [was] not fraud in the ordinary sense of the word”). 
256. Davis, 356 F.3d at 79. 
257. Id. at 82 (citations omitted).  On appeal, D argued that some of the escrowed funds were 
exempt, and if the escrow was an attachment, the funds were exempt and that D should have them.  Id. 
at 94.  The court of appeals noted that, according to the bankruptcy court, the property was “effectively 
attached,” not “actually attached.”  Id.  Therefore, the funds were not beyond the competence of the 
divorce court to order disposition of the funds.  Id. 
258. Id. at 93. 
259. Id. 
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custodia legis, so were the IRA funds.  There is no distinction between these 
two funds. 
Since CRS and Davis, the First Circuit picture is confused.  In Piccerelli v. 
Piccerelli (In re Piccerelli),260 the court was presented with a straight case of 
the doctrine of equitable conversion.  The court seemed not to know that such 
a doctrine existed and proclaimed that it could not be a constructive trust, since 
a constructive trust requires that legal title be transferred to a transferee.  Since 
the debtor’s legal title pre-existed the real estate contract, it could not be a 
constructive trust and so the plaintiffs were simple breach-of-contract creditors.  
Nevertheless, if it were a constructive trust, the court was prepared to deny 
recognition of it.  The plaintiffs could be made whole by money damages and, 
so on the authority of CRS, the constructive trust claim, if it existed, should be 
denied. 
In Cellceutix Corp. v. Nickless (In re Formatech, Inc.),261 the court also 
shows a shaky grasp of equity jurisprudence.  In Formatech, V made an asset 
payment to a vendor that was not licensed to provide the service.  V filed an 
adversary proceeding seeking to “rescind.”  No one mentioned the word 
“constructive trust,” but the court did note that the bankruptcy estate had within 
in it a mere voidable title—a conclusion consistent with constructive trust.  The 
court refused to give summary judgment for the trustee, and so the case leaves 
open the possibility that a constructive trust might be imposed by a Bankruptcy 
Code.262 
More directly, in Carlson Orchards, Inc. v. Linsey (In re Linsey),263 D 
embezzled funds and used them to enhance real property and to buy a car for 
her nondebtor spouse.  The court recognized constructive trusts on the real 
property and car, noting that, in light of a claimed real property exemption, V 
was not in competition for these assets with D’s general creditors. 
In Davis v. Cox,264 the First Circuit upheld what it called a constructive 
trust.  But in fact it really dealt with the concept of in custodia legis.265   
Therefore, it is less than clear that Davis compels the conclusion that CRS is 
overruled.  The fate of the constructive trust in the First Circuit is cloudy. 
 
260. 525 B.R. 184, 190–93 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015). 
261. 496 B.R. 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). 
262. See id. at 35–40; see also Lassman v. McQuillan (In re Charles River Press Lithography, 
Inc.), 338 B.R. 148, 156, 162 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (upholding a trust in an insurance policy because 
it was either a resulting or constructive trust). 
263. 296 B.R. 582, 585–86, 590 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003). 
264. 356 F.3d 76.  See generally Cosgrove, supra note 239. 
265. See supra text accompanying notes 101–05. 
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Finally, just before press time, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Darr 
v. Dos Santos (In re TelexFree, LLC),266 has ruled that all constructive claims 
are “derivative”267 (i.e. duplicative) of constructive trust claims.  Therefore, V 
was barred from pursuing a constructive trust claim against X, and the 
bankruptcy trustee was able to displace V with fraudulent transfer claims 
against X.  I will criticize this conclusion in due course.268  For the nonce, I note 
that TelexFree cites the notorious Omegas opinion with favor,269 suggesting 
that TelexFree must be read as announcing the death of constructive trusts in 
bankruptcy cases. 
 
F. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit has held that, as a matter of California law, a constructive 
trust does not antedate a court order imposing it.  In effect, this opinion, if 
followed, eliminates constructive trusts in any California case.270 
In CHoPP Computer Corp. v. United States,271 D made a short sale of stock 
in V Corp. and then made disparaging remarks about V Corp., hoping to drive 
down the price of the shares.  D then presumably bought covering shares on the 
cheap, thereby completing its short sale.  This tactic resulted in a profit for D. 
V Corp. brought some sort of tort action in state court and obtained a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting D from transferring out the short sale profits 
from D’s brokerage account.  While the injunction was pending, the Internal 
Revenue Service obtained a money judgment and levied the brokerage account.  
After the levy, the state court imposed a constructive trust on all short-sale 
profits. 
It should be easy to see that a constructive trust in the case was 
inappropriate.  A constructive trust requires V Corp. to make a conveyance of 
some property to D.  No such thing happened here.  Actually, a better claim for 
V Corp. was that, by issuing a preliminary injunction, the court brought the 
brokerage account in custodia legis before any creditor could obtain a lien.  
 
266. 941 F.3d 576 (1st Cir. 2019). 
267. Id. at 588. 
268. See infra text accompanying notes 423–28. 
269. In re TelexFree, 941 F.3d at 586 n.8 (“Allowing one group of victims to bring its claims 
first ‘thwarts the policy of ratable distribution” at the heart of  bankruptcy law.”) (citing XL/Datacomp, 
Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp, Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1451 (6th Cir. 1994). 
270. See Wadsworth v. Talmage, 911 F.3d 994, 995 (9th Cir. 2018) (certifying a similar question 
to the Oregon Supreme Court). 
271. 5 F.3d 1344, 1345–48 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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Such a theory would have allowed V Corp. to prevail without any reliance on 
constructive trust theory. 
V Corp. then sued the IRS and the broker maintaining the account, claiming 
that the IRS had converted V Corp. property by means of the levy. 
The court, however, ruled that V Corp. had no constructive trust until the 
court declared the constructive trust to exist.272  Its reasoning seemed to 
emphasize, however, that the trial court was wrong to declare a constructive 
trust in a case that only sought money damages.  But because the case did not 
really have a constructive trust before it, it is perhaps best ignored. 
Earlier, the Ninth Circuit gave lukewarm endorsement of constructive trusts 
in bankruptcy cases, but found that imposition of the trust was inappropriate on 
the facts of the case. 
In Torres v. Eastlick (In re North American Coin & Currency, Ltd.),273 V 
paid in advance for precious metals that D, a broker, promised to procure.  
Before the procurement, D filed for bankruptcy.  V sought to receive its money 
back, but the court declined to find a constructive trust.  
While we agree that any constructive trust that is given effect 
must be a creature of Arizona law, we cannot accept the 
proposition that the bankruptcy estate is automatically 
deprived of any funds that state law might find subject to a 
constructive trust . . .  A constructive trust is not the same kind 
of interest in property as a joint tenancy or a remainder.  It is a 
remedy, flexibly fashioned in equity to provide relief where a 
balancing of interests in the context of a particular case seems 
to call for it.  Moreover, in the case presented here it is an 
inchoate remedy; we are not dealing with property that a state 
court decree has in the past placed under a constructive trust.  
We necessarily act very cautiously in exercising such a 
relatively undefined equitable power in favor of one group of 
potential creditors at the expense of other creditors, for ratable 
distribution among all creditors is one of the strongest policies 
behind the bankruptcy laws.274 
The case falls short of ruling that constructive trusts are not valid in 
bankruptcy.  Indeed, it recognizes that “[t]he principle underlying this rule is 
that the creditors should not benefit from fraud at the expense of those who 
have been defrauded.”275 
 
272. Id. at 1348–49.  The court cites GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 472 (rev. 2d ed. 1978). 
273. 767 F.2d 1573 (9th Cir. 1985). 
274. Id. at 1575 (citations omitted).  
275. Id. at 1576. 
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G. Summary 
We have seen that the doctrine of constructive trust is in great disarray.  
Many cases are called “constructive trust” cases but are really something else.  
In three circuits, constructive trusts have been proclaimed not to exist prior to 
their declaration by a court before bankruptcy.  Where such a doctrinal error is 
insisted upon, a constructive trust cannot survive in bankruptcy.  In most 
circuits, however, constructive trust theory dates back to the wrong it addresses.  
Where the trust property is real estate, the constructive trust may fall to the 
trustee’s strong-arm power under § 544(a)(3) (though, bizarrely, there is a 
surviving constructive trust on the fixtures).  Constructive trusts in personal 
property are on solid ground, however, in most circuits. 
IV. WHAT IS A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER? 
Very roughly speaking, fraudulent transfers are gifts by D for no valuable 
consideration at a time when D is insolvent.276  In the alternative, they are 
“midnight liquidations” with the idea of hiding the cash from creditors (bulk 
sales).277  In such cases, there is a buyer for some kind of consideration.  If the 
buyer knows of D’s intent to hinder the creditors, the buyer has received a 
fraudulent transfer.  If the buyer is a good faith transferee for a reasonably 
equivalent value, the buyer takes both legal and equitable title free and clear of 
D’s creditors.278   
Taken in isolation, courts (indeed the uniform fraudulent transfer statutes) 
are deeply confused about the nature of a fraudulent transfer.  Courts puzzle 
over whether a fraudulent transfer is void or merely voidable.  If void, X has no 
 
276. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (2012) (listing insolvency and proxies for insolvency); 
UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTION ACT § 4(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (proxies for insolvency); 
Id. § 5 (insolvency). 
277. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (“actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity . . .”); UNIF. 
VOIDABLE TRANSACTION ACT § 4(a)(1). 
278. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c); UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTION ACT § 8(a).  These conform with two 
of the three “paradigm examples” in Boston Trading Grps., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st 
Cir. 1987).  One paradigm I think does not describe a fraudulent transfer: 
First (and most important), suppose that a debtor conveys property to a friend 
whom he expects will use the property in a way that benefits the debtor (suppose, 
for example, the friend lets the debtor retain possession of the property or 
secretly agrees to return the property after the debtor’s creditors have given up).  
In such a case, the debtor in effect lies to his creditors, pretending he has no 
property left, when he really has some (in the hands of his friend). 
Id.  A fraudulent transfer requires a complete alienation of legal and equitable title to X.  Where X 
retains rights in the thing transferred, we do not have a fraudulent transfer.  The creditors do not need 
an avoidance theory if D retains present or future rights in the property. 
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property interest in the thing conveyed.  The thing remains D’s property.279  If 
voidable, D has no interest in the thing conveyed to X.  The transfer must be 
“set aside,”280 at which point it becomes D’s property again, and C may “levy 
execution”281 on the thing.282 
Whether a fraudulent transfer is void or voidable is a deep, unanswerable 
question, just as is the question whether light is a wave or a particle.  In physics 
light is a wave for some theoretical inquiries.  It is a particle for others.  Neither 
position is able to exclude the other.  So it is with fraudulent transfers, Courts 
cannot legitimately declare for all purpose that they are void or voidable.  Either 
theory does violence to some aspect of the doctrine.283  The controversy will 
influence our consideration of colliding worlds. 
Fraudulent transfers are very different from constructive trusts yet they 
share many features.  First, the differences.  From the perspective of a bankrupt 
D, as regards a constructive trust, a conveyance to D in trust makes D the holder 
of legal title (but not equitable title). A fraudulent transfer by the D makes 
someone else (we’ll designate him as X) the title holder.  Thus, from D’s 
perspective, legal title arrives under constructive trust doctrine.  Legal title 
departs under fraudulent transfer law. 
Yet the two doctrines overlap.  Suppose D holds title in constructive trust.  
D then conveys title to a bad faith purchaser for value or to a purchaser for no 
consideration (X), X holds title in trust for V, the victim.284  Similarly, suppose 
D (owning both legal and equitable title) fraudulently transfers a thing to X.  In 
a fraudulent transfer situation, X holds title in trust for the benefit D’s creditors 
(C).285  When D conveyed trust property, V owns the cause of action.  In the 
case of fraudulent transfer, C owns the cause of action.  If D is bankrupt, the 
 
279. Am. Nat’l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 
1272–73 (5th Cir. 1983). 
280. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(1)(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1918). 
281. Id. § 9(1)(b); UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7(b). 
282. David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable 
Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 169–70 (2003). 
283. I document this in a forthcoming manuscript.  David Gray Carlson, Civil Procedure and 
Fraudulent Transfers (2020) [hereinafter Carlson, Civil Procedure] (on file with the author). 
284. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000) (“[I]t has 
long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust 
property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has 
purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty.”). 
285. Nat’l Tradesmen’s Bank v. Wetmore, 26 N.E. 548, 551 (N.Y. 1891) (“The fraudulent 
transferee holds the legal title as a trustee ex maleficio for the benefit of the defrauded creditors . . . .”) 
(Follett, C.J., dissenting). 
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trustee, as fiduciary for D’s unsecured creditors, owns the fraudulent transfer 
cause of action (and the individual C does not).286  
The duties imposed on X differ, depending on whether the theory is 
constructive trust or fraudulent transfer.  In a constructive trust context, X’s duty 
is to surrender title to V.  Upon doing so, legal and equitable title are reunited 
in V.  In a fraudulent transfer context, C has no right of possession.  Rather, C 
has a right of sale.  C’s right therefore resembles an equitable lien, except that 
often C works through a sheriff or receiver as auctioneer of the fraudulently 
transferred property.  C must get a judicial lien, which is usually not thought of 
as equitable lien (though in conjunction with a fraudulent transfer theory it 
more or less is).287 
As every bankruptcy practitioner knows, a bankruptcy trustee can avoid D’s 
fraudulent transfers by one of two means.  First, the trustee has direct standing 
(on behalf of all the unsecured creditors) to recover from X pursuant to 
Bankruptcy Code § 548(a).288  This right is subject to a two-year look-back 
period.289  X is accorded a bona fide transferee defense under § 548(c).290 
Second, under § 544(b)(1), the trustee inherits the right of any existing 
unsecured creditor to avoid a transfer by D.291  The chief utility of this 
alternative is that state fraudulent transfer rights are typically subject to a longer 
statute of limitations than the two years accorded under § 548(a).292 
If, however, D did not have both legal and equitable title to convey to X, 
then the trustee has no cause of action for fraudulent transfer against X at all.  If 
D only conveys legal title to X, V’s constructive trust rights are unaffected.  V, 
not D’s bankruptcy trustee, owns the cause of action. 
 
286. See David Gray Carlson, The Supreme Court, Dischargeability, and Actual Fraud, 27 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 535 (forthcoming 2019). 
287. Judicial liens can be valid against bona fide purchasers.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5202(a)(2) 
(Consol 2019) (pertaining to tangible personal property).  Equitable liens are no good against 
subsequent bona fide purchasers for value, consistent with the UVTA.  UNIF. VOIDABLE 
TRANSACTION ACT § 8(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).  Whether C’s lien is legal or equitable is 
controversial.  The difference turns on bona fide purchaser protection.  Carlson, Civil Procedure, supra 
note 283. 
288. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2012). 
289. Id.  
290. Id. § 548(c). 
291. Id. § 544(b)(1). 
292. Id. § 548(a). 
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V. WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE 
The world of constructive trust collides with the world of fraudulent 
transfer when, just prior to bankruptcy, insolvent D makes a conveyance of 
legal title to X for no consideration. 
If D owns equitable as well as legal title to personal property and D conveys 
both to X,293 X is the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer.  Accordingly, X 
must return the thing transferred to D’s bankruptcy trustee or, if the court so 
orders, X is liable in personam for the value of the thing transferred.294 
If, however, D holds only legal title to personal property in trust for V, X 
only receives D’s legal title.  V continues to hold the equitable interest.  X is 
liable to V for the return of the thing.  If X has wrongfully interfered with V’s 
right of possession, X is liable in personam to V.  X has no liability to D’s 
bankruptcy trustee. 
In the case of constructive trust, may D’s bankruptcy trustee recover the 
legal title from X as a fraudulent transfer?  In such a case, the trustee takes back 
only legal title.  V continues to have the equitable title, if the property in 
question is personal property.  But if D has conveyed only a valueless legal title 
to X, the “gift” is for a reasonably equivalent value after all.  That is to say, legal 
title is worth nothing to D and that is what X (a bad faith purchaser) has paid to 
D.  (Any surplus transferred by X to D is held in trust by D for V.)  The predicate 
for fraudulent transfer is not met, and so there cannot be a fraudulent transfer 
after all.295 
Even if the transfer of a valueless legal title to X was a transfer for no 
reasonably equivalent value, the trustee still faces the difficulty that she is 
supposed to be a representative of D’s unsecured creditors.  The trustee is not 
supposed to be acting for V, who is not even a creditor.296  Rather, V claims the 
 
293. D sometimes conveys legal title to X for the benefit of Y.  Citibank, N.A. v. Bombshell Taxi 
LLC (In re Hypnotic Taxi LLC), 543 B.R. 365, 367–76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016).  In such a case, X and 
Y together are the initial transferees of a fraudulent transfer. 
294. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1). 
295. Belford v. Cantavero (In re Bassett), 221 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) (“[B]ecause 
a resulting trustee has an absolute duty to reconvey legal title to the beneficial owner upon demand . . . , 
bare legal title is not an interest of any value to the Debtor, or to his bankruptcy estate upon a putative 
avoidance and recovery of such bare legal title.”) (citation omitted); David Gray Carlson, Voidable 
Preferences and Proceeds: A Reconceptualization, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 517, 542–43 (1997) 
[hereinafter Carlson, Reconceptualization].  Bassett had a second facet to it.  There, D was not only a 
resulting trustee of legal title but had an equitable lien on equitable title.  221 B.R. at 55.  If conveyance 
of legal title was not a fraudulent transfer, conveyance of the equitable lien was a transfer for no 
reasonably equivalent value.  This was a fraudulent transfer. 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71.  
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equitable title in the thing transferred.  Accordingly, courts deny standing to 
enforce V’s rights in the thing transferred to X.297 
The governing authority on the trustee’s standing to pursue claims on behalf 
of a subset of a debtor’s creditors is Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. 
of New York, where a bankruptcy trustee sought to represent debenture holders 
in suing an indenture trustee for negligence in monitoring the debtor-issuer.298  
The courts at all levels (over dissents) denied the bankruptcy trustee standing.  
One of the points made for the majority by Justice Thurgood Marshall was that 
the bankruptcy trustee succeeds to the causes of action of the debtor.  The 
negligence action did not belong to the debtor but to a subset of creditors.  
Another point was that the creditors themselves should have the right to control 
the litigation, where the creditors were endowed with this right by the Trust 
Indenture Act.  In particular, a bankruptcy trustee’s settlement with the 
indenture trustee might not be binding on the individual creditors. 
Therefore, the possibility arises that X can defend against the fraudulent 
transfer theory by alleging that V (not the bankruptcy trustee) owns the 
equitable title and that therefore X has not received a fraudulent transfer. 
This puzzle is legislatively solved by the Securities Investors Protection Act 
(SIPA)299 in stockbroker bankruptcies, where the broker is a Ponzi artist.  In 
such a case, what V entrusted to the broker is “customer property.”300  Customer 
property must be distributed to customers only.301  According to 
SIPA section 78fff-2(c)(3): 
Whenever customer property is not sufficient to pay in full the 
claims set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph 
(1),302 the trustee may recover any property transferred by the 
debtor which, except for such transfer, would have been 
customer property if and to the extent that such transfer is 
voidable or void under [the Bankruptcy Code].  Such recovered 
property shall be treated as customer property.  For purposes 
 
297. Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838, 855 (6th Cir. 2002).  
Analogous are cases in which a bankruptcy trustee is not permitted to bring in personam claims against 
third parties where the third parties have negligently or intentionally led to fraudulent investments.  
Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995). 
298. 406 U.S. 416, 417 (1972). 
299. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-lll (2012). 
300. “The term ‘customer property’ means cash and securities . . . held by or for the account of 
a debtor from or for the securities accounts of a customer, and the proceeds of any such property 
transferred by the debtor, including property unlawfully converted.”  15 U.S.C. § 78lll(4) (2012). 
301. Id. § 78fff-2(c)(1). 
302. These include customer claims and subrogees (such as the Securities Investor Protection 
Corp.) of customer claims. 
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of such recovery, the property so transferred shall be deemed 
to have been the property of the debtor and, if such transfer 
was made to a customer or for his benefit, such customer shall 
be deemed to have been a creditor, the laws of any State to the 
contrary notwithstanding.303 
Thus, anticipating the issue just posed, SIPA deems the broker to own the 
equitable interest in customer property, and it authorizes the trustee to recover 
transfers as if fraudulent transfer really applies, reserving the proceeds for the 
investors.  This confesses congressional doubt that, but for the above-quoted 
intervention, fraudulent transfer law does apply when D conveys trust property 
to X.304 
Outside of the context of stockbroker bankruptcies, the Sixth Circuit, in 
Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), has ruled that trust property 
cannot be fraudulently transferred by a debtor—that only V can recover from 
X.305  To be noted is that Cannon arose in Tennessee and so Sixth Circuit 
precedents as to constructive trust apply.  The case, however, involved a real 
(not a constructive) trust, but the holding is instructive for constructive trusts in 
other circuits. 
In Cannon, D was a lawyer who took funds in trust for real estate 
transactions.  As such, D was expressly a trustee for his clients.306  D embezzled 
funds from his clients to play the commodities market.  D incurred losses.  To 
make up these losses, D “borrowed” money from a bank307 and deposited them 
in his trust account. 
 
303. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff-2(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
304. Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 762 F.3d 199, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2014); Carlson, 
Reconceptualization, supra note 295, at 545–46; Kull, Madoff, supra note 2, at 958–65.  Professor Kull 
documents some bad side effects.  Because the broker’s trustee proceeds under fraudulent transfer 
law, § 546(e) safe-harbors payees from state-law fraudulent transfer theories, thereby shortening the 
statute of limitations to two years (a big deal in the Madoff legislation).  In addition, payees are entitled 
to a jury trial under Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).  For an inference that a specific 
congressional empowerment implies a general disempowerment, see Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 
291 U.S. 245 (1934).  In Pottorff, a bank receiver disaffirmed a pledge of a bank deposit on the ground 
that the pledge was not authorized by the Federal Banking Act.  Id. at 251–52.  The would-be pledgee 
pointed out that pledges were permitted to secure a deposit of public money by a state, but this simply 
proved to Justice Brandeis that the Banking Act did not empower pledges for ordinary deposits.  Id. at 
258–59. 
305. 277 F.3d 838, 851 (6th Cir. 2002).  
306. Id. at 850; see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9 § 35.1(a)(1) (2013) (requiring attorneys to deposit client 
funds in trust account). 
307. More accurately, D began kiting checks, In re Cannon, 277 F.3d at 844, which amounts to 
borrowing from a bank.  Check kites are themselves frauds.  But are they constructive trusts?  The 
answer is no.  Here is a super-simple check kite to illustrate why not.  Suppose D opens an account 
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Ordinarily, under the lowest intermediate balance test for trust funds 
commingled with personal funds, the deposit of personal funds does not 
replenish the trust.308  A different rule applies when personal funds are 
deposited in a trust account with the intent to reimburse the V.  In Cannon, D 
(so the courts found)309 intended to reimburse his V, and so the entire deposit 
account was held in trust for the V.310 
Just before D’s eventual bankruptcy, D owed his commodities broker (X) a 
debt for commodity futures and commissions.  D’s eventual bankruptcy trustee 
would claim that these payments were intentional fraudulent transfers.   
Preliminarily, however, the claim does not function.  The transfers were on 
antecedent debt, which is a reasonably equivalent value for the purpose of 
fraudulent transfer law.  X was not in good faith in the sense that X knew or was 
on notice that D was embezzling funds.  But it cannot be the case that D was 
 
with V Bank by depositing a check written on D Bank.  V Bank gives D a provisional credit.  U.C.C. § 4-
104(a)(11) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (“‘Settle’ means to pay in cash, by clearing-
house settlement, in a charge or credit or by remittance, or otherwise as agreed.  A settlement may be 
either provisional or final.”).  A provisional credit is not withdrawable as of right. Pioneer Liquidating 
Corp. v. San Diego Tr. & Sav. Bank (In re Consol. Pioneer Mortg. Entities), 211 B.R. 704, 708 n.1 
(S.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 166 F.3d 342 (9th Cir. 1999).  So far D 
has nothing.  D then draws a check on V Bank, made out to cash.  D deposits the check with D Bank.  
D Bank memorializes the occasion with a provisional credit, not withdrawable as of right by D.  D 
Bank, however, permits D to withdraw an amount equivalent to the provisional credit.  In effect, D 
Bank has lent funds to D.  By law, D Bank has a lien on the deposited V Bank check.  U.C.C. § 4-
210(a).  So D Bank is D’s secured creditor.  D Bank advances funds to D because D Bank expects to 
collect the V Bank check from V Bank.  When it collects, D Bank receives cash proceeds of its security 
interest.  Having obtained these proceeds, D Bank can (indeed must) reduce the secured claim against 
D by the amount of proceeds received.  Suppose further that V Bank, holding D’s check drawn on D 
Bank, now presents that check to D Bank.  D Bank rightfully dishonors, as D has no funds on deposit 
with D Bank.  Thus, D is enriched by fraud.  V Bank is impoverished.  Notice that V Bank can trace no 
funds into the possession of D.  D received a loan from D Bank and therefore received D Bank funds.  
The entity that received V Bank funds was D Bank.  If there is a constructive trust in this case, it applies 
to the funds D Bank now holds.  On whether V Bank can make this claim, see David Gray Carlson, 
Check Clearing and Voidable Preference Law Under the Bankruptcy Code, 73 BUS. LAW. 627, 704–
08 (2018).  Therefore, D has received nontrust funds when he kited checks. 
308. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 619–20 (1st Cir. 1988).  
It is odd that the LIB test presumes F in good faith withdraws his own funds from a commingled 
deposit account until it is impossible to deny that F has embezzled.  Yet when F deposits funds in the 
account, F is not attributed with the good faith intent to reimburse the embezzlement.  In any case, if 
F really did intend to reimburse, the trust is replenished. 
309. In re Cannon, 277 F.3d at 850; see also Mitchell v. Dunn, 294 P. 386, 388 (Cal. 1930). 
310. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59(2)(b) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (“Subsequent contributions by the [conscious wrongdoer] do not restore property 
previously misappropriated from the claimant, unless the recipient affirmatively intends such 
application.”). 
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defrauding creditors.  In fact, D’s unsecured creditors were positively delighted 
that X, a creditor, might be paid with other people’s money.  With X paid off 
with other people’s money, the more property D had to divide amongst his 
unsecured creditors.  D’s creditors were not aggrieved.  Rather, it was the V 
who were aggrieved by the embezzlements. 
X defended by claiming that it never received D’s funds.  It received 
embezzled funds actually owned (equitably) by the V, victims of D’s larcenous 
behavior. 
Judge Alice Batchelder (author of the Omegas opinion) agreed and held 
that X was off the hook.  Receipt of embezzled funds was a defense to 
bankruptcy avoidance. 
More precisely, Judge Batchelder ruled that D had stolen the funds and had 
no title to them.311  This goes too far.  As an express trustee, D already had legal 
title to the funds.312  Theft implies no title.  Nevertheless, the court was quite 
correct that a fraudulent transfer requires D to convey both legal and equitable 
title to X.  D conveyed only legal title, and so this was no fraudulent 
conveyance.  Rather, the V were the ones who could sue X for conversion of the 
trust property.  D’s bankruptcy trustee had no theory to recover from X. 
On a theory different from fraudulent transfer, D’s bankruptcy trustee also 
argued that D could have recovered the trust funds that he himself transferred.  
Such a cause of action, the trustee alleged, was part of the bankruptcy estate 
under § 541(a)(1).  A debtor has no ability to recover fraudulent transfers on 
behalf of the creditors.313  A fraudulent transfer theory belongs either to the 
individual creditors or to a creditor representative.  But where D is a fiduciary 
and transfers property to a bad faith X, D can recover D’s own defalcations from 
X.  Indeed it is D’s duty to do so.  The recovery is required as part of 
administering the trust.  But, Judge Batchelder reasoned, bankruptcy trustees 
should not be administering trust property for noncreditor beneficiaries.   
Rather, outside of the bankruptcy proceeding, the beneficiaries are entitled to a 
replacement trustee, if D cannot be relied upon to do his duty with regard to the 
trust.314 
 
311. In re Cannon, 277 F.3d at 851. 
312. See Notinger v. Migliaccio (In re Fin. Res. Mortg., Inc), 468 B.R. 487, 501 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
2012) (criticizing Cannon on this score). 
313. GLENN, supra note 9, §§ 101a, 114. 
314. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 37 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
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Accordingly, the Cannon court held that bankruptcy trustees lacked 
standing to assert property rights that belonged to the beneficiaries of the 
trust.315 
Cannon holds that trust property cannot be fraudulently transferred.  A case 
that more or less says the same thing is Boston Trading Group, Inc. v. 
Burnazos,316 a case often cited for its observations on the morality of fraudulent 
transfers.  Boston Trading encounters the dilemma of colliding worlds.  It does 
so in the context of an equity receivership, where R was appointed at the behest 
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to administer the assets of a 
failed commodities broker.317 
To give a schematic treatment of Boston Trading, D Corp.318 was a broker 
holding fiduciary funds for its customers (whom we shall call the V).319 X was 
the owner of D Corp.  X bought D Corp. from Y320 for a down payment and a 
nonrecourse note.321  X caused D Corp. to embezzle V funds and use them to (i) 
make the $400,000 down payment to Y, (ii) pay an installment of $73,000 on 
the note, and (iii) to fund a $400,000 settlement of a law suit by Y against X.322 
 
315. In re Cannon, 277 F.3d at 855–56.  For a case holding that Cannon does not apply in this 
regard if D is a bankrupt ERISA fiduciary, see McLemore v. Regions Bank, 682 F.3d 414, 420 (6th 
Cir. 2012).  A related idea is that the bankruptcy trustee inherits the in pari delicto defense that a third 
party wrongdoer has against the debtor wrongdoer.  These cases arise in the context of a corporate 
bankruptcy.  D Corp. is the bankrupt, and D’s officer has wrongly caused a loss to the corporation, 
aided and abetted by a third party.  In such cases, it is said that the officer’s wrong is attributed by 
agent-principal ideas to D Corp.  When D Corp. sues the third party for aiding and abetting, the third 
party has the defense of in pari delicto.  See Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto 
Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with what Is § 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 519, 520–22 (2005) (criticizing the doctrine as applied in bankruptcy cases).  In pari delicto 
involves a tort claim against third parties.  In Cannon, D may have been a wrongdoer and the broker 
may have been a wrongdoer, but D, in his capacity of trustee for the beneficiaries of the trust, is a 
separate person from D the wrongdoer. 
316. 835 F.2d 1504 (1st Cir. 1987). 
317. Id. at 1506. 
318. D Corp. is Boston Trading Group.  Id. 
319. X is a composite of Richard Shaw and Theodore Kepreos.  Id. 
320. Y was Robert Burnazos, former owner of D Corp.  The debt arose from X’s acquisition of 
D Corp.  Id. 
321. The debt seemed to be a nonrecourse note signed by X and secured by D Corp. assets.  Id. 
(stating that “Burnazos’s only recourse for payment of the note was against the assets of BTG” and 
another firm not pertinent here.).  In short, the parties were engaging in a leveraged buyout.  
Nonrecourse creditors are not considered creditors for the purpose of the UFCA.  Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
633 Third Assocs., 973 F.2d 82, 84–86 (2d Cir. 1992). 
322. Boston Trading, 835 F.2d at 1506. 
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Y was innocent of knowledge as to (i)323 but had guilty knowledge with respect 
to (ii) and (iii). 
D Corp. failed, and a receiver (R) was appointed to administer the assets of 
D Corp.  
R could not decide, however, what his theory was, except that it sounded in 
fraudulent transfer.  So he pleaded in the alternative.  Perhaps X was the debtor 
of D Corp. and D Corp. was the creditor.  In that case, D Corp. “lent” the 
embezzled money to X, so that X had both legal and equitable title to the funds.  
Thereafter, X conveyed X’s own property to Y.  Under these assumptions, R 
theorized that X’s transfer to Y was an intentional fraud on the creditor, D Corp.  
So conceived, D Corp.’s chose in action against Y for fraudulent transfer was a 
corporate asset.  R succeeded to D Corp.’s causes of action and thus R could 
recover the fraudulent transfer from Y. 
But perhaps D Corp. was debtor to V and the V were the creditors.324  On 
that assumption, X was merely the agent who, on behalf of D Corp., 
fraudulently transferred D Corp. property to Y.325  If D Corp. was the debtor, 
then (R figured) D Corp.’s creditors had a fraudulent transfer cause of action 
against Y.  Implicitly, V would have to share the proceeds of the cause of action 
with the non-V creditors of D Corp.326  R pleaded both that X (or D Corp.) had 
made intentional and constructive fraudulent transfers to Y. 
Both theories of the case ignored the fact that Y received funds embezzled 
from V.  In fact, fraudulent transfer was the wrong theory for R.  D Corp. was 
fiduciary to V under an express or implied trust.  D Corp. gave legal title to the 
embezzled funds to X.  X directed these funds to Y in satisfaction of X’s 
antecedent debt.  Y thus had legal title to the trust funds, and V retained equitable 
title.  If Y had knowledge of the embezzlement, Y was liable to V to return the 
funds.  Under Cannon, D Corp. (as fiduciary for V) had the duty to take back 
the funds now held by Y.  Since R succeeded to D Corp.’s causes of action, Y 
had standing to recover the funds from Y (if Y was in bad faith). 
The case proceeded, however, on R’s fraudulent transfer theories.  As to the 
intentional fraud claims, the trial court awarded summary judgment to Y for 
 
323. As Macbeth quips, “Be innocent of the knowledge, dearest chuck, Till thou applaud the 
deed.”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 3, sc. 2. 
324. This is contrary to what I have argued.  See supra text accompanying notes 1–2. 
325. Y was paid with bank checks, which did not indicate who had procured them.  Boston 
Trading, 835 F.2d at 1509. 
326. It troubled Justice Breyer that, if R could step into V’s shoes and recover embezzlement 
proceeds, these proceeds would be shareable with the unsecured creditors of D Corp., whereas if V 
alone had standing to recover, V need not share unpaid creditors.  Id. at 1515. 
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want of evidence of actual intent to hinder a creditor by whomever the 
transferor was supposed to be. 
With respect to the constructive fraud claims, these the trial court submitted 
to a jury.  As to the $400,000 down payment, the jury decided that Y had given 
a fair equivalent in good faith, presumably to X.  But as to the $73,000 
installment and the $400,000 settlement, the jury found that X (or perhaps D 
Corp. )327 did not receive a fair equivalent in “good faith.”328  Here we should 
allude to the fact that the Massachusetts UFCA defined “fair consideration” as 
that which is paid in good faith.329  Y had paid these two sums in bad faith.330  
The UVTA has eliminated the “good faith” component in its definition of 
value.331  It is an interesting datum that, under current law, Y would walk away 
free and clear of liability.332  Only under the constructive trust theory just 
described would Y’s bad faith count against him. 
R appealed from the summary judgment (intentional claims) and Y appealed 
from the jury verdict (constructive fraud claims). 
Judge Stephen Breyer was understandably perplexed by the procedural 
mess that had been dumped on his desk.  On the one hand, he clearly saw the 
difference between a restitutionary theory of constructive trust and a fraudulent 
transfer theory.333  Thus summary judgment on the intentional fraud was upheld 
 
327. Id. at 1509 (The jury verdict “did not explicitly state who had made the transfers.”). 
328. Id. at 1507. 
329. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1918) defines fair 
consideration as “when in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and 
in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied . . . .”  The good faith component 
of the definition perplexed and confounded a generation of lawyers.  See Note, Good Faith and 
Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REV. 495 (1983).  Massachusetts has since enacted the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1996 Mass. Acts, ch. 157, approved July 8, 1996, which omits “in good faith” 
from the definition of reasonably equivalent value.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109A § 4 (1996). 
330. Inexplicably, the jury awarded R a money judgment of $436,000 rather than $473,000.  
Boston Trading, 835 F.2d at 1514. 
331. UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTION ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (“Value is given 
for a transfer . . . if, in exchange for the transfer . . . property is transferred or an antecedent debt is 
secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the 
ordinary course of the promisor’s business to furnish support to the debtor or another person”). 
332. Of “constructive” fraudulent transfer liability that is.  Bad faith purchasers for value are 
liable in actual fraud cases.  But actual fraud was off the table via the trial court’s summary judgment 
against R. 
333. Boston Trading, 835 F.2d at 1507 (Breyer, J.) (“The suggested pattern in one in which B, 
with C’s full knowledge, dishonestly takes money from A and gives it to C.  It seems fair (given C’s 
knowledge) that ordinarily A should be able to sue C for return of his money. . . .  Thus, the 
Massachusetts courts treat an investment advisor’s wrongful taking of his clients’ money as an 
embezzlement, they impose a ‘constructive trust’ upon these funds, and those who take such funds 
‘with knowledge’ must return them to the original owner.”). 
 
CARLSON_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:45 PM 
2019] CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 433 
because fraudulent transfer law simply did not apply.334  In this respect, Boston 
Trading lines up with Cannon. 
On the other hand, this good point was mysteriously forgotten as to the 
constructive fraud claim.  Instead, Judge Breyer reversed the fraudulent transfer 
theory, not because no fraudulent transfer ever occurred, but because the jury 
instructions did not require the jury to consider whether X was insolvent at the 
time X paid Y.335  Also, Judge Breyer feared that the jury might have wrongly 
believed that a preference of Y over other creditors is per se bad faith.336 
A new trial was ordered, but what Judge Breyer should have done was to 
reverse the jury verdict because a debtor cannot make a fraudulent transfer with 
embezzled funds. 
Judge Breyer raised questions about R’s standing to bring causes of action 
belonging solely to the V.  Judge Breyer thought that R was a receiver charged 
only with marshaling assets of D Corp.  As such, R was not authorized to collect 
fraudulent transfers that D Corp. may have made.  These were claims belonging 
to the V (based on the erroneous assumption that the V were creditors).  Judge 
Breyer noted that R drew his “authority to sue from a court order that gives him 
‘full power to prosecute all claims . . . on behalf of [D corp] . . . ,’” and that in 
the court’s view, “a verdict for [R] under [the UFCA] is legally improper 
because . . . [R] is suing not on behalf of [D Corp.] itself, but solely on behalf 
of the investors in [D Corp.’s] commodity pools, and [R] lacks the legal 
authority to bring this kind of suit.”337 
Thus, Judge Breyer thought R had no standing to bring any claim belonging 
to V: 
[P]erhaps, if [R] had requested authorization to bring such a 
suit, the district court would have granted it (or would do so 
now).  We express no opinion on the lawfulness or the 
desirability of any such expanded authority; we simply find 
 
334. Id. at 1510 (Breyer, J.) (“Suppose that S & K, officers of Corporation C, obtain C’s money 
through dishonest means (larceny, fraud, etc.) and use it to pay a debt that S & K owe B, a transferee 
who knows of, but did not participate in, S & K’s dishonesty.  Does § 7 of the Massachusetts 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act permit C to recover its money from B?  We think the district court 
correctly ruled that § 7 does not.”). 
335. Id. 
336. Boston Trading is frequently cited for the proposition that, without more, getting paid is not 
bad faith.  Securities Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Madoff Sec.), 476 
B.R. 715, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  On the “something more” required to make receipt of payment a 
fraudulent transfer, see Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 469 B.R. 713, 
755–59 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012); Emil A. Kleinhaus & Alexander B. Lees, Debt Repayments as 
Fraudulent Transfers, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 307 (2014). 
337. Boston Trading, 835 F.2d at 1514 (Breyer, J.). 
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that the authorizing language, in its present form . . . does not 
now permit [R] to assert [V] claims . . . .338 
In any case, whatever may be true for bankruptcy trustees, a receiver 
liquidating a commodities broker very plausibly could be given broad powers 
to administer trusts339 or to avoid fraudulent transfers.340  Yet to the extent the 
theory is fraudulent transfer, the proceeds of these choses in action belong to 
the general creditors, not to the beneficiaries of a constructive trust.  The V are 
not even creditors if the V are beneficiaries of a constructive trust.  Only if 
tracing has failed (or if V opts to assert her conversion tort action) is V a general 
creditor.  As such, V can only obtain a pro rata share of the fraudulent transfer 
recovery.  Asymmetrically, if tracing is possible, V alone has the right to the 
constructive trust proceeds, and these must be kept away from the general 
creditors.  Generally applicable, Cannon (and half of Boston Trading) would 
mean that, basically, bankruptcy trustees cannot administer Ponzi scheme 
liquidations where all the “creditors” are beneficiaries of a constructive trust 
and where tracing of trust proceeds into the bankruptcy estate is possible.  If X 
could assert that the bankruptcy trustee succeeds only to D’s legal title, not to 
V’s equitable title, then fraudulent transfer theory disintegrates in the Ponzi 
 
338. Id. at 1516.  Further confusing matters is this remark: “We recognize that the pool investors 
[V] arguably have a valid fraudulent conveyance claim . . .”  Id.  This observation contradicts Judge 
Breyer’s earlier distinction between restitution and fraudulent transfer law.  The V do not need an 
avoidance theory to recover embezzled funds.  They already own them.  Indeed, they are not even 
creditors.  Furthermore, recall that Judge Breyer remanded a constructive fraudulent transfer claim, 
implying that R did have standing to bring that action.  Indeed, one of R’s alternative theories was that 
D Corp. did not embezzle but rather lent its own funds to X who then fraudulently transferred X’s own 
funds to Y.  This was indeed D Corp.’s chose in action and, on Judge Breyer’s theory of standing, R 
was authorized to bring it.  Of course, I have asserted that there were no fraudulent transfers in the case 
at all. 
339. Federal Sav. Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 1987) (receiver had 
standing to pursue constructive trust theories); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 290 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 
2002) (receiver could distribute constructive trust funds to victims pro rata); see Donell v. Kowell, 533 
F.3d 762, 777 (9th Cir. 2008) (SEC-sponsored receiver had authority to pursue “fraudulent transfers” 
on behalf of Ponzi victims). See generally Ralph S. Janvey, An Overview of SEC Receiverships, 38 
SEC. REG. L.J. 89 (2010). 
340. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 261 (1934) (“It is the duty of the receiver 
of an insolvent corporation to take steps to set aside transactions which fraudulently or illegally reduce 
the assets available for the general creditors, even though the corporation itself was not in a position to 
do so.”).  But see Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying receivers have 
standing to pursue fraudulent transfers).  Eberhard is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 
362–72. 
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environment.341  So does voidable preference theory.342  Both presuppose that 
D has, before the bankruptcy, conveyed both legal and equitable title to a third 
party.  But that is not the case when the funds held by D are all constructive 
trust property. 
Scholes v. Lehmann343 is a receivership case where the worlds collide.  In 
Scholes, three D Corps. were each the general partner of limited partnerships 
purportedly dedicated to investment in commodities.  They sold limited 
partnership interests to V and then looted their respective partnerships.  The loot 
was passed on to the evil mastermind (EM) who then enriched an ex-spouse 
and several religious institutions.  As in Boston Trading, a receiver (R) was 
obtained for the D Corps.—this time by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission. 
R brought fraudulent transfer actions against EM and EM’s transferees. 
Properly, these were not fraudulent transfer cases.  They were constructive trust 
cases.  More precisely, R was acting for the limited partnerships that the D 
Corps. had looted.  The limited partners stood in place of the V.344 
EM’s transferees maintained that fraudulent transfer claims belonged only 
to creditors of D Corp. whereas the SEC was empowered to represent victims 
of investment fraud.  Therefore, R had no standing to bring these claims.  Judge 
Posner, however, begged the question by conceptually confusing 
embezzlements and fraudulent transfers. 
Though injured by [EM], the corporations would not be heard 
to complain as long as they were controlled by him, not only 
because he would not permit them to complain but also 
because of their deep, their utter, complicity in [EM’s] fraud. 
 
341. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added) (“The trustee may avoid any 
transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in property . . . .”). 
342. Id. § 547(b) (emphasis added) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property . . . .”); see Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990) (“Because the debtor does not 
own an equitable interest in property he holds in trust for another, that interest is not ‘property of the 
estate.’”). 
343. 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). 
344. Judge Randolph Haines has written: 
[W]hat Scholes upheld was really a corporate law action for waste or ultra vires 
transactions although they were couched as fraudulent transfer actions.  That it 
really was such a corporate law cause of action rather than a vesting of creditors’ 
fraudulent transfer actions in the receiver was made explicitly clear by the 
Seventh Circuit’s acknowledgement that “we can find no cases in which a 
receiver for a sole proprietorship recovered a fraudulent conveyance.” 
Aaron v. Rosepink (In re Glob. Grounds Greenery, LLC), 405 B.R. 659, 664 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). 
While Judge Haines is entirely correct that Scholes was no fraudulent transfer case, he sees the receiver 
representing the shareholders of the D Corps. (that is, EM), not the victims of the fraud.  
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The rule is that the maker of the fraudulent conveyance and all 
those in privity with him—which certainly includes the 
corporations—are bound by it.  But the reason, of course . . . , 
is that the wrongdoer must not be allowed to profit from his 
wrong by recovering property that he had parted with in order 
to thwart his creditors.  That reason falls out now that [EM] has 
been ousted from control of and beneficial interest in the 
corporations.  The appointment of the receiver removed the 
wrongdoer from the scene.  The corporations were no longer 
[EM’s] evil zombies.  Freed from his spell they became entitled 
to the return of the moneys—for the benefit not of [EM] but of 
innocent investors—that [EM] had made the corporations 
divert to unauthorized purposes.  That the return would benefit 
the limited partners is just to say that anything that helps a 
corporation helps those who have claims against its assets.345 
This passage reveals a serious misconception of colliding worlds.  Judge 
Posner imagines that, where D conveys a thing to X in order to hinder creditors, 
D may not recover the thing from X.  The reason: D must not be allowed to 
profit from D’s wrong against D’s creditors.346 
But this does not explain why D cannot avoid D’s own fraudulent transfers.  
The reason is because D has no property interest in the thing D formerly 
conveyed to X.  Rather, X has title to the thing in trust for the creditors of D and 
the creditors of D have equitable interests in X’s thing.  D has forever alienated 
the property to X.347 
Suppose some sort of conservator is appointed over D’s estate—an assignee 
of the benefit of creditors, for example.  The assignee does not become entitled 
to X’s thing, as D voluntarily conveyed the thing away before the assignment.348  
On the other hand, suppose, prior to the assignment, D holds a thing in trust for 
V and then gives the thing to X.  X holds legal title for V.  Although D gave the 
thing to X voluntarily, D is still a constructive trustee and has the fiduciary duty 
to act for V in getting the thing back from X.  When the assignee takes over 
 
345. 56 F.3d at 754 (citations omitted). 
346. Accord Levy v. Braverman, 260 N.Y.S.2d 681, 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)  
347. To be distinguished is Estate of Blanco, 150 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).  There, D, 
fearing liability for medical malpractice, conveyed to X who “would hold title in trust for [D] and 
reconvey the parcels upon request of [D].”  Id. at 646.  D was acquitted of malpractice and sought to 
enforce that trust.  Id.  The court decided that D had “clean hands” and was entitled to get the land 
back.  Id. at 652.  The decision is not a fraudulent transfer but is a case forcing a trustee (X) to conform 
to the terms of the trust. 
348. GLENN, supra note 9, § 102.  
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from D, the assignee becomes the trustee for V and is authorized to recover 
from X.349  That is the case Judge Posner had before him. 
Judge Posner’s reasoning was followed in Wiand v. Lee,350 where the facts 
were basically identical.  A receiver (R) was appointed at the behest of the 
SEC.351  R sought to recover excess lulling payments352 from lucky escapees 
(X) of the Ponzi scheme.  In the case, R was said to represent the transferors of 
dividends (T).  Properly, T should have been conceived as D.  T = D held 
investor funds in constructive trust for the defrauded investors and used them 
to make excess lulling payments to X.  Properly, R then succeeds to the fiduciary 
duty of T = D to get back trust funds wrongfully given away.  Instead, the 
Wiand court insisted that T was a creditor (T = C).  The debtor was viewed to 
be the evil mastermind (EM).  Yet EM was neither transferor not transferee.  
Nor did EM owe a debt to T.  EM should have been left out of the analysis 
altogether. 
X objected that it received transfers from T = C.  Yet the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act required a transfer by property of EM = D.  Since 
EM = D, and since X never received D’s property, X should be off the hook.  
Here is how the court characterized X’s argument: 
But, [X argues], the transfers were of [T] funds, not [EM] funds. 
In other words, applying [the Florida UFTA] to [EM’s] 
transfers appears to treat [T and EM] as simultaneously both 
separate and distinct entities—the [T] are considered distinct 
from [EM] in order to establish a creditor and a debtor, but they 
are treated as one entity in order to establish that [EM’s] 
transferors of [T] funds were transfers of [EM’s] property.353 
X hit the nail right on its head.  R’s theory was contradictory.  The court, 
however, was “not persuaded by these arguments” and instead followed the 
lead of Scholes.  Scholes taught that the reason D has no standing to recover a 
fraudulent transfer from X was in pari delicto.  But since receivership purges D 
of wrongdoing, D has standing to take back his own gifts. 
 
349. See Scholes, 56 F.3d at 754.  In dictum, Judge Posner suggests that a bankruptcy trustee 
could recover trust property for V, but this overlooks Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of 
N.Y., 406 U.S. 416 (1972); Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
350. 753 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2014). 
351. Wiand v. Lee, 8:10-CV-210-T-EAK-MAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8997, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 23, 2013). 
352. In Ponzi argot, “lulling payments” are payments to investors in order to give the appearance 
that all is normal.  McHale v. Boulder Capital LLC (In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC), 439 B.R. 47, 72 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
353. Wiand, 753 F.3d at 1202. 
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Of course, ultimately, X should not be off the hook.  R does have a valid 
theory in constructive trust, but it is simply wrong to say that T is equal to C in 
this case.  Not even Judge Posner went this far in Scholes.  According to Judge 
Posner, T is equal to D and D (once baptized with receivership, exorcized of 
zombiism and forgiven all past sins) could avoid his own evil gifts.  But this is 
not so.  When D conveys to X, D surrenders all rights in the thing D conveys.  
X gets the legal title and the creditors of D get the equitable title. 
It is far more satisfactory to follow Cannon: D is the constructive trustee 
for the investors and has a duty to retrieve transfers of legal title from bad faith 
purchasers or good faith purchasers for no value. 
In Meoli v. The Huntington National Bank,354 the court permitted recoveries 
of constructive trust funds under the guise of fraudulent transfer theory.355  A 
fraudster (EM) had incorporated X Corp. and D Corp.  X Corp. obtained 
purchase money financing for computer equipment from secured lenders.  D 
Corp. posed as the seller of computer equipment.  X Corp. represented that D 
Corp was to sell equipment to X Corp.  Consistent with good practice (but 
without the due diligence to assure the sale was real), the purchase money 
lenders would wire funds directly to D Corp. to finance X Corp.’s apparent 
purchase of equipment.  X Corp. purported to grant to the lenders security 
interests on this non-existent collateral.356  The case proves that purchase money 
lending and Ponzi schemes do indeed mix. 
From a restitution standpoint, X Corp. had borrowed money on false 
pretenses.  It was therefore constructive trustee for the lenders.  The borrowed 
funds were initially wired to D Corp., which (consistent with good conscience) 
restored the funds to X Corp. as constructive trustee-in-chief for the lenders.357  
D Corp. was never more than a sub-trustee in this case. 
X Corp. did indeed make lulling payments to the victims for a while—in 
Ponzi style.358  At the end of the day, the fraudster used the loan proceeds to 
pay X’s bank (X Bank) for a loan.  Excess proceeds were deposited with X Bank.  
 
354. 848 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2017). 
355. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 444 B.R. 767 at 786–87 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011). 
356. Id. at 784. 
357. Id. at 785. 
358. Id. (“[D Corp.], of course, did not keep its ill-gotten gains.  Rather, it funneled them back 
to [X Corp. and X Corp.] in turn used what it received: (1) to perpetuate the fraud by making payments 
on the many promissory notes and leases [X Corp.] had signed in connection with prior nonexistent 
purchases; and (2) to pay [X Corp.]’s other operating expenses, including the handsome salaries and 
expense accounts of Watson and his fellow cheats.  Of course, Watson accomplished this by depositing 
the transfers from [D Corp.] into [X Corp.’s deposit accounts with X Bank]. . . .”).  
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These proceeds X Corp. withdrew and dissipated.  X Bank was found to be a 
bad faith purchaser of these trust funds.359 
Bankruptcy Judge Jeffrey Hughes recognized that D Corp. did not own 
equitable title to the funds.  Nevertheless, D Corp. has a “sufficient interest in 
what it had stolen in order to have made a cognizable Section 548(a) transfer of 
its property when it then used the purloined funds to pay off the remainder of 
[X Corp.’s] debt to [X Bank].”360 
Without more explanation, Judge Hughes was in violation of our definition 
of a fraudulent transfer—D must convey an equitable title which otherwise the 
creditors of D would have enjoyed.  All that happened here is that D Corp. 
conveyed funds to the main constructive trustee.361  The beneficial interest 
never changed hands.  That interest stayed with the V, the defrauded purchase 
money lenders.  These V owned the cause of action against X Bank—not D 
Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee.  Under Cannon, X Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee (not 
to mention D Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee), has no standing to collect property 
for third parties. 
Eberhard v. Marcu362 is a case where the two worlds do not actually collide, 
though it is a near miss.  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
contributed some dubious wisdom on SEC receiverships.  In Eberhard, the evil 
mastermind (EM) caused D Corp. to loot V’s property in the customary manner.  
At the behest of the SEC, R was appointed receiver of EM’s estate and also the 
estate of D Corp.  Soon, D Corp. was wrested from R’s control in favor of a 
SIPA proceeding, where the colliding worlds are mediated by sensible 
legislation.363  R was left with the estate of EM. 
 
359. The Sixth Circuit, on appeal, would rule that, to the extent X Bank received payment in bad 
faith, X Bank was liable to the bankruptcy trustee of D Corp. for receiving proceeds of a fraudulent 
transfer.  Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 848 F.3d 716, 735–36 (6th Cir. 2017).  But as to deposits 
above and beyond the repayment amount, X Bank was not a transferee at all!  It was a “mere conduit.” 
Id. at 736.  For a critique of this holding, see generally Carlson, Conduit, supra note 1, at 555–64. 
360. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. at 787.  The court in Jobin v. Lalan (In re M&L Bus. 
Mach. Co.), 160 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993), also assumes that mere possession suffices to 
sustain a fraudulent transfer theory. 
361. Judge Hughes used his Erie privilege to ignore Alliance Bancorp v. Select Mortgage, LLC, 
No. 274853, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 554 (Mich App. Mar. 18, 2008), as being the incorrect 
pronouncement of a court subordinate to the Michigan Supreme Court.  See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l 
Bank (In re Teleservices Group, Inc.), 469 B.R. 713, 763 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012) (Hughes, J.).  In 
Alliance, D “defrauded” funds from V and transferred them to X.  2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 554, at *1.  
V pleaded a fraudulent transfer theory against X and was dismissed.  Id.  Somehow the Alliance court 
found itself talking about stolen funds, not trust funds, though clearly the case was about trust funds.  
Id. at *3–6.  Presumably V in Alliance could sue X under a restitutionary theory. 
362. 530 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008). 
363. Id. at 126; see supra text accompanying notes 300–304. 
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EM, it appears, invested stolen funds in a separate wholly owned 
corporation (S Corp.).364  EM then conveyed the S Corp. shares to X.  R claimed 
that EM fraudulently transferred these shares to X.  X demurred that R had no 
standing to assert this cause of action against X; only creditors could do so, and 
R was not (nor did he represent) a creditor of EM.  The court agreed, thus putting 
the Second Circuit at odds with the Seventh365 and Eleventh366 Circuits.367 
Properly, the SIPC trustee should have pursued the proceeds of stolen funds 
into the hands of S Corp., thereby denuding S Corp. of assets.  Had this strategy 
been pursued, the shares in S Corp. conveyed to X would have been valueless 
and not worth pursuing.  Nevertheless, this point was overlooked by all the 
parties, not to mention the SIPA trustee. 
Be that as it may, R certainly could have been bestowed with the power to 
recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the creditors of EM.  The creditors of 
EM presumably had no money judgments against EM.  As such, under New 
York Debtor and Creditor Law § 279, these creditors were creditors “whose 
claim has not matured.”  Such creditors are entitled to “a receiver to take charge 
of the property . . . .”368  Certainly, the court could have appointed R to represent 
the creditors—unless the court meant to rule that the SEC was incapable of 
representing the creditors of EM.  If so, Eberhard stands for the fact that a 
receiver merely succeeds to the choses in action that the receivership entity 
actually happens to own.  Translated back to the corporate looting environment, 
such a restriction is no impediment to receivers because, under Cannon, a 
constructive trustee can recover the very property that the trustee transferred to 
X.  Eberhard becomes an impediment only when fraudulent transfers are 
confounded with constructive trust theory. 
In Eberhard, the Second Circuit erroneously thought it was in accord with 
the Seventh Circuit in Scholes, but this was not so.  Eberhart quotes Scholes as 
holding that R’s “object was ‘to maximize the value of the corporations for the 
benefit of their investors and any creditors.’”369  If R represented creditors, it 
 
364. 530 F.3d 122 at 128. 
365. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). 
366. Wiand v. Lee, 753 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2014). 
367. See also Evans v. Armenta, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1062 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (receiver had 
standing to pursue fraudulent transfers in the context of a Ponzi scheme); Bartholomew v. Avalon 
Capital Grp., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1026–27 (D. Minn. 2009) (same).  But see Aaron v. Rosepink 
(In re Global Grounds Greenery, LLC), 405 B.R. 659, 663–64 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (holding that 
Arizona law does not countenance authorizing a receiver to avoid fraudulent transfers). 
368. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 279 (Consol. 2009). 
369. 530 F.3d at 132 (emphasis added) (quoting Scholes, 56 F.3d at 755). 
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stands to reason that R could collect the fraudulent transfers D Corp. actually 
made.370 
An old Supreme Court case can be cited against Eberhard and in favor of 
R’s standing to pursue D’s fraudulent transfers.  In Texas & Pacific Railway 
Co. v. Pottorff,371 a bank pledged securities to a depositor and subsequently 
failed.  R was appointed receiver for purpose of liquidating bank assets.  The 
depositor made a claim against R as a secured creditor.  R claimed that the 
pledge was ultra vires—not within the power of the bank to give.  R tendered 
mere pro rata dividends to the depositor as if the depositor were unsecured.  The 
depositor responded by seeking to replevy the securities. 
Justice Brandeis agreed that the pledge was ultra vires and held that the 
depositor was not entitled to possession of the collateral.  Strictly speaking, this 
is not a fraudulent transfer.  If it were, the bank could not deny the pledge.  Only 
a creditor could avoid it.  But, with regard to an ultra vires act: 
The bank itself could have set aside this transaction.  It is the 
settled doctrine of this Court that no rights arise on an ultra 
vires contract, even though the contract has been performed; 
and that this conclusion cannot be circumvented by erecting an 
estoppel which would prevent challenging the legality of a 
power exercised.372 
This clearly shows the claim of ultra vires is not the same as a fraudulent 
transfer.  What comes next, however, contradicts the Eberhard conclusion that 
R has no standing to pursue D’s fraudulent transfers: 
But even if the bank would have been estopped from asserting 
lack of power, its receiver would be free to challenge the 
validity of the pledge.  The unauthorized pledge reduced the 
assets available to the general creditors.  It is the duty of the 
 
370. The Eberhard court cites and purports to follow Troelstrup v. Index Futures Grp., Inc., 130 
F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1997), another opinion by Judge Posner.  530 F.3d at 132.  In Troelstrup, a receiver 
brought a negligence action against a third party on behalf of creditors of D.  130 F.3d at 1275–76.  
Judge Posner ruled that R was not subrogated to these negligence claims. Id. at 1277–78.  The Eberhard 
court analogized R’s fraudulent transfer claim against X to the negligence claim against the third party 
in Troelstrup.  530 F.3d at 133–35.  It therefore followed that R in Eberhard had no standing.  Id. at 
135. 
This use of Troelstrup must be questioned.  If I may indulge in an SAT-style simile, Troelstrup 
is to Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416 (1972), what Eberhard is to 
Bankruptcy Code § 544(b)(1).  The first two cases are not appropriate to subrogation, but the latter two 
cases are.  The distinction is that the creditors in the first two cases owned purely in personam rights 
against a nontransferee third party.  In Eberhard and any given bankruptcy case, the creditors have in 
rem rights against X, a transferee of D. 
371. 291 U.S. 245, 251–53 (1934). 
372. Id. at 260. 
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receiver of an insolvent corporation to take steps to set aside 
transactions which fraudulently or illegally reduce the assets 
available for the general creditors, even though the corporation 
itself was not in a position to do so.373 
This "even if" point certainly encompasses standing to pursue fraudulent 
transfer theories. 
To summarize, we have Cannon, which stands for the proposition that D’s 
conveyance of trust property can never be a fraudulent transfer.  Then we have 
Boston Trading, which holds that a conveyance of trust property can never be 
intentional fraudulent transfers, but it can be a constructive fraudulent transfer.   
And finally, we have Scholes and Meoli, which hold that a conveyance of trust 
property is always a fraudulent transfer. 
The Scholes–Meoli position is the one that is needed if bankruptcy courts 
are to have jurisdiction over Ponzi liquidations.  But how can this position be 
sustained?  Asserting that constructive trust cases sound in fraudulent transfer 
strips V of an asset and awards it to creditors of D. 
If one recognizes two separate worlds exist that do not collide—the world 
of constructive trust and the world of fraudulent transfer—is it possible to 
administer Ponzi scheme liquidations from within a bankruptcy proceeding?  
There are two possibilities—a failure of tracing and the principle of ius tertii. 
A. Tracing 
First, a trustee might take jurisdiction over constructive trust property 
because tracing difficulties prevent a particular V from connecting her property 
with that which D transferred to X.374  If tracing fails, the constructive trust fails, 
and V is but an unsecured creditor of D.375  The embezzled funds effectively 
become D’s property.  If D conveys these untraceable funds to X and X is not a 
bona fide purchaser, nothing impedes D’s bankruptcy trustee from a successful 
fraudulent transfer theory. 
If V wishes to recover trust property from bad faith X, V must necessarily 
show that the property transferred by D was in fact V’s property.376  Suppose D 
fraudulently induces V to convey her car to D.  V has an equitable interest in the 
 
373. Id. at 260–61. 
374. See Gowan v. Patriot Grp., LLC (In re Dreier LLP), 452 B.R. 391, 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (trustee’s allegations of untraceability survived motion by X to dismiss complaint). 
375. Montanile v. Board of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651, 659 
(2016); Jobin v. Youth Benefits Unlimited (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 59 F.3d 1078, 1080–81 (10th 
Cir. 1995). 
376. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). 
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car and D holds legal title for V’s benefit.  Coincidentally, D also has a truck.  
D then gives the truck to X.  V cannot recover the truck from X when V’s 
equitable interest is in the car.  V’s rights are in the car and not in the truck. 
On the other hand, if D, with voidable title to the car, trades the car for X’s 
motorcycle, D may replevy the motorcycle from X because the motorcycle is a 
proceed of the car.377 
Tracing rules aid V in this identification task.  If D takes fungible property 
from V and commingles it with D’s own property, the famous lowest 
intermediate balance rule allows V to identify her property. 
As applied to deposit accounts, the rule works as follows:378  Imagine that 
D has a deposit account in which D deposits trust money obtained from D.  We 
may imagine that the deposit account is a barrel of water, and V’s funds are 
“heavy” water that sinks to the bottom of the barrel. 
When D dips into the barrel to convey water to some creditor of D, it is 
presumed that D, in good conscience, uses D’s own water to liquidate the debt.  
Only when D dips down so deeply that D invades the heavy water will we admit 
D has embezzled V’s funds.  If D has ladled this heavy water to a bad faith X.  
V can sue X for conversion, to the extent X received V’s funds.  
In a Ponzi scheme, there are multiple V.  The tracing rule in the case of 
multiple V is supplied by Clayton’s Case,379 which institutes a rule of “first in 
first out.”380  Suppose in sequence D defrauds V1-4 each of $100.  Then $400 
sinks to the bottom of D’s commingled account.  Under Clayton’s first-in-first-
out rule, V4’s funds are heaviest.  V3’s funds settle just above V4’s funds, V2’s 
funds are layered above the funds of V4-3.  As “first in,” V1 is most vulnerable. 
 
377. SMITH, Tracing, supra note 55, at 130 (“Whenever there has been a substitution, there are 
two possibilities: follow or trace.  If some steals my car and swaps it for a motorcycle, I can follow my 
car, or I can trace into the motorcycle.”). 
378. See generally Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of 
Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 971–72 (1999). 
379. (1816) 1 Mer 572.  Clayton’s Case was cited with approval in Cunningham v. Brown, 265 
U.S. 1, 12 (1924). 
380. See Clayton’s Case (1816) 1 Mer. 572.  In Clayton, Devaynes was a partner in a bank.  1 
Mer. at 572.  Devaynes died solvent.  Id.  The surviving partners were soon bankrupt.  Id.  In the 
bankruptcy, the unsecured creditors received a dividend.  Id.  They sought to recover the deficit from 
Devaynes’ estate.  Id. at 573.  The rule applied was that Devaynes’ estate was liable for pre-death 
deposits with the bank but not liable for post-death deposits.  Id. at 574.  Clayton had £453 due him 
from pre-death payments.  Id. at 586.  But Clayton had made many post-death deposits and 
withdrawals.  Id.  The issue was whether a post-death withdrawal counted against a post-death deposit.  
Id. at 607–08.  Or, alternatively, a post-death withdrawal counted against a pre-death deposit, on the 
rule of “first in first out.”  The chancery applied “first in first out.”  Id. at 610.  Accordingly, Clayton 
had withdrawn the £453 first and so Clayton had no claim against Devaynes’ estate.  See generally 
SMITH, Tracing, supra note 55, at 185–89. 
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Suppose D pays bad faith X $80 out of the deposit account.  The $80 comes 
from V1’s share. V1 can sue X for $80.381  V1 was the first in and so is the first 
out.  Suppose further that D decides to pay dividend of $30 to V3.  D’s account 
is reduced to $290.  The funds D pays to V3 are deemed to come from V3’s 
layer.382  At the end of the day V4 (last in, last out) can trace $100 to the bottom 
of the account.  V3 is next for $70.  V2 can trace for $100 and V1 can trace for 
$20.383  V1, however, may recover $80 from X.384 
The leading (and original) case on Ponzi schemes approved of tracing in 
general but not on the facts of the case.  In Cunningham v. Brown,385 the court 
cited the standard lowest intermediate balance test, which it said was used in 
the lower courts, but (the court concluded) that its use is too “fantastic” for 
Ponzi schemes: 
To make the rule applicable here, we must infer that in the 
deposit and withdrawal of more than $3,000,000 between the 
deposits of the defendants prior to July 28th, and the payment 
of their checks after August 2d, Ponzi kept the money of 
defendants on deposit intact and paid out only his subsequent 
deposits.  Considering the fact that all this money was the result 
of fraud upon all his dupes, it would be running the fiction of 
[the lowest intermediate balance test] into the ground to apply 
it here.  The rule is useful to work out equity between a 
wrongdoer and a victim; but, when the fund with which the 
wrongdoer is dealing is wholly made up of the fruits of the 
frauds perpetrated against a myriad of victims, the case is 
different.  To say that, as between equally innocent victims, the 
wrongdoer, having defeasible title to the whole fund, must be 
presumed to have distinguished in advance between the money 
of those who were about to rescind and those who were not, 
would be carrying the fiction to a fantastic conclusion.386 
What does this case mean?  One view is that, where tracing is impossible, 
no V can identify trust property.  All the V are transformed from property 
owners into unsecured creditors.  Any V paid within the preference period must 
disgorge as a matter of federal preference law.  In short there is no constructive 
 
381. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59(2)(a) 
(“Withdrawals that yield a traceable product and withdrawals that are dissipated are marshaled so far 
as possible in favor of the claimant.”). 
382. SMITH, Tracing, supra note 55, at 209–10. 
383. See Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 12 (citing Clayton’s Case (1816) 1 Mer. 572).  
384. Loring v. Baker, 106 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Mass. 1952); SMITH, Tracing, supra note 55, at 205. 
385. 265 U.S. at 12. 
386. Id. at 12–13. 
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trust.  The world of voidable preference and of constructive trust do not collide.   
Voidable preferences occurred because D Corp. conveyed its own property.  It 
did not use V property to pay.387 
Alternatively, the case may mean that, where multiple V exist, tracing will 
not be used to prejudice one victim over another.388  Tracing, however, may be 
used for the V as a group.  On this view, there is a constructive trust.  The 
victims are entitled to a pro rata share of the pool.389  On such an interpretation, 
the trustee’s standing to assert the property rights of the victims is imperiled.390 
Caplin391 restricts the trustee to succession of D’s causes of action or to 
subrogation of avoidance theories of unsecured creditors.392  It certainly implies 
that the trustee is not subrogated to or authorized to act for V, where the V can 
trace their trust property out of the Ponzi scheme and into the hands of X.  After 
all, the V (if they can trace) are not even creditors.  They are property owners.  
And Cannon stands for the proposition that the bankruptcy trustee is not the 
successor trustee for a set of trust beneficiaries. 
In contrast, suppose there are thousands of V and deposit records are 
unavailable.  Then we say that D has converted the trust funds, and the V are 
unsecured creditors for claim sounding in conversion.393  Under this 
circumstance, D’s bankruptcy trustee can recover payment to X as a voidable 
preference or a gratuitous transfer to X as a fraudulent transfer.  These 
 
387. See also Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1980). 
388. Claire Seaton Rosa, Note, Should Owners Have to Share? An Examination of Forced 
Sharing in the Name of Fairness in Recent Multiple Fraud Victim Cases, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1331, 1348 
(2010).  Other passages in this article suggest that tracing in general failed, leaving the V as unsecured 
creditors.  Id. at 1349–50. 
389. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“The holding of [Cunningham] is that the tracing rules summarized in § 59(2) may not 
be used to create priorities between restitution claimants whose interests in commingled assets are 
otherwise indistinguishable.”).  R3RUE goes on to opine that Cunningham stands for the proposition 
that tracing “will not be mechanically applied to answer an altogether different question: namely the 
proportions of a commingled fund and its products to which competing restitution claimants are 
entitled.”  Id.  On the other hand, “[t]he law of unjust enrichment does not impose a rule of contribution 
or loss-sharing between the victims of common or related injuries . . . .”  Id.  For a case in which 
individual V who could trace were made to share with V not able to trace, see United States v. Durham, 
86 F.3d 70 (5th Cir. 1996). 
390. See Andrew Kull, Ponzi, Property, and Luck, 100 IOWA L. REV. 291, 304–06 (2014) 
(deploring such a reading of Cunningham).  One feature of the case not usually noted is that, if a V 
sought payment of a note, V was excluded from a restitutionary remedy.  Only if a V demanded a refund 
(not payment of a note) was V even entitled to a constructive trust. 
391. See supra text accompanying note 298. 
392. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2012). 
393. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 12 (1924). 
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recoveries are then shared pro rata, not just by the V, but by all unsecured 
creditors of D.  When this occurs the theft that Ponzi began was consummated 
by Ponzi’s bankruptcy trustee.  Of course, as creditors the V are entitled to share 
the loot with the non-V creditors of Ponzi. 
Costliness of tracing is indeed a factor that cannot be ignored.  In support 
of this claim is the leading case on substantive consolidation, In re Owens 
Corning.394  There, the court barred any substantive consolidation of two 
bankrupt related entities, where the consolidation would adversely affect 
distributions to the creditors of one of the subsidiaries.395  The exception was 
the case where the accounting expense of retroactively separating the 
transactions of the subsidiaries was so prohibitively expensive that every 
creditor would lose value if the work were actually carried out.  Extreme cost 
therefore justifies substantive consolidation. 
It should be recognized, however, that the incentives of the trustee to claim 
tracing is too difficult are seriously misaligned.  The trustee is in the position 
of arguing that tracing is too much work or is supposedly impossible.  The labor 
expended to trace does not benefit the bankruptcy estate.  It benefits third party 
property owners.  The expense arguably is not an “actual, necessary cost[] and 
expense[] of preserving the estate”396 and so not allowable as an administrative 
expense.  Nor does Bankruptcy Code § 506(c) apply, since the benefited 
property owners (the V) do not hold allowed secured claims.397  In short, the 
trustee is being asked to separate (by proper tracing) what belongs to the 
bankruptcy estate and what does not.  Yet rather than expend funds to protect 
the property rights of the V, the trustee proposes to skip the hard, 
uncompensated work and expropriate the property for the benefit of the 
unsecured creditors of D.  In short, the bankruptcy trustee argues that D’s theft 
should be sanctified and the unsecured creditors should benefit because 
determining the true owners of the loot is costly. 
In the modern computer era, amazing achievements in tracing are no doubt 
possible.  But this would have the effect of depriving bankruptcy trustees of the 
power to recover from payments to third parties.  These causes of actions would 
belong to the V, not to the bankruptcy trustee. 
There is something wrong with using expense as an excuse to proclaim 
tracing unfeasible.  A better argument for the trustee is the time-honored claim 
of ius tertii. 
 
394. 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005). 
395. Id. at 216. 
396. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). 
397. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68. 
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B. Ius tertii 
The principle that best justifies bankruptcy jurisdiction over Ponzi schemes 
is the principle of ius tertii.  Yet it too, like “tracing is impossible,” has an 
unethical component to it. 
First year law students typically learn the principle of ius tertii from the 
case of Armory v. Delamirie.398  In that case, a chimney sweep’s boy (B) found 
a ring.  He brought it into a jeweler’s (J) shop.  J’s apprentice offers three pence 
for it.  B declined the offer.  J’s apprentice returned the ring sans valuable jewel. 
B sued J for the tort of conversion.  J defended on the ground that some true 
owner (TO) had better title than B and that therefore B did not deserve the 
money judgment.  The judges of King’s Bench found for B: 
[T]he finder of the jewel, though he does not by such finding 
acquire an absolute property or ownership, yet he has such a 
property as will enable him to keep it against all but the rightful 
owner, and consequently may maintain trover.399 
Some ethical notes about this opinion will come in handy later.  As has been 
observed, the tort of conversion (or trover) has a unique feature.  Once the 
money judgment has been entered, B is deemed to have conveyed all his title to 
J.  Conversion amounts to a forced sale to J against J’s will.400  B, however, has 
acted unethically by selling the jewel to J.  In effect, by suing J for conversion, 
B has committed the tort of conversion against TO.  Thus B’s invocation of the 
ius tertii rule against TO constitutes a tort against TO. 
Because B’s assertion of conversion against J is itself a conversion by B of 
TO’s property, TO, following B’s judgment against J, has a right to a money 
judgment against B.  Alternatively, TO can treat the proceeds of the suit against 
J as held by B in constructive trust.  If TO so elects, TO admits that B’s 
conversion action against J was rightful.  Assertion of constructive trust theory 
against B implies TO’s title to the jewel was validly conveyed to J. 
If TO chooses, TO can ignore B and can replevy the jewel from J, or sue J 
a second time in conversion.  But if TO has already recovered from B, TO 
forfeits the right to sue J on either theory.  The reason for this is that TO’s 
recovery in conversion from B constitutes the sale of TO’s rights to B.  Since B 
has already conveyed more than he had to J, B’s subsequently acquired title 
reverts to J under the doctrine of estoppel by deed.401  Thus, TO’s recovery from 
 
398. (1722) 1 Strange 505; see generally Luke Rostill, Relative Title and Deemed Ownership in 
English Personal Property Law, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2015). 
399. Armory (1722) 1 Strange 505 (K.B. 1722). 
400. Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 182 N.E. 235, 236 (N.Y. 1932); Cooper v. Shepherd (1846) 136 Eng. 
Rep. 107, 109; 3 C.B. 265, 269. 
401. See supra text accompanying notes 97–99. 
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B implies that J has a valid right of possession against J.  Similarly, if TO 
declares that B holds in trust the proceeds of B’s action against J, TO’s right 
against J fails.  Constructive trust is based on the idea of ratification.  If TO 
claims the proceeds of B’s judgment, TO is admitting (after the fact) that B’s 
wrong (the action against J) was in fact right.  Thus, B had authority to convey 
good title to J, and J’s possessory right becomes superior to that of TO. 
Applying these principles to Ponzi schemes, suppose, as in Cunningham v. 
Brown,402 all or nearly all of the funds of D Corp. are held in constructive trust 
for V.  D Corp. pays V1, using constructive trust funds.  D Corp. is bankrupt 
shortly thereafter, V1 cannot prove (or, per Cunningham, is not permitted to 
prove) that V1 is receiving the self-same funds D Corp. gulled V1 into investing.   
Contrary to Cannon or Boston Trading, D Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee brings a 
voidable preference action against V1. 
Suppose V1 pleads that D Corp. did not convey to V1 an equitable title.  D 
Corp. conveyed only the legal title.  V1’s equitable title in fact comes from, say, 
V2.  Or V1 pleads that, if the money does not belong to V2 or any identifiable V3 
or V4, it belongs to some Vi.  If this plea is permitted, then the trustee’s voidable 
preference claim falls apart.  Meanwhile, if V1 is a good faith creditor without 
knowledge of the Ponzi scheme, the cause of action in any V1 cannot be brought. 
V1 walks away free and clear.403 
V1’s plea, however, is a ius tertii—a claim that D Corp. was not the true 
owner of the equitable interest in the funds conveyed—some party not before 
the court was the owner.  Thus, V1 will not be heard to claim that D Corp. was 
the true owner.  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court is obliged to treat the funds 
transferred as entirely the property of D Corp. 404 
The irony of this principle is that D Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee is effectively 
stealing from the Vi when she recovers from V1.  The trustee’s voidable 
preference recovery is tortious against the Vi.  Suppose the trustee wins on ius 
tertii grounds.  As a result, the trustee takes property that rightfully can be traced 
to, say, V2.  The trustee is just like B in Armory: the mere assertion of ius tertii 
is a wrong.  As a result, the trustee has converted V2’s property and is liable for 
it. 
The trustee is like B in another respect.  B and the trustee both hope that TO 
will never appear and that they will reap the profit of their thefts.  In Ponzi 
litigation, this is a good, if ethically dubious, bet. 
 
402. 265 U.S. 1, 12 (1924). 
403. Carlson, Reconceptualization, supra note 295, at 538–39. 
404. Rine & Rine Auctioneers, Inc. v. Douglas Cty. Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Rine & Rine 
Auctioneers, Inc.), 74 F.3d 854, 862–63 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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Ius tertii appears in a classic case under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  In 
Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York v. Schorn,405 D embezzled money 
from her employer and did not surrender the funds to the bankruptcy trustee.   
The trustee sought to deny the debtor a discharge because the debtor “failed to 
explain satisfactorily losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet his 
liabilities.”406  D responded that she did not withhold estate property.  The 
property withheld really belonged to her employer.  The court found for the 
trustee: 
All we need do is to follow the common-law doctrine that 
possession and asserted dominion is good title “against all the 
world except the true owner” to reach the result that an 
explanation is here required, with appropriate penalty when it 
is not forthcoming.407 
Within the context of fraudulent transfer litigation, ius tertii has a history in 
various lower court bankruptcy cases.  The most prominent of these cases is 
Merrill v. Allen (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), where a bankruptcy 
trustee of a defunct pyramid scheme brought fraudulent conveyance actions 
against salesmen of Ponzi shares seeking a return of their sales commissions.408  
The dollars these salesmen received were fraudulently procured from the 
investors—though the salesmen were apparently not in on the fraud.409  The 
salesmen eventually prevailed because their commissions were in satisfaction 
of antecedent debt.  As such, they were transfers in exchange for reasonably 
equivalent value and hence not fraudulent transfers in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy.410 
Relevant here is the salesmen’s additional argument: that all funds were 
held in constructive trust for defrauded investors.  Hence, any payment to them 
was not “debtor” property for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 548(a).  Judge 
David Winder rejected this theory, reasoning that any given investor might 
rescind the investment and get back the identifiable dollars contributed.  But 
pending the appearance of an investor to do just that, the funds were the 
debtor’s, insofar as the salesmen were concerned.  Although the phrase ius tertii 
 
405. 135 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1943). 
406. Id. at 540. 
407. Id.; see also id. at 539 (“[A] bankrupt cannot refuse to turn over to his trustee assets of 
which he had assumed possession and dominion merely upon a showing that title to them is in a third 
person.”); see also Carlson, Reconceptualization, supra note 295, at 517–20 (theorizing voidable 
preference law in ius terti terms). 
408. 60 B.R. 985, 989 (D. Utah 1986). 
409. Id. at 989 n.3. 
410. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (2012). 
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never appears in Judge Winder’s opinion, it describes the result reached in 
Universal Clearing House.411 
Some courts describe the ius tertii principle as a matter of “standing.”412  
This seems to be an abuse of the notation, as the mathematicians would say.  
“Standing” is an attribute of plaintiffs.413  They must have standing to sue or 
they are out of court.  The illicit attempt to assert ius tertii is something 
defendants do.  The attempt, if successful, undermines an indispensable part of 
the plaintiff’s cause of action—namely, that D Corp. conveyed D Corp.’s own 
property (and not property of another).  Nevertheless, no confusion arises by 
calling the principle in question as one of “standing” to make a claim.  
“Standing” is just ius tertii by a different name. 
At least one court allowed its obsession with standing (or ius tertii) to 
obscure another outcome-determinative issue.  In McHale v. Boulder Capital 
LLC (In re The 1031 Tax Group, L.L.C.), D Corp. was a fiduciary for a set of 
clients (V).414  D Corp. was controlled by X.  X stole funds from D Corp. and 
(necessarily) from V.  X used these funds to pay his creditor Y for loans Y had 
made to X.  D Corp. soon went bankrupt, and D Corp.’s trustee415 sued Y for 
having received fraudulent transfers from D Corp.  
Y attempted to assert the forbidden ius tertii—D Corp. did not own the 
funds.  Rather (Y claimed) the clients V did.  Y did not have “standing” to make 
this claim,416 and so client funds were deemed to be D Corp. funds.  So far so 
good. 
What was overlooked in this case was the fact that X stole what we shall 
agree were D Corp. funds.  D Corp. therefore had a conversion cause of action 
against X.  D Corp. did not need a fraudulent transfer theory to recover these 
funds from X. 
 
411. Universal Clearing House, 60 B.R. at 994–96; see also Cassirer v. Sterling Nat’l Bank & 
Tr. Co. (In re Schick), 246 B.R. 41, 44–47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying the ius tertii principle). 
412. McHale v. Boulder Capital LLC (In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC), 439 B.R. 47, 62–63 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
413. Id. at 59 (“Every party in federal court must demonstrate proper standing to bring a case”). 
414. Id. at 53, 62–63. 
415. The trustee in this case was not, strictly speaking, a bankruptcy trustee.  Rather, a chapter 
11 plan had been confirmed, and all causes of action owned by the bankruptcy trustee, had been 
conveyed to the 1031 Debtors Liquidation Trust.  The plaintiff trustee was in charge of this post-
confirmation trust, not the pre-confirmation bankruptcy estate.  Id. at 55. 
416. Id. at 63.  The court could have evaded the issue of ius tertii.  The prohibited ius tertii 
defense is Y’s statement: any cause of action belongs to V not to D Corp.’s trustee.  A chapter 11 plan 
had been confirmed under which V conveyed their equitable interests to the postconfirmation debtor.  
Id. at 57.  Therefore, the trustee owned the right to enforce V’s rights against Y.  Ius tertii, even if 
permitted, was useless. 
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Ordinarily, a thief such as X can convey no title to a good faith purchaser 
such as Y.  But since we are dealing with funds, X has power to “negotiate” the 
stolen property to Y.  Thus, Y took D Corp.’s funds free and clear of D Corp.’s 
ownership rights. 
By characterizing the case as a fraudulent transfer, the trustee got away with 
something.  The trustee was able to characterize Y as the initial transferee of D 
Corp.’s fraudulent transfer.417  Y’s defense therefore had to fall within the 
purview of Bankruptcy Code § 548(c), which provides: 
[A] transferee . . . of such a [fraudulent] transfer . . . that takes 
for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any 
interest transferred . . . to the extent that such 
transferee . . . gave value to the debtor in exchange for such 
transfer . . . 418 
Satisfaction of an antecedent debt is considered value,419 Y’s problem was 
that this was value given to X, not “to the debtor.”420  Therefore, transfixed by 
the ius tertii question, the court overlooked the fact that this was no fraudulent 
transfer case.  If it is not a fraudulent transfer case, then Bankruptcy 
Code § 550(a) did not apply.  If § 550(a) did not apply, then Y’s receipt of 
payment on X’s debt constituted a good faith purchaser defense.  
In effect, by characterizing the case as a fraudulent transfer, the trustee was 
denying that X was a thief. Rather, the trustee implied that X was a faithful agent 
authorized by D Corp. to convey D Corp. property to Y.  But this was quite 
contrary to the facts.421 
Another case in which ius tertii misled the court into an unjust result was 
Taylor Associates v. Diamant (In re Advent Management Corp),422 D Corp. was 
 
417. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2012).  Actually, D Corp. sent the funds to an escrow agent, which 
then sent the funds to Y.  In re 1031 Tax Grp., 439 B.R. at 54–55.  The court elected to ignore the 
transfer to the escrow agent as a transfer on the grounds that the escrow agent was a mere conduit.  Id. 
at 69.  I have argued against the wisdom of using this phrase.  Carlson, Conduit, supra note 1.  In fact, 
the phrase covers a variety of property ideas.  Here it would be appropriate to say that D Corp. 
transferred to the escrow agent in exchange for which the escrow agent promised to follow instructions.  
Later, D Corp. instructed the agent to pay Y.  Properly, what Y received was the agent’s obligation to 
pay.  The escrow agent was an initial transferee of D Corp. funds.  But what Y received was D Corp.’s 
right to be paid by the escrow agent.  So analyzed, we can dispense with the fiction that the escrow 
agent was not a transferee. 
418. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (emphasis added). 
419. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (“‘[V]alue means . . . satisfaction . . . of . . . antecedent 
debt.”). 
420. In re 1031 Tax Group, LLC, 439 B.R. at 73. 
421. Id. at 53 (“it is undisputed that the funds were stolen.”). 
422. 178 B.R. 480 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 104 F.3d 293 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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the shareholder of V Corp.  D Corp. managed the affairs of V Corp.  D Corp. 
“diverted” V Corp. funds, commingling those funds with D Corp. funds (which 
also came from V Corp. in the form of managerial fees).  One of V Corp.’s 
creditors was C.  D Corp. paid C, there by discharging V Corp.’s debt.  D Corp. 
was soon bankrupt.  D Corp.’s trustee claimed C received D Corp. property as 
a fraudulent transfer.  When C tried to claim that the cash was from V Corp., 
ius tertii enjailed C’s tongue, doubly portcullised by his teeth and lips. 
Ius tertii misled the court into overlooking an obvious solution in C’s favor.   
Let us concede that D Corp. used its own funds to pay C.  D Corp. received 
something valuable from C.  Through subrogation, D Corp. bought C’s right 
against V Corp.  If V Corp. was solvent, then this subrogation right was a dollar-
for-dollar reasonably equivalent value.423  C therefore did not receive a 
fraudulent transfer of D’s property.  Later, if D’s bankruptcy trustee were to 
enforce C’s claim against V Corp., pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 542(b), V 
Corp. could assert a valid setoff, as D Corp. either converted V Corp. funds or 
owed the money for V Corp.’s “loan.” 
Ius tertii is powerful point when worlds collide.  But the dazzling brilliance 
of the point should not be permitted to occlude other decisive factors. 
Where X is silenced by invocation of ius tertii, what if V intervenes and tries 
to assert equitable title?  Then V is a party before the court and ius tertii ceases 
to apply.  Between D’s bankruptcy trustee and V, the court should award 
identifiable constructive trust property to V. 
This obvious principle was recently ignored by the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Darr v. Dos Santos (In re TelexFree, LLC).424  Simplifying the facts 
of the case, D defrauded funds from V and instructed V to deposit the funds with 
X, in payment of claims X had against D.  D filed for bankruptcy, and the 
bankruptcy trustee sued X for fraudulent transfer and voidable preference.  V 
(in the guise of a class action) brought unjust enrichment claims directly against 
X.  The bankruptcy trustee responded with an adversary proceeding seeking an 
injunction (in supplement to the automatic stay) preventing V from suing X. 
Properly, V was not in violation of the automatic stay.  D had neither legal 
nor equitable title to the funds.  D (via the agency of V) had conveyed legal title 
to X and V all the while retained equitable title.  True, D had conveyed the 
valueless legal title in the funds to X.  But being valueless this transfer was not 
fraudulent.425  Nor was the transfer a voidable preference.  The Supreme Court 
 
423. On subrogation as a routine defense in tripartite fraudulent transfer cases, see Carlson, 
Conduit, supra note 1, at 536–40. 
424. 941 F.3d 576, 579–82 (1st Cir. 2019). 
425. See supra text accompanying notes 293–294. 
 
CARLSON_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:45 PM 
2019] CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 453 
itself has ruled that the use of constructive trust funds to pay a debt is not a 
voidable preference.426 
The First Circuit, however, ruled that the automatic stay applied because D 
had an interest in X’s funds.  But didn’t D transfer all interest to X prior to 
bankruptcy?  Yes, but the TelexFree court insinuated that the transfer to X was 
a fraudulent transfer on ius tertii grounds.  The transfer was voidable, not 
void.427  This is a good point to silence X, but it is utterly invalid to silence V 
from asserting V’s own equitable interest in X’s funds. 
The Court of Appeals also denied that constructive trust and fraudulent 
transfer constitutes separate worlds.  They are the same world, the court 
thought.  Thus V’s claim was held to be “derivative” of the bankruptcy trustee’s 
fraudulent transfer cause of action. 
The bankruptcy court ruled that the unjust enrichment claims 
brought by [V] are derivative of the trustee’s Avoidance 
Actions because they seek to accomplish the same thing as the 
trustee’s actions and to go about it the same way.  That 
is . . . [V’s] efforts to prove unjust enrichment will not focus on 
any supposed wrongdoing by individual [X].  Rather, [V] seeks 
to prove its unjust enrichment case through the overall 
fraudulent scheme created by [D].  That is what the trustee 
seeks to do. 
 . . .  
But for the reasons just discussed, under the framework 
adopted by the bankruptcy court, the unjust enrichment claims 
are best understood as avoidance actions in disguise.  The 
bankruptcy estate as a whole was harmed, not any individual 
[V].428 
Everything in this passage is contestable.  A fraudulent transfer is 
completely distinguishable from an unjust enrichment claim.  In a fraudulent 
transfer case, D has both legal and equitable title to a thing.  D conveys it to X 
in hindrance of the unsecured creditors.  The transfer is the fraud.  But in an 
unjust enrichment case, D’s acquisition of the thing is the fraud.  The later 
transfer of legal title to X is not a fraud.  D’s acquisition of legal title to the thing 
has no effect on the unsecured creditors.  If anything, D’s acquisition positively 
benefited D’s unsecured creditors, if the constructive trust principle is negated.  
If the constructive trust is recognized, the bankruptcy estate was definitely not 
 
426. Begier v. Internal Revenue Service, 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990).  The case involved the 
surrender of trust property to the beneficiary of the trust.  Id.  The case, however, should also govern 
here, where D paid X with V’s money. 
427. 941 F.3d at 584. 
428. Id. at 588. 
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harmed because V’s equitable interest never would have entered the bankruptcy 
estate.  V’s cause of action in no way conflicts with the trustee’s fraudulent 
transfer action, mainly because the trustee’s fraudulent transfer action does not 
even exist. 
TelexFree must be counted as a case in which the limits of ius tertii were 
transgressed because V was entirely before the court and yet was not permitted 
to assert V’s equitable interest in X’s funds.  Indeed, the case probably stands 
(like Omegas) for the negation of constructive trust doctrine in bankruptcy 
cases.429 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that, in the liquidation of Ponzi schemes, two worlds 
collide—the world of constructive trust and the contradictory world of 
fraudulent transfer.  Ponzi schemes are largely made up of constructive trust 
funds.  When Ponzi debtors have conveyed trust funds to bad faith third parties 
or to donees, we are in the world of constructive trusts.  Yet courts have 
presumed themselves to be in the world of fraudulent transfers.  A fraudulent 
transfer, however, requires a debtor to convey legal and equitable to title to the 
third party.  A Ponzi debtor conveys only legal title.  Equitable title stays with 
the victims of the fraud. 
If asked, trustees would respond with a practical observation.  If the trustee 
does not sue the third party, no one will, as the victims of a Ponzi scheme are 
too disorganized to trace their trust property into the hands of a given third 
party.  On a doctrinal level, bankruptcy trustees may claim that tracing is 
impossible or too expensive.  Since tracing is impossible, the trust disappears, 
and the Ponzi debtor really is transferring debtor property in a fraudulent 
transfer. 
I have pointed out the self-serving nature of the factual claim that tracing is 
impossible.  Instead, the principle of ius tertii better justifies continued 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over Ponzi schemes.  But even this better rationale 
involves the expropriation of victim property.  Where tracing is indeed possible, 
the bankruptcy trustee, after recovering, should properly disgorge trust property 
to its true owners, when and if they intervene. 
My final observation is that denying standing to a trustee in Ponzi cases is 
unwise.  But so is denying fraud victims their constructive trust remedy. 
SIPA430 avoids the dilemma by giving the SIPC trustee standing to recover 
embezzlements for the benefit of the class of victims as if embezzlements were 
 
429. See supra text accompanying notes 139–55. 
430. See supra text accompanying notes 293–297. 
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fraudulent transfers.  An expansion of bankruptcy trustee standing in a similar 
fashion makes a lot of common sense. 
 
